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ABSTRACT

Until recently, Kenya was considered an icon, a bastion of political stability and
economic growth in East Africa and Africa in general. Forty-four years after gaining
independence, and fifteen years since the beginning of multiparty democracy, the ruling elite
touted this exceptionalism to conceal the historical grievances of marginalized communities.
Given this background, the electoral violence experienced between December 2007 and March
2008 came as a surprise to many. Much scholarship on the topic focuses on the immediate
triggers such as voting irregularities rather than the underlying conditions that existed prior to the
violence. In this study, I attempt to identify the root causes of the electoral violence in Kenya by
focusing on two main areas of historical marginalization: class and ethnic marginalization. The
Kenyan crisis helps show some lessons for pan-African world.
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Definitions of Terms
•

Mwakenya: a political publication by University lecturers termed “subversive” by the state in
mid 1980s.

•

Waki Report (2008) Republic of Kenya: the popular name for Commission of Inquiry into
Post-Election Violence. It was set up by the Coalition Government to investigate the facts
and circumstances surrounding the Kenyan post-election violence.

•

Coalition Government: an arrangement of power-sharing between two Kenyan political
parties, PNU (headed by President Kibaki) and ODM (headed by Raila Odinga), leading to
what Kenyans see as a ‘hybrid’ type of government.

•

The Ndungu Report (2004) Republic of Kenya: a commission set up by the Kibaki regime to
investigate patterns of corruption and unfair allocations of land.

•

Historical injustices: unresolved grievances in Kenya dating back to the colonial times and
the period immediately after independence.

•

Akiwumi Report (1999) Republic of Kenya: the report of the judicial commission appointed
by the Moi regime to inquire into the ethnic clashes in Kenya.

•

Jeshi la Mzee: an informal security outfit of party youth that was maintained by the ruling
party, KANU, in the 90s, and whose main role was to harass the opposition, the civil society
groups and anyone else they viewed as being anti-Moi.

•

PEV: acronym for Post-Election Violence
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MAP OF KENYA

	
  

Source: International Crisis Group, Africa Report N°137, 21 February 20
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
	
  

1.1 The Problem
This thesis is about the 2007 electoral violence in Kenya. Kenya gained independence
from Great Britain in 1963, and from then up until 2002 it was ruled by the political party Kenya
African National Union (KANU). Post-colonial Kenya was ruled by the iron hands of two men
in succession from 1963 to 2002, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Arap Moi (19782002). KANU’s dominance was achieved by banning opposition parties in 1969, moving Kenya
from a de facto one-party state to a de jure one-party state when a constitutional amendment in
1978 ruled that no other party was able to contest the elections (Nyawalo, 2011, p.14). In 1991
after much pressure from Kenyan activists and the international community multi-party elections
were re-introduced.
In 2002, there was a change in political leadership. That year, KANU, the country’s
ruling political party since independence was defeated, by a new political party: National
Rainbow Coalition (NARC), formed by an alliance between the major Kenyan tribes as well as
some of the marginalized communities. NARC came to power as the new coalition government
promising to reform the existing constitution by limiting the executive power (presidency), while
creating checks and balances between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government (Adebayo, 2012, p.69). It also sought a power-sharing arrangement that would
introduce the position of prime minister, put an end to corruption, tribalism, and bring about an
equitable uplift of the living conditions for all Kenyans regardless of their ethnicity. They also
promised to provide free primary education.
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However, most of these promises were not kept. Corruption, cronyism and partisanship
manifested in public offices (Adebayo, 2012, p.70). The constitution remained intact, and there
was a lack of progressive reforms, such as institutionalizing transparency and accountability in
public spheres. Kibaki’s government designated numerous positions to his fellow tribesmen,
which in turn provoked genuine resentment among the marginalized communities and also
cemented the underlying causes of the 2007 post-election violence.
The 2007 general elections included parliamentary, presidential, and civic elections.
Three main political parties emerged. The Party of National Union (PNU) was led by the
incumbent President Mwai Kibaki; Kenya’s current president Uhuru Kenyatta led the KANU
party, and the opposition leader Raila Odinga formed ODM (Orange Democratic Movement).
Despite some incidences of hate speech during the campaign period, the Election Day went
forward without violent eruptions. On 30 December 2007, as vote tallying proceeded, suspicions
of major rigging by the electoral commission mounted. Odinga, the main opposition leader, was
leading the polls by 370,000 votes with 90 percent of the constituencies reporting (Adebayo,
2012, p.78). Ultimately he was announced the loser by 200,000 votes. Hours after the
announcement of this highly controversial outcome, the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)
declared incumbent Mwai Kibaki of PNU re-elected as the President of Kenya (Lafargue, 2009,
p.51). The use of state power to perpetrate electoral fraud led to protests against electoral rigging.
The swearing in ceremony was only witnessed by a few political backers and was not
broadcast on television. ODM supporters immediately disputed the declared outcome of the
presidential elections. Independent bodies that had observed the elections, including the
European Union, the Commonwealth Observer Group, and the East African Community group,
reported major flaws in the tallying of the presidential votes. Furthermore, the ECK chairman’s
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statements, before and after the announcement of the results, cast serious doubts on the
credibility of the presidential tallies.
Violence erupted simultaneously throughout the country, taking everyone by surprise.
The violence first seemed to be spontaneous; however, it soon became more organized and
premeditated as local gangs took over (Murunga, 2011, p.15). The country descended into chaos
and violence left at least 1,162 people dead and about 350,000 others displaced from their homes
in a matter of just over a month. Gross violations of human rights took place in different parts of
the country, particularly in Western, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Nairobi and the Coast provinces.
Kenya has the reputation of being one of the very few “stable” states in Africa. However,
retrospective glances at the historical events marking its political landscape reflect deep-lying
violent structures that have been left unchecked for a very long time (Beigon, 2009, p.18).
Horrified by the violence and the Kenyan government’s failure to protect civilians,
regional and international actors responded swiftly. A swarm of mediators descended upon
Kenya including President John Kufour of Ghana, Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, Mozambique’s Graça Machel, amongst others. Eventually, both parties entered into
negotiations with a panel consisting of former UN-Secretary Kofi Annan (Nyawalo, p.15, 2011).
The aim of the negotiations was to (1) take immediate action to stop the violence and restore
fundamental rights and liberties; (2) address the humanitarian crisis and promote reconciliation,
healing and restoration of calm; (3) overcome the political crisis; and (4) address long-term
issues and the root causes of the conflict, including constitutional, legal and institutional reforms.
The negotiations also set in motion a process of examining the institutional deficits that had
contributed to the violence. Three commissions were established to identify contributing factors
and develop policy recommendations to address them:
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•

The Independent Review Commission on the 2007 Elections (IREC), also known as the
Kriegler Commission, mandated to review the electoral process.

•

The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the
Waki Commission, mandated to analyze the factors contributing to the electoral violence
and

•

The National Task Force on Police Reform, mandated to review the conduct of the
police.

A political compromise was reached that saw the two opposing parties sign a National
Accord. One of the products of the Kofi-Annan-led mediation effort that brokered a powersharing deal in late February 2008 was the formation of CIPEV. Kenyan judge Philip Waki
chaired the commission. Waki passed the official Waki commission report to Kofi Annan with
the list of names of those considered most responsible for the violence (Murunga & Shadrck,
2007, p.152). One of the many suggestions in the official report was that the Kenyan government
establish a tribunal of both international and national judges to investigate and prosecute
perpetrators of the gross human rights violations (Biegon, 2009), p.19). The commission gave
the government a limited amount of time to agree to create a special tribunal, and made it clear
that the commission would give its findings to the ICC if the government failed to establish the
tribunal within the given timeframe. The public opted for the ICC to investigate the case for
various reasons, including lack of faith in the local judicial system (Njogu, 2009, p.85). In
February 2009, after the Kenyan Parliament voted against founding a tribunal and no further
action was taken by the government, the Waki Commission handed over its information,
including a list of those believed to be responsible for the violence, to the ICC.
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This stalemate by the government prompted Louis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC prosecutor at
that time, to investigate the Kenyan situation. On 26 November 2009, the Prosecutor requested
permission from the court to investigate the crimes against humanity, and was granted
permission to do so by the majority of the court. The summons was issued, on March 8, 2011.
On January 23, 2012, charges were confirmed against Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta,
Industrialization Minister and opposition leader Henry Kosgey, top opposition leader and former
Education Minister William Ruto, former police commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali, Cabinet
Secretary Francis Muthaura and executive radio broadcaster Joshua Arap Sang (Arieff, 2010).
The prosecutor presented the charges to Pre-Trial Chamber II as two separate cases. One case
was the prosecution of Ali, Kenyatta, and Mathaura, and the second case was the prosecution of
Kosgey, Ruto, and Sang. The six suspects, known colloquially as the "Ocampo six” were
indicted by the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber II on 8 March 2011 and summoned to appear before the
Court (Smith, 2009, p.12). They were accused of being indirect cooperators at different locations
particularly within the Rift Valley and major cities such as Nairobi, Nakuru, Kisumu and
Mombasa. Their charges were murder, deportation or forcible transfer of a population, torture,
persecution, rape and other forms of sexual violence. Sang was accused of thumping up ethnic
hatred on the airwaves and planning attacks along with Kosgey and Ruto.
The government of Kenya and the National Assembly both attempted to stop the ICC
process. The government appealed to both the United Nations Security Council and the Court
itself regarding the admissibility of the case. The National Assembly voted in favor of removing
Kenya as a state party to the Rome Statute, the international treaty that established the ICC.
Despite this opposition, the suspects cooperated with the proceedings and attended preliminary
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hearings in The Hague in April 2011 and confirmation of charges hearings in September of that
year.
After carrying out investigations against six prominent individuals believed to be
responsible for the crimes against humanity, the International Criminal Court investigation in
Kenya decided to send three of them to trial. Charges against Ali, Kosgey and Muthaura were
dropped; while those against William Ruto and Joshua Sang are on-going. Kenya’s current
President Uhuru Kenyatta was released for lack of sufficient evidence.
Kenya has remained central to the economic and security of East Africa. As neighboring
countries faced social turmoil and political decay, Kenya maintained its position as beacon of
political stability. The post-electoral violence that engulfed Kenya in 2007 marked the end of its
regional uniqueness. It raised profound questions regarding the solidity and stability of the
regional hegemon. To many scholars and analyst the profundity of Kenya’s post-election
political and humanitarian crisis has not been investigated enough. In fact 2007 post-0election
violence remains a puzzle to many. It is this puzzle that I attempt to investigate in this study.
1.2 Objective and Interest of Study
The existing literature on Post-Election Violence tends to focus on the immediate triggers
of the violence such as rigging or election fraud as opposed to examining the predisposing
conditions that existed prior to the conflict. Of course, this approach does have its place in
political analysis. Nevertheless, my objective in this research is to analyze the deeper issues
surrounding the post-election violence, because even if presidential elections had not been
rigged, violence may still have occurred. Explaining the deeper causes of the violence has the
potential of contributing more to African politics.
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The majority of studies on post-election violence have focused on cross-country
comparisons, or on the usual “hot spots” such as Rift Valley, where the land question was
heated. This gives a fragmented view of what is taking place in the society as whole because it
limits the understanding of the risk factors for violence. It is evident from my observations that
even so-called “peaceful” areas in the Kenyan context contain latent but very volatile elements
likely to explode at the slightest provocation. For example the urban areas such as Nairobi, the
capital city, Mombasa, and Kisumu, experience similar violent eruptions although not considered
“hotspot” areas like Rift Valley. Therefore, my objective is to link other potential violent areas to
my main hypothesis.
Such a deep understanding of the event and its consequences have implications for
Kenya’s political development and the Pan-African world. I am interested in providing insight to
policy makers and possible recommendations to the existing reforms and policies. The study
draws from a wealth of historical, political, economic, demographic and socio-cultural sources to
analyze factors that underlay the post-election violence and that may still place hurdles in the
path of durable peace, improved democratic dispensation and equitable division of the national
cake in Kenya. Furthermore, this study will contribute to existing literature on PEV by
interweaving various theoretical frameworks such as democratization, institutionalism, ethnic
conflict and class analysis which are indeed relevant to understanding the issues surrounding the
political violence.
Last but not least, this study may serve to increase awareness among the general public
and particularly the government officials who have vested interests in understanding the
historical underpinnings of conflicts in Kenya.
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Although the 2007 election had various implications and affected various social groups.
This study does not address all those groups. For example, the question of women’s role in postelection violence. The study also fails to address the role of trade unions in Kenya’s struggle for
democracy. Though these groups played a critical role and they are equally interesting to
investigate, my research topic focuses on mobilization of ethnic differences and socio-economic
marginalization of large segments of society.

1.3 Research Question
The above statement of the problem may raise a range of questions such as:
•

How did the lack of constitutional order and institutions impact the outcome of
elections in Kenya?

The existing reports by commissions of inquiry such as the Waki report and political
statements made by scholars such as Professor Yash Ghai suggest that this is the central
question. Waki’s report asserted that constant and systematic violation of the constitution may
have triggered post-electoral violence. The report blamed the subordination of the independent
electoral commission, the police, and the judiciary to the executive power as a breach of rule of
law, since they did not exercise their power as an independent entity (Ghai, 2009, p.3).
Proponents of constitutionalism/institutionalism may argue that constitutional vacuity was the
underlying cause of the violence. Lack of a culture of constitutionalism has engendered the
politics of ethno-regional exclusion and negative competition by vesting immense powers in the
office of the presidency, minimizing public participation, and rendering state institutions
ineffective (Ghai, 2009, p.3)
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On the other hand, Professor Ghai argues that blaming a “bad constitution” for enormous
powers vested in the office of, or illegally appropriated by, the president; the centralization of
power in Nairobi; the lack of public participation; the lack of autonomy, effectiveness and
legitimacy of state institutions is not the challenge facing Kenya. Instead it is the idea of
establishing constitutional order. Enactment of a constitution is distinct from the adherence to its
values, institutions and procedures. A constitution by itself makes no difference. Kenyan society
determines the extent to which the constitution will be observed, manipulated, or disregarded,
and therefore the extent to which constitutional reforms will have meaning. The notion of
constitutional order is broader than merely the text of the constitution. It represents a
fundamental commitment to the principles and procedures of the constitution and therefore
emphasizes behavior, practice, and internalization of norms (Ghai, 2009, p.4).
For these reasons, implementing a constitution is not about this or that provision, or even the
totality of the constitution, important as these are. It is about the inculcation of a culture of
respect for and discipline of the law, acceptance of rulings by the courts and other bodies
authorized to interpret the law, giving effect to judicial decisions, acceptance of the limits on the
government, respecting and promoting human and collective rights, and equally important the
participation and empowerment of the people (Ghai, 2009, p.5). Ultimately the people have to be
guardians of the constitution. He concludes that the future of the Kenyan state as a viable entity
lies in entrenching a culture of constitutionalism within state-society relations.	
  These arguments
will be discussed as part of my conceptual/theoretical framework of institutionalism, but I do not
consider them the central issues. They do not help me achieve my primary objective, which is to
gain a deeper understanding of the underlying causes.
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Other questions that can be asked concern the violence itself.
•

What role did symbolic, invisible, visible and structural state-violence play? Was
the violence spontaneous or premeditated?

In the article, “Invisible Violence in Kenya: A case study of Rift Valley and Western
Regions,” Nyawalo investigate the role of symbolic violence in Kenya’s post-election violence
(Nyawalo et.al, 2011, p.6). This question led them to explore new areas of analysis, which in turn
enabled them to uncover violent structures within the Kenyan socio-political system. Mainstream
literature on electoral violence focuses on the relationship between violence and its visibility, or
violence and morality, thus indirectly placing symbolic violence as a secondary category. Yet,
symbolic violence adds a dimension to visible violence, without which the latter would generally
not be possible. The argument they advance is that for one to understand the dynamics of visible
violence – that is, the outbreak of war, riot or electoral violence – one needs to start by reexamining the invisible aspect of violence because it fuels, organizes and sustains visible
violence (Nyawalo, 2011, p.20). According to mainstream writers, focusing on the
visible/physical aspects of violence only serves to maintain the cycle of violence (Nyawalo,
2011, p.36). There are two types of invisible violence: structural and symbolic violence.
Structural (invisible) violence is associated with state structures and other institutional practices
that violate people’s social and political rights. Symbolic violence may be viewed as a form of
domination wherein the dominators have shifted their power from overt coercion to symbolic
manipulation. In other words, dominators are able to impose meanings on things and at the same
time legitimize their power by concealing the underlying relations. One needs to emphasize the
fact that as a form of domination, symbolic violence is exercised in an unrecognized manner
because it is fully normalized within the socio-historical setting. It is within this context that
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ethnicity in the Kenyan setting provides a framework for subtle symbolic violence (Nyawalo
et.al. 2011, p.52). From the Kenyan experience, we have seen how negative forms of ethnicity
easily assume a natural state of being and can therefore be ignored, even as they continue to hold
together and perpetuate archaic systems and violent structures. Ethnicity, deconstructed and
viewed from within the context, turned out to be a mythical invention of the British colonialists,
with no parallel within the social realities on the ground.
The second aspect of symbolic violence discussed in the article is symbolic capitalism. The
material manifestations of symbolic violence are connected to the enlightenment sociopolitical
project of “personal improvement” or “attaining a state of civility” (Nywalo et al. 2011 p.53).
The notion of human progress and personal improvement “up the social ladder” is ingrained
within the Western philosophic tradition, particularly the British tradition. For the British, the
central feature of personal improvement philosophy was intricately connected to the land,
because its proponents perceived that land could be consciously refashioned in a manner that
would simultaneously increase its value and transfigure the human condition – the landed
gentleman was the epitome of “civility” and self-worth (Nyawalo et al. 2011, p.55). The analogy
of this situation to the Kenyan one is quite significant. In the nineteenth century the British came
to Kenya to civilize the natives. They started off their mission by denigrating everything that was
African and assigning symbolic meanings to things, especially material possessions. One’s social
status and personal worth gained value by virtue of possessing these western products. The
Kenyan elite were exposed to the British culture and education thus absorbing the “civilizing”
ideas of acquiring land and serving the capitalist system through the production of cheap labor
and consumerism of western goods (Nyawalo, 2011, p.57). These questions are important in
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their own right. Because they raise issues of state structure, ethnicity and capitalism, they are
addressed in chapter three.
In light of the above, my core research question is:
Why was the post-election violence in Kenya’s 2007 general election so sudden and
generalized? What were the underlying causes?
1.4 Literature Review and Hypothesis
1.4.1 Electoral Violence Defined
Elections are the mechanisms by which public questions are resolved and public contests
are determined. An electoral process is an alternative to violence as a means of achieving
governance (Murunga, 2010, p.8). When an electoral process is perceived as unfair,
unresponsive, or corrupt, its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated
to go outside of the established norms to achieve their objectives. Electoral conflict and violence
become tactics in political competition. In the context of this study, I will be focusing on
electoral violence as a category of political violence. Understanding the concept and criteria of
electoral violence helps to differentiate it from general political violence. Therefore, it is
imperative that I define electoral violence prior to discussing my hypothesis.
In his book, Comparing Apples and Mangoes: The Overpoliticized State in Developing
Countries, S.N. Sangmpam provides a clear definition of electoral violence as any act involving
actual or threatened physical coercion. Such acts may occur at different stages of the electoral
process: before, during or after elections. Additionally, he argues that such acts are committed by
those who seek to make their position prevail and to express their disagreement over the outcome
of the competition by intimidating or silencing the opposition. “Among its manifestations are
violent disruptions of elections through burning or other forms of violence, organized armed
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confrontations, kidnappings, death, and, as a corollary in many cases, military surveillance of
elections” (Sangmpam, 2007, p.46). Other scholars who seek to explain election-related violence
have summed it as:
“Any spontaneous or organized act by candidates, party supporters, election authorities, voters,
or any other actor/stakeholders that occurs during an electoral process, from the date of voter
registration to the date of inauguration of a new government, that uses physical harm,
intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or
other coercive tactics aimed at exploiting, disrupting, determining, hastening, delaying,
reversing, or otherwise influencing an electoral process and its outcome.” (Fischer,2002,
p.15)
As defined, electoral violence in Kenya can be explained through the lenses of three
conceptual frameworks. I briefly review them before discussing my hypothesis.
1.4.2 Conceptual Framework
Democratization and institutionalism:

There are various types of democracy. In this research I will focus on liberal democracy.
Howard Handleman defines democracy as “a political system in which most of the country’s
leading government officials are elected; there is nearly universal suffrage; elections are largely
free of fraud or manipulation, frequent, and competitive; opposition party candidates have a real
chance of being elected to important national offices; and minority rights as well as general civic
liberties are respected, including free speech and free press” (Handleman, 2013, p.24). Godwin
Murunga asserts that these prerequisites are necessary for democracy to be realized within the
institutional guarantees. The more a country approximates these institutional guarantees, the
more democratic it is. Liberal democracy emphasizes a separation of powers into different
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branches of government, the rule of law in everyday life as part of an open society, and the equal
protection of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, accountability and political freedoms for
all persons (Mutua, 2008, p.12).
Liberal democracy focuses on the individual whose claims are ultimately placed above
those of the group. It replaces the government by the people with government based on the
consent of the people. Instead of sovereignty of the people it offers the sovereignty of “law” and
operates by repudiating the very idea of popular power (Murunga, 2007, p.38).
The democratization of Africa gathered momentum in the 1990s and has continued to
date. Many factors have been suggested for this new wave. The end of the cold war and the
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in late 1989. This produced extensive scholarship on
democratization and capitalism giving pre-eminence to western institutions. Different theoretical
frameworks have been used to explain the liberal democratic state in the West and the variant
state in the non-West. These frameworks can be broadly categorized as institutional explanations
and non-institutional explanations. Proponents of universalism assume that western-like
institutions as practiced in liberal democratic states ought to be applied or rather emulated in
non-western countries. By assuming their evolution toward Western-like institutions, Third
World countries were seen as experiencing similar “growing pains” of the West during its earlier
development (Sangmpam, 2007, p.64). Samuel Huntington (1968, p.32), for example, argued
that, contrary to what modernization theory proclaims, the modernization process will not always
result in political stability in other countries as it did in the West. He writes, “throughout Asia,
Africa, and Latin America there was a decline in political order… Not political development but
political decay dominated the scene” (Huntington, 1968, p.34). Thus, modernization in these
countries brought about political instability, military coups d’état, and other acts of violence.
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This discrepancy between the West and non-West, according to Huntington, is due to the lack of
institutionalized institutions in non-Western countries.
Another factor that contributed to the success of democratization in the second phase
was the transition of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in
2002 (Adebayo, 2012, p.11). One of the criticisms of the defunct Organization of African Unity
was its insistence on the non-intervention in domestic affairs of member states. AU altered the
interpretation of the non-intervention principle through the Constitutive Act providing that
“governments which shall come to power though unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to
participate in the activities of the union.” (Adebayo, 2012, p.71) Such continental pressures have
helped to fecundate the ground for democratization in the continent.
Huntington described global democratization as coming in three waves, the first
beginning in the early 19th century and the third being the current one. Developing countries
have played a significant role in the world’s most sweeping transition from authoritarianism to
democracy or semi-democracy. However, for a country to become democratic it must undergo
three logical phases (1) Destruction of the non-democratic regime-authoritarian; (2) Inauguration
of democratic institutions, that is, democratic transition is usually associated with the conduct of
credible elections; and (3) Cultural and social consolidation of the democratic regime. This is
evidenced by the entrenchment of a democratic ethos (Handleman, 2013, p.24). Only when
democratic institutions, practices have become entrenched in society can we say that a country
has experienced democratic consolidation (Handleman, 2013, p. 25). Unfortunately, not all
transitions to democracy are subsequently consolidated. For example the African continent has
experienced many countries reverting to dictatorship or merely becoming mired in political
disorder.
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Most democratization scholars agree that real democracy requires not only free and fair
elections or proper governance but also fair and just government policy/outcomes. Proper
governance or free and fair elections are seen as the procedures while equal access school and
health care by all citizens is seen as policy outcomes or rather substantive democracy. In his
book, Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan (2008), Makau Mutua asserts that
African states suffer from a deficit of democracy because most government’s focus on the
procedures such as free fair election while policy outcomes like healthcare or education are
ignored or devalued (Mutua, 2012, p.10). Drawing from Kenya’s struggle for democracy he
emphasizes the need for the fundamental reconstruction of the state beyond the traditional
panacea of holding multiparty elections or strengthening legislature to ensure the betterment of
the social and economic conditions. Social and economic injustices threaten democratic
consolidation. Because without improved social conditions democratic governments may be
unable to continue commanding the support of the masses.
In conclusion, on the basis of the literature on democratization and institutionalism one
may argue that political violence may occur when there is lack or weakness of institutions; or, it
may occur because of failure in socio-economic fairness as suggested by Makau Mutua.
Election-related violence threatens the development and consolidation of democracy. In
countries where violence is a regular feature of the democratic process, democratic values and
institutions are prevented from developing because power is gained and retained through
violence. Where a government is perceived to have come to power through irregularities as
happened in Kenya, its legitimacy is then questionable, and it will likely have problems. Imperial
constitution failed to entrench democratization.
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Ethnicity:

The definition of ethnicity is varied and complex. Ethnicity is sometimes equated with tribe.
Handleman defines ethnic identity as “a social construction – a way that certain groups have
come to view themselves as distinct from others over time – rather than an inherent or
primordial characteristic” (Handleman, 2013, p.78). It can also be seen as “A group of people
united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors”
(Handleman, 2013, p.79). The primary factor that distinguishes one ethnic group from other
groups is the symbolism they employ. Ethnic groups uphold cultural symbolism, expressing their
cohesiveness. The symbolism is characterized by one or more of the following: “collective myths
of origin; the assertion of ties of kinship or blood, be they real or putative; a mythology
expressive of the cultural uniqueness or superiority of the group; and a conscious elaboration of
language and heritage” (Bates, 1983, p.153). In addition, ethnic groups differ from other social
groups in their composition; they include persons from every stage of life and every socioeconomic level. The third distinction is that each group be it ethnic or class requires definitional
and analytical tools that use an empirical base to support the evidence on the ground. In other
words, the distinctions ought to be contextually rooted.
The issue of ethnicity needs to be addressed in this research mainly because numerous
reports and literature on election-related violence have mentioned it as a fundamental cause of
electoral violence. It also needs to be addressed because the issue of marginalization from
political power can be analyzed using ethnic-politicization as well as ethnic-class analysis. Yet,
many scholars deny ethnicity either because it does not cohere with their theoretical or
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ideological positions, or because it is not measurable. There is a long-standing debate and a
growing body of literature on the existence of ethnic consciousness, the distinction between the
terms, ethnicity or “tribe” and the implication of the terms for the African situation (Sangmpam,
Opening Old Wounds –forthcoming). Ethnic affiliations may be soft or fluid in different
societies, and they can change over time. They are not always “given” or primordial as suggested
by certain schools of thought. For example, in certain cases the techniques of exploitation of
nature, history, religion and spatial organization determine ethnic identity. Political factors are
equally as important in the process of ethnic identification, as economic ones. The fluidity,
heterogeneity, and complexity of processes of identity and group formation fuels this debate
(Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.66).
It is important to note that ethnic groups need not be tribes. The term “tribe” is associated
with rural communities or groups that are governed through traditional political structures, to
which the people have an obligation. On the other hand, ethnic groups need not be based on
traditional political institutions; rather, many are based upon newly created organizations, forged
in a competitive environment of modern nation-states (Bates, 1983, p.152). The ties that bind the
members of the ethnic groups are not necessarily limited to traditional political institutions, but
rather cemented on material interests. However, ethnic groups may expand into the rural sector
and gain the backing of tribes (Bates, 1983, p.153).
It was not until after the Second World War that critics strongly challenged the concept of
“tribe”, pointing out its underlying racist implications. By mid 1960s, “tribe” was gradually
replaced by the use of the term “ethnic group” or ethnicity, which underlines the importance of
self-organization and self-definition. Nevertheless, many critics have continued to note that
“ethnicity” is simply an avatar of “tribe”, given the fact that even here one is still required to
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make abstraction of the fluid nature of identities found within the African settings (Doz, 1998).
The ethnographic procedures still require that an ethnic group be defined by its specific
observable features, distinct from all others, to enable the construction of an accepted area of
study.
Proponents of the term “tribe” have argued that tribe and tribalism are part of the African
civilization that differentiates it from Western civilization. Therefore, the term tribe and tribalism
are almost exclusive to the African context given that it supersedes anything that foreign
civilizations may have brought including religion (see Sangmpam: Opening Old Wounds).
Furthermore, the artificial boundaries set by the colonialists during the scramble for Africa
confined various groups and communities in definite regions. This in turn created the notion that
each community should forge tribal unity in order to amass material wealth, political power, and
eventually overcome their rivals, that is, neighboring communities and the colonizers themselves
(Berman, 2010, p. 18).
Proponents of ethnicity, on the other hand, argue that “tribe” is not exclusive to SSA. On
the contrary, various nation-states around the globe have experienced similar “ethnic conflicts”.
For example, in the United States during the 19th-20th centuries political parties fostered ethnic
identities, such as Jewish-American, Irish-American or Italian-American. Drawing from this line
of argument, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are not exclusive to Sub-Saharan Africa; hence, the
term “ethnicity” should replace the Eurocentric notion of “tribe”.
According to Robert Bates, ethnic competition endures as a feature of politics even in the
most modern of nation states. The author repudiates the notion that ethnic competition belongs to
the pre-modern era; that it is an irrational form of behavior or false consciousness. In his
conclusion, he establishes that ethnic groups’ represent, in essence, coalitions which have been
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formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization –
benefits which are desired but scarce (Bates, 1983, p. 152)
Within the vast body of literature on ethnicity, there are two main schools of thought. The
first school of thought believes that pre-colonial societies of Africa had complex political and
administrative structure that sustained the community in its relations both internally and
externally. Lineage constituted the backbone of social relations in these societies (Sangmpam,
1995, p.616). The clan was the highest lineage unit within all these societies. People were able to
trace their patrilineal or matrilineal unilateral descent “from a common ancestor and included
both living members and the dead” (Sangmpam, 1995, p.617). Each of the lineage units was led
by a lineage head, which was determined through seniority or in some cases achieved through
breakaway, heroism, or choice of a dying lineage head. The leader performed various functions
including that of referee, legal representative, youth educator, marriage counselor, migration
judge, ambassador to other lineage groups, and guarantor of the group’s property. This proves
the intricate social dynamic of pre-colonial societies in Sub-Saharan Africa prior to the advent of
the colonial state and culture. It also shows the pre-existing passage from kinship-centered
organization to a wider framework for social identifications such as ethnic allegiance. Therefore,
Africa was not a tabula rasa as suggested in Eurocentric scholarship.
The second school of thought is drawn from a post-colonial perspective. As such, this
literature dwells on the origin and significance of ethnic groups in relation to the state. According
to this perspective, the concept of “tribe” or “ethnic groupings” did not exist among the African
communities before the colonial era, but was invented by the colonizers. The advocates of the
post-colonial perspective argue that imperial powers inculcated the ideas of “tribe” and tribalism
into the African mindset in order to facilitate the debilitating state of hegemony for the colonial
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administration (Nyawalo et al. 2011, p.67). This argument is consistent with instrumentalism,
which stems from cultural pluralism. Proponents of the theory argue that the doctrine of indirect
rule paved the way for ethnic consciousness and cultural relativism, and, therefore, hampered the
cultural convergence or cultural synthesis of African societies. African societies entered
selectively into the consciousness of the European colonizer: some were thought to belong to
“higher civilization” based on their physical features that stemmed from their ethnic groupings,
some were considered to be of higher social class either through dynasty or level of education,
some were considered more industrious and reliable, others as inherently lazy, dumb and
repulsive (Bates, 1983, p.150). This form of divide and rule tactic was largely successful in most
Anglophone African states given that it exacerbated ethnic tensions while allowing the
colonialists to manipulate the state machinery. By favoring some ethnic groups over others, it
fostered ethnic rivalry as well as ethnic alliances amongst culturally close ethnic groups. Cultural
preconceptions and personal idiosyncronism were closely intertwined with one’s “tribe” or
ethnic grouping (Green, 2006, p.15).
Ethnicity (symbol of identity) and materialism (comprising symbols of social status) were
used by colonizers to dominate and exploit natives.	
  Therefore, just as the divisive politics of
negative ethnicity made it easy for the colonialists to achieve the aim of exploiting the colony to
serve the capitalistic interest of their home country, after independence, the same system mutated
itself and had the African elite take over, to continue the use of ethnicity as a means of
maintaining the hegemonic and exploitative status quo (Nyawalo et. al. 2011, p.72).
In conclusion, the perception of ethnicity as representing the core political identity of
subnational communities offers a theoretical explanation for the post-election violence in Kenya.	
  
Ethnic politicization and particularly ethnic voting may have contributed to the post-election
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violence because the intensity behind the winner-takes-all zero-sum game was deliberately
channeled into ethnic differences. Politicians used their respectable position in society to coerce
their ethnic and co-ethnic groups to vote ethnically so as to prove their loyalty and cement their
unity against “rival” ethnic groups. This ideology of competition for state resources through
ethnic commonalities became a weapon of mass destruction (Rutten & Owuor, 2010, p.47).
Ethnic groups turn against each other in the race to political power –winning the presidential
seat. From a theoretical point of view, this form of competition with an ethnic dimension may
spark widespread violence simply because all ethnic groups want to belong to the winning, as
opposed to the losing, political party. Similarly, dominant ethnic groups are not ready to be
governed by their rivals simply out of superiority and inferiority complex. Block-voting or
ethnic voting can be found mainly among larger ethnic groups with their own presidential
candidate at the expense of marginal groups. Smaller ethnic groups are less uniform in their
voting behavior (Kagwanja, 2010, p.57). The motivations which may drive ethnic voting include
strong group attachments, fear of domination, and prejudice against outsiders, and favoritism. In
the long run, these emotions may have the potential for erupting into violence as marginalized
ethnic groups may seek to vent their bottled-up frustrations.	
  	
  
Class Analysis

Similar to the idea of ethnic groups, the notion of class is another social category. Given
the broad range of literature on class and class relations, this discussion will focus on the
Marxian perspective of class analysis.	
  According to Karl Marx, classes are socio-economic
groups articulated around their relations to the means of production (capital, labor, and land),
with the dominant classes changing as the modes of production change (e.g., capitalism,
communism and feudalism) (Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p. 109). Class relations involve the
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exploitation that production relations generate. Class exploitation can only occur when one class
appropriates a part of the surplus product that is produced by another class. The dominant class
controls the conditions under which the exploited class works. The exploiting class does this
using four aspects (1) by controlling the means of production; (2) by determining what portion of
the production goes where and for what purpose; (3) by lowering or raising at their will the
portion of the product allocated to the producers/exploited class; (4) lastly, the exploited class is
given no way of withdrawing from the exploiting class, except under capitalism (Sangmpam,
1995, p.626).
My decision to apply Marxist analysis to Kenya’s PEV stems from the realization that
material production and its attendant social relationships are essential to understanding the
political relations within a given society. Most societies cannot be defined outside its material
production; and the Kenyan society is not an exception to this rule. An understanding of electoral
violence in Kenya requires one to pay attention to class in addition to ethnicity as a potential
contributor to the violence. Prior to opening a discourse on class relations in colonial and postcolonial Kenya, it is imperative that I discuss in brief the pre-colonial period. There are two main
reasons for this. First and foremost, the pre-colonial mode of production set the stage for how
“class” and “class relations” would be perceived in both colonial and post-colonial periods.
Secondly and most importantly, understanding the existing social relations in pre-colonial Kenya
enabled African scholars to explain why class and ethnicity intersected in post-colonial politics.
The dominant mode of production in pre-colonial Africa was the lineage mode of
production. In this analysis the term lineage is used to refer to descent –a real or fictitious
common ancestor. In almost every village in Africa, the senior lineage was a representative of
the ancestors; he/she was granted high marks of deference, and in some instances, given tribute
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by their subjects (Sangmpam, 1995, p.618). The overall process of production took place under
the guidance of the senior lineage. The role of the ancestors was crucial in the production process
as well as the elaborate rituals performed by the lineage elders at the opening of each farming
season. The production forces ranged from hunting, fishing, gathering, agriculture, animal
husbandry, handicraft and manufacturing ironwork which includes spears, machetes, bracelets
etc. Therefore, it is clear that the social relations of production in pre-colonial Africa were
dominated by the lineage system. The head of the lineage indirectly controlled the labor process
and trust fund. Despite his/her power in extending or withholding blessings, it is noteworthy that
individual ownership of private property (land, machinery, labor) as described by John Locke
and Thomas Hobbes did not apply to Africa. Instead instruments of labor were shared among
lineage members. The goods put in trust with the lineage head were eventually redistributed
among the members of the lineage without creating any sentiments of marginalization or
grievances. (Sangmpam, 1995, p.613; 617; 618; 620)
Unfounded class arguments have been proposed by Eurocentric scholars that suggest the
existence of class relations in pre-capitalist economies of Africa. In what follows, I will outline
some of these arguments and subsequently refute the claim that class relation prevailed. The first
argument provided by Thornton (1983) asserts that class relations existed through the
exploitation of enslaved people by their owners. This argument is debatable since enslaved
people were not necessarily an object of class. They controlled their own labor process; they
contributed towards the lineage organization as opposed to the empowerment of a single
individual. Enslaved people became absorbed into the lineage system rather than remaining
marginalized and oppressed in the periphery. Despite being captives of war, they were not turned
into an exploited class.
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The second argument claims that the relationship between nobles and commoners in
southern African communities was an example of class relations and exploitation (Vansina,
1978). This claim has no basis given that both nobles and commoners were engaged in the same
type of economic production. Moreover, becoming part of the noble class was not based on class
exploitation; instead it was determined by belonging to the chief’s lineage system. Therefore,
class relation in pre-colonial Africa was based on ascriptive oriented membership rather than
achievement-oriented (Sangmpam, 1995, p.623). However, most western anthropologists view
class relations as non-birth-ascribed (Bienen, 1983, p.104). While it is true that such features as
income, education, and occupation identify one’s class status, in the generic sense, it does not
reflect the Marxian definition. The African situation was a prime example of lineage system
dominating class relations. Similarly, the king versus commoners and the age grade system do
not depict class exploitation and domination. In both scenarios, it is the lineage system that
determined who became king and when one was promoted to the next age group. The heavy
involvement of the matrilineages or patrilineages in the selection and support for the King proves
that political power was based on lineage (Sangmpam, 1995, p.620)
With the arrival of the colonialists, the existing mode of production was transformed into
capitalism and class-based exploitation. In the pre-colonial economy of Kenya social groups did
not depend on the sale of their labor power to gain access to social products. Social products
were communally shared until the advent of the colonial state introduced a capitalist mode of
production. Under colonial rule, workers depended on a wage income to settle their annual taxes
and meet the costs of a particular social commitment, such as marriage (Mamdani, 1976, p.150).
The indigenous people were seen as a source of capital through their cheap labor, which in turn
would support the high demand for goods and materials in the western hemisphere. Capitalist
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production consists of two main classes –the bourgeoisie, the capitalists who own the means of
production, and the much larger proletariat or “working class” who must sell their own labor to
maintain a position in society. Proponents of Marxism suggest that class is formed through one’s
relation to the means of production. However, because of the lack of industrialization and the
limited spread of industrial capitalism in various parts of Africa, class relations could not be
defined only through “production” or exploitation (Markovitz, 1977, p.148).
The colonial state created an economy that was based on economic dependency and
capitalism. In the first phase of colonial capitalism, all labor was reduced to the lowest common
denominator, that of unskilled labor producing raw materials on the land. (Mamdani, 1976,
p.143) The main purpose of the colonial state was to produce commodities for the metropolitan
market. These commodities were unprocessed raw materials, which in turn required further
processing to generate a finished product. While the metropolitan state developed its technical
skills in the manufacturing industry, the colonial state was reduced to a mere agricultural
economy. As a result, colonial states depended on the metropolitan state for their imported
goods. This led to the destruction of political autonomy and the material base of the pre-colonial
ruling groups. Besides undermining the indigenous mode of production it also created entire new
classes. The class that the colonial state created was the working class/the wage laborers,
peasantry, petite bourgeoisie, landed/landless class (Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.115). One way
for the colonial state to acquire laborers was through forced labor and later through the cash-crop
production and eventually requirement of cash taxes. The productive activity of the communities
living in present-day Kenya was redirected from the traditional mode of production into the
production of cash crop farming such as cotton, coffee, tea.
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At the political level, the state unites the ruling class(es) and divides the working
class(es). Therefore, the ruling class controls the state apparatus and institutions while the
working class remains confined to the level of production. The state institutionalizes politics, not
just uniting the ruling classes but seeking to contain the contradictions of class society and
thereby maintaining its unity. Ideally the state represents itself as a state of all classes or a state
above all classes, in essence a guardian of the general interest of society. However, the ruling
class presents its own sectional interest in the guise of the general interest (Mamdani, 1976,
p.13).
For Richard Sklar (1979), class relations in Africa were not simply about capitalists
versus workers, but more importantly the role of the state in generating and consolidating the
various classes (Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.118). The colonial state created classes through its
capitalist economic base; the state in post-colonial Africa became even more involve in socioeconomic affairs. As a result, class formation in Africa could not be discussed without
highlighting the role of the state. According to Sklar, the most dominant form of class action in
Africa is class formation through the state. By this he meant that although class struggles exist,
they are not always visible. In addition, power is not necessarily acquired from the economic
sphere. Instead those who control the various and diverse social organizations – that is, those
who have political power – can determine how classes are formed and how resources are
distributed. Following independence, the new Kenyan elites who assumed control, entrenched
themselves in the economy by taking over the former settler farms and the major agricultural
institutions. They also consolidated their hold on political power through constitutional
amendments that stifled opposition political parties and centralized power in the executive. Party
leaders were rewarded with positions in government and access to the settler farms in the White
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Highlands. Clientelism flourished and emerged as the main means of cementing class relations
between elites.
In present day Africa, class relations are still determined by relations of power rather than
economic production. Whereas power stemmed from the lineage system in pre-capitalist Africa,
today class and status are derived from the state. Gaining access to the state is therefore how one
gains access to resources. In this context, political corruption becomes the primary means of
accumulating wealth. Seemingly, alliances between the ruling elite and traditional rulers
exemplify class collaboration/ class formation as opposed to “economic” class struggle. In order
to consolidate power, the “modernized” ruling elites ally themselves with traditional rulers who
carry a lot of local power and legitimacy (Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.111). The end result is
cultivation of clientelism as elites distribute state resources and political power to traditional
elite. In post-independence Africa, political power and national resources were distributed both
vertically and horizontally from the state to local elites through cronyism, clientelism as opposed
to merit-based recognition. This theory implies that class is an ongoing fluid process of
contestation rather than a fixed or static category. Markovitz (1977, p.213) states “class models
must certainly be modified by factors of cultural values and communal concern”. For instance,
one’s obligation towards his/her lineage and members of the extended family –a consequence of
pre-colonial lineage social relations –may prevent them from forming a rigid class barrier.
Appeals to ethnic or tribal loyalties can be another device that the political elites employ to
strengthen their rule. This situation helps reinforce the strong link between class and ethnicity in
Kenya and Africa at large.
In conclusion, applying the concept of class to explain the 2007 election violence is
useful because it provides a new perspective on how capitalism institutionalized violence. If
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certain portions of the population, be they individuals or groups, are seen to profit from
government and others are not, violence can be seen as a means to right economic wrongs and tip
the balance. In the face of an undesirable election outcome, the election is seen as having failed
to reverse economic imbalances and violence becomes a viable alternative. Therefore, access to
the State is in fact vital, since it is the State which controls the circulation and monetization of
the bulk of the surplus product (Kitching, 1982, p.454). While access to the surplus product both
in production and circulation defines the position of the richest Africans in Kenya, the total
absence of such access defines the poorest. The richest in Kenya are those who both employ and
benefit from the labor that produces a significant proportion of the surplus product, and who
receive a disproportionate share of the product when it is monetized and circulated (Kitching,
1982, p.398). Whilst the poorest are those whose labor produces little or no surplus product, i.e.
most of their labor time is expended in the pursuit of a basic subsistence; they also receive little
monetized surplus product when it is circulated through the State and private capital. Over the
years, such inequalities in production and circulation of state resources have contributed to class
antagonism and resentment among the various classes and ethnic groups. This has been
worsened by the fact that Kenyans with access to capital live alongside those who only have
access to the most basic means of subsistence.
Drawing on Marxist tendencies of the populism of the 1960s and ‘70s, “the forty one
tribes against one” rhetoric invented a class notion from an ethnic group –kikuyu. Kikuyus
holding positions of power in banking, government, trade, etcetera, were viewed as dominating
class -allegedly resulting from political patronage of Jomo Kenyatta’s regime. Historically,
Kenya’s ruling class has managed to cement its position as petite bourgeoisie. The high levels of
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economic inequality and poor economic prospects in case of soaring youth unemployment has
increased the risk for the occurrence of PEV (Republic of Kenya; Waki Report, p.58). 	
  

1.5 Research Hypothesis
In light of the above theoretical frameworks, my main hypothesis is as follows.
In the event of electoral fraud, the higher the social marginalization of those excluded from
political power and national resources, the more likely electoral violence will erupt and will be
generalized. In Kenya, social marginalization is the by-product of ethnic and class
polarization.

My hypothesis assumes that social marginalization existed at the time of the 2007 postelection violence. Although the scarcity of the country’s resources in terms of geographical
distribution may contribute to the marginalization of some portions of the population, I assume
that marginalization has been mostly linked to two important factors: ethnic politicization and
class division. In the case of Kenya, scholars such as Colin Leys (1975) and Akanamu Adebayo
(2012) have reaffirmed that marginalization partly stemmed from ethnic-politicization. However
this is not always the case. In some countries marginalization of communities has taken place in
the absence of ethnic politicization. The marginalization is exacerbated by class divisions that
can be traced to colonial rule as certain social groups may have acquired more resources than
others. The hypothesis also suggests that electoral violence was made feasible by electoral fraud.
In this case, electoral fraud supplemented marginalization as an independent or causal variable.
In this sense, it is imperative that I investigate the role played by institutionalism in facilitating
electoral fraud.
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This hypothesis does not overlook the auxiliary role played by the digital revolution. The
“digital revolution” across the country helped to fuel the post-election protest. I will discuss how
the use of sophisticated forms of communication, such as smartphones, social networking via
Facebook and twitter, and media coverage on television as well as online may have created the
space for resentment among the marginalized groups and the distrust of the electoral system.
1.6 Methods
This research is a single country case-study involving Kenya’s 2007 post-election
violence. Like most single country case studies, it attempts to provide an overview of Kenya’s
political history particularly in general elections. The historical events that have marked its
political landscape reflect deep-lying violent structures that have been left unchecked for very
long. For this reason, historiography is an essential methodological guideline for my research.
During my externship, I visited the Kenya National Archive, where I found a collection of
records of Kenya’s precolonial and colonial history. These historical records have broadened my
understanding of the root causes of marginalization. An extension of these archival materials,
which were once confidential, is now available at Syracuse University Library. The Archives
only served to broaden my basic understanding of Kenya’s post-colonial history in terms of postcolonial political, economic and social marginalization. However, it is not my primary source of
knowledge hence, I do not rely on the Archives to support my findings. It only served as a
foundation to widen my knowledge about Kenya.

The reports funded and documented by local and International inquiry of commissions
into post-election violence have also formed part of the primary database. I have identified the

	
  

31	
  

	
  
	
  

Ndungu land commission report, the Kofi Annan National dialogue and reconciliation report, the
truth, justice and reconciliation report, the Kriegler report and the Waki report as primary sources
of information that document the historical injustices committed in Kenya by political and nonpolitical actors. Apart from information they have placed on their online database, researchers
can also access the hardcopy documents in their headquarter offices in Nairobi. Therefore, it was
absolutely necessary to conduct this research in Kenya, where I was able to access documented
reports generated by local inquiry commissions and international election monitoring agencies.
Historiography as a qualitative methodological tool is appropriate for my research
because I am seeking to determine whether there is continuity or a change from the past. The
electoral fraud of 2007 is arguably a result of events at past critical junctures. The transfer of
power from colonial rule to Kenya’s first political party (KANU) is an example of one such
critical juncture, because certain ethnic groups were favored to take leadership roles and
educational opportunities, while the majority of “other” ethnic groups remained on the periphery.
Secondly, the land question as a matrix for state and class formation also presents itself as
critical juncture. This is because the land policies have been used to marginalize social groups
throughout Kenya’s colonial and post-colonial history. Due to political and economic structures,
the divisions within these ethnic-groups remained entrenched despite the passage of time.
Positive feedback in path dependence means that history is remembered; small events early on
may have consequences on larger events at a later stage.
Besides historiography, this research also incorporates elements of empirical evidence
and ethnographic fieldwork. The range of qualitative methods has allowed me to become more
“objective” and open-minded to include different sources of information from popular culture,
social media (Facebook/Tweeter) to academic blogs such as Pambazuka. I also spoke to
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numerous commentators on PEV, political analysts, Kenyan professors and political activists.
For secondary information I focused on literary analysis such as online journals, articles, books,
political statements, newspapers and political cartoons/images. In selecting my secondary
sources, I was guided by core research question, and particularly my research hypothesis. Most
of the materials or sources I used, were meant to verify my hypothesis or help me answer my
over-all research question. Therefore, the secondary sources were not chosen based on gender or
any other orientation. It was simply guided by my research hypothesis.
Although, I understand the critical role played by various social groups in the struggle for
democracy and nation building; I did not use this to guide my secondary sources. My literature
review was compiled using sources and materials and discussed by research hypothesis in depth.
Indeed Kenyan women, trade unions, workers, students all contributed to the broad literature in
Kenya and particularly the overall state-building. However, my sources were selected based on
how to answer my research question.
Finally, I sent a questionnaire to a selected group of people who were well informed
about the 2007 violence. Their responses have been analyzed and incorporated into various
chapters of my study, particularly chapter five where I discuss Marginalization and Electoral
violence.
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1.7 Chapter Outline

The thesis has five chapters. Chapter two consists of a Literature Review of the theoretical
frameworks that inform my over-all analysis. I summarize the theoretical debate on
democratization and institutionalism, ethnicity and class relations, the three variables that are
paramount in my study.
Chapter three analyzes the intersection of land tenure, class formation, and ethnic relations as a
historical background to understand social marginalization in Kenya. I relate my argument to the
historical realities of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Kenya. The chapter sets the stage
for the substantive empirical analysis of marginalization and electoral violence in Kenya’s 2007
post-election violence.
In Chapter four, I test empirically my hypothesis and discuss the research question in detail.
Using my three main variables of marginalization, I present my empirical findings to verify the
research hypothesis. I argue that the politics of exclusion and marginalization along ethnic and
class lines were responsible for the 2007 electoral violence, once electoral fraud was suspected.
The third variable, democratization and institutionalism, played a “lesser” role in what
transpired.
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Chapter five is my conclusion. I provide a short discussion on my findings and propose possible
recommendations to avert electoral violence in the Pan-African world in light of the Kenyan
crisis. I emphasize the building of regional and continental institutions as pillars for security,
prosperity and collective identity for Africans.

CHAPTER  2:  LITERATURE  REVIEW  AND  THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORKS  
My aim in this chapter is to discuss the three theoretical frameworks that help me answer the
core research question of the thesis. They are democratization and institutionalism; ethnicity and
class relations.
2.1 Democratization and Institutionalism
	
  

From its inception, there has been only one definition of ‘democracy’, namely, rule by
the ‘demos’, that is, the people (Mafeje, 1995, p.5). Arguably, the French revolution of 1789
marks the first modern definition of democracy. Since then, three concepts of democracy have
been featured in European theoretical and political discourse. These are liberal democracy, social
democracy and socialist democracy. For my purpose in this study, I will be focusing on liberal
democracy. This is because liberal democracy transcends the simplistic understanding of
democracy as “government by the people” to refer to government formed based on the consent
of the people. It is not just about the sovereignty of the people but it also covers the sovereignty
of “law” and operates by repudiating the idea of popular power (Murunga, 2007, p.29). In short
the government is not above the law, but also subject to scrutiny. Liberal democracy is by far the
oldest, best-studied and most well-advertised form of democracy. Its ideals such as the freedom
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of speech, freedom of association, freedom of press, rule of law and respect for individual rights
are still unexceptionable (Mafeje, 1995, p.7). Liberal democracy is also the type of democracy
that was imposed on democratizing countries by neoliberalism in post-Soviet period.
Theoretically and practically, liberal democracy reached its climax in the nineteenth
century, having presaged the rise of the second estate and the liberation of the third estate from
serfdom in the eighteenth century (Eshtu C & Ibrahim J, 1995, p.8). Liberal democracy
championed itself as protector of individual rights, suffrage, and rule of law. However, it was
under the ethos of democracy that “enlightened” Europe reserved the right to subjugated and
degraded the working class. Studies by Engels and Beatrice Webb demonstrated the negative
aspect of liberal democracy by referring to the working conditions of workers in nineteenthcentury England. Such critique was aimed at undermining the social and theoretical foundations
of liberal democracy by revealing class exploitation and domination. However, as a panAfricanist, what strikes me most is not only class domination in the production process in
Europe, but the fact that proponents of liberal democracy used racial discrimination to carry out
their agenda of exploitation. It was under the ethos of liberal democracy that European
colonizers partitioned Africa for economic reasons.
The anti-colonial struggle throughout Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia were
historical antecedents, which had been made by people themselves through popular struggles.
Unfortunately, after independence, African states sought to reproduce the same democratic
models that had been imposed on them by the European colonizers.	
  Adopting such models
seemed natural to African states since they saw themselves as an extension of the metropolitan
countries (Mafeje, 1995, p.6). However, these abstract models did not have substantive content.
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The democratization of Africa gathered momentum in the 1990s with the end of the cold
war and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in late 1989. This produced extensive
scholarship on democratization and capitalism, giving pre-eminence to western institutions.
Different theoretical frameworks have been used to explain the liberal democratic state in the
West and the state variant in the non-West. These frameworks can be broadly categorized as
institutional explanations and non-institutional explanations. Proponents of universalism assume
that western-like institutions of the liberal democratic state ought to be emulated by non-western
countries. By assuming their evolution toward Western-like institutions, Third world countries
are seen as experiencing “growing pains” similar to those of the West during its earlier
development (Sangmpam, 2007, p.64).

Like Sangmpam, Makau Mutua disagrees. He argues that in societies such as Africa
democracy cannot be merely a matter of institutions, procedures, and rules (Mutua, 2012, p.11).
Democracy is not a method of governance but a critical proxy for the legitimization of the state.
Democratic rule must be viewed as substantive. This means that procedures and rules must have
“just” and legitimate outcomes for the people. Otherwise it is likely to fail. For Mutua, the right
to vote and to stand for elections are merely procedural and thus, meaningless. What is more
important is that political conditions are open, fair and supportive for people to participate
(Mutua, 2008, p.15 Therefore, democracy cannot simply	
  be a method of governance; it must pay
particular attention to the outcomes. In his book, Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming
Leviathan (2012 p.18), Makau Mutua criticizes the definitions of “democracy” by J.Shumpter
and Samuel Huntington. He argues that their definition are predominantly procedural and thus
not fit for the African case. Instead he proposes two thematic categories that is, democratization
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and civil society. These outcomes must revolve around the viability and legitimacy of the African
state.
Democratization is the only category on which there is universal agreement among
scholars of African politics. The subject appears in a variety of guises and terminologies,
including governance, electoral politics, and political participation among others. In a nutshell,
the process of democratization occurs when a state moves from a less democratic stage to a more
democratic political regime. In the process of transitioning, states can be at different stages. For
example, it may be a transition from an authoritarian regime to a full democracy, from an
authoritarian regime to a semi-democracy, or from semi-authoritarian political regime to a
democratic regime. The outcome may be consolidated democracy, but in the case of Africa,
many states face frequent reversals due to coup d’états and political instability (Mutua, 2012,
p.18).
According to Mutua (2012, p.18), the reason African post-colonial states failed to
establish enduring democracies is because liberal constitutions were imposed by departing
colonial hegemons from London, Paris and other metropolitan cities, which allowed the colonial
state to reassert itself, thus questioning the legitimacy of the African state. Kenya was among the
African countries that had their constitutional framework and independence negotiated in the
Lancaster House Conference, London. Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe) was another. The
constitution included entrenched provisions for citizenship, fundamental rights, and the
composition of the bicameral legislature. In this sense, states are supposed to achieve political
democracy under constitutionalism (Mutua, 2012, p.13).This is because constitutionalism holds
the cultural norms and values that are core to popular sovereignty. The constitution makes the
state accountable through checks and balances and the separation of the three arms of the state:
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an independent judiciary, the executive branch and the legislature. In the case of Africa, the
executive branch overpowers the other two arms, which in turn leads to a tyrannical rule. For
many years, many African countries were governed by authoritarian rule. The judiciary was
unable to safeguard the individual rights, or to impose the rule of law that was not in accordance
with the executive branch. Democracy was merely a matter of procedure, elections existed but
they were not free and fair.
Another key theme is the centrality of civil society in the reconstruction and
democratization of the state. According to Mutua, civil society1 is an indispensable element in
the push for democratization. Political transition must seek to understand the structure,
philosophy, role, composition, size and depth of civil society if they aim to establish an enduring
democracy. Patrick Chabal (1986) defines civil society as “a vast ensemble of constantly
changing groups and individuals whose only common ground is their being outside the state and
who have…acquired some consciousness of their externality and opposition of the state”
(Beissinger & Young, 2002, p.244). Patrick Chabal; Crawford Young; Antonio Gramsci and
Karl Marx have all underscored the capacity of the civil society to undermine tyranny of the
state. South Africa and Kenya are among the countries in Africa with a strong civil society. In
the case of Nigeria, civil society has not always been preeminent. The military rule have in the
past suppressed democratization in spite of the presence of a vibrant civil society and
independent media (Mutua, 2012, p.19). Kenya is an example of country that has been able to
attain transformative reform of the state through a vigilant and strong civil society. Civil society
has been a key factor in almost every critical juncture of the country (see Firoze Manji	
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interview). Many gains in civil and political liberties throughout Moi’s repressive regime have
been possible thanks to a disciplined and vigilant civil society, made up of religious
organizations, human rights group, the media and professional associations, who worked closely
with opposition political parties and foreign political observers. The cases of Benin, South Africa
and Kenya indicate the positive role the church and other religious institutions can play in
transition to a more open society. In Kenya for example, both Conference of Catholic Bishops
and the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the umbrella organization for the mainline
Protestant congregations, played a leading role in the struggle for democracy against Kenyatta’s
undemocratic state that was later perfected by Moi (Mutua, 2008, p.24). Their voices were
instrumental in achieving multipartysim and drafting of a new democratic constitution.
Other scholars have criticized the ‘positive role’ of religion in the reform process. Athena
Mutua (2006), describes how religion retarded advocacy of women’s right, in the Kenyan
constitution, by using ‘moral ethics’ to impose rigid understandings of reproductive rights such
as abortion (Makau, p.19, 2011). Religious groups tend to be less liberal when it comes to
matters of gender equality, family law. This is because of the patriarchal nature of religious
doctrine.
Last but not least, citizenship is another important facet of consolidating democratization
process. This is because, popular sovereignty without which constitutionalism would not exist,
makes citizens the owners of the state (Mutua, 2012, p.21). Citizenship gives the state
legitimacy. In what follows I will provide alternative arguments for understanding electoral
violence within the parameters of democratization.
The first argument is that new democracies with legacies of ethno-political discrimination
are more likely to experience pre-and post-electoral violence than new democracies without
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ethno-political discrimination. If electoral violence is a strategy to subvert the democratic
process, or a response to the oppositions’ attempt to subvert the democratic process, then one
also needs to identify the conditions under which political actors are more likely to violate the
democratic rules. Group inequalities that stem from ethnic marginalization, class division or
religious affiliations can increase the stakes of the electoral contest, and this in turn increases the
incentives for both incumbents and challengers to subvert the rules. Nigeria as a state, has failed
to devise a system of government where all ethnic and religious groups are adequately provided
for (Mutua, 2012, p.13). The interest of the state, has often clashed with the demands of the
people. Long (2012) argues that the presence of underlying ethno-political discrimination in a
new democratic state may or may not increase the likelihood of electoral violence. The potential
for electoral violence to occur depends on how the political actors perceive their chance of
winning.	
  A candidate with a very low chance of winning the election is less likely to subvert the
election process, given that his/her chance of winning are minimal even if he/she attempted to do
so. The same is true for candidates with a very high chance of winning. They have few
incentives to attempt to rig, simply because they already anticipate victory without using fraud.
Rigging would only tarnish their reputation and reduce the credibility of their victory and rule. In
principle, new democracies with legacies of marginalization are more likely to experience preand post-election violence.
Did institutions play a role in Kenya’s electoral violence? I will attempt to answer this
question in relation to my hypothesis by revisiting some of the literature discussed here.
According to Mutua (2012), democratization may lead to further marginalization of smaller
ethnic groups since multiparty democracy promotes competition of political parties. In most
African cases, political parties are dominated by specific ethnic groups. Often larger ethnic
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groups have the production force to erect political parties that represents their needs on a nation
level. On the other hand, smaller ethnic groups have less chance of vying for the country’s top
leadership because of their limited means. Political candidates pull most of their support from
their ethnic kin. For this reason, electable candidates usually come from the largest ethnic groups
representing the constituency or area. Because of this, dominant ethnic groups are able to
compete more intensely for democratic seats than smaller ethnic groups. Given the high stakes
involved in winning the elections (the perception that the gaining political power will guarantee
access to state resources and enable ethnic group a chance ‘eat’ their labor), electoral defeat
becomes a huge loss for the ethnic group (Wrong, 2009). As such, the losing side views
democracy and the process of democratization as the enemy. This situation is likely to lead to
electoral fraud and violence.
According to Adam Przeworski (1991), however, the trick is to erect democratic
institutional frameworks such as electoral rules that seek to regulate and manage elections in
such a manner as to provide procedural certainty to all stakeholders (political actors, voter’s
etcetera). Stakeholders of the election are only concerned with the credibility of the process. if
electoral bodies can guarantee them a free and fair process, and can also reassure that “today’s
looser can compete in tomorrow’s election”, then electoral violence is less likely to occur.
However, when institutions are not perceived as trustworthy or able to convince loosing
candidates that they can compete for power in the future, then there is a high chance that
electoral violence will occur. For Przeworski, democracy entails clear rules and procedures,
albeit the outcomes are uncertain.

2.2 Ethnicity
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Ethnicity is one of the most difficult concepts to grasp, and one of the most essential in
understanding Africa. The challenge, therefore, is not how to overcome ethnic identities, but how
to integrate them into social relationships and political processes (Copan, 2007, p.78). The
process of building democratic institutions will succeed with appropriating ethnic identities into
the structure of nation-state. Recent scholarship has claimed that any political organization based
on ethnic identity is a primitive model (Lynch, 2011, p.14). Such approaches implicitly suggest
that if Africa wants to make progress, it must first of all eradicate ethnicity. Because of such
influence, African leaders have conceptualized ethnicity as an atavistic residue that impedes
political integration and potential of attaining nationhood. Much emphasis has been placed on the
process of urbanization as a way combat this “epidemic”. However, as a pan-African scholar, I
believe that the solution is not to deny the existence and persistence of ethnicity; in fact, ethnic
identities provide meaning and content to the nation-state. If appropriated properly, ethnic
identities could be ingredients required for the realization of an ideal civil society, political
integration, participation and common good. Historically, ethnocentrism has revealed itself in the
form of resistance against the oppressive structure of nation state. African states, however, have
failed to modify ethnic identification in favor of a national identity. More often than not, African
leaders have resorted to ethnic-politicization for political gain. In the process, they undermine the
diversity of ethnic identities, thus paving the way for political instability. Ethnocentrism is not to
be seen as a primordial communal sentiment that obstructs the state. In my analysis, ethnicity is
viewed as a fluid and highly malleable concept.
Scholars have been trying to develop a theoretical approach to ethnicity and ethnic
conflict for a long time. Some, like Donald Horowitz (1985), Edward Azar (1990) and Donald
Rothschild (1983) agree that the ethnic conflicts experienced today, especially in Africa, are
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deeply rooted. This is true in the Kenyan situation. These identity conflicts have become so
complex that they are difficult to resolve or manage. For this reason, scholars have opted to
construct analytical tools in the form of ethnic theories to explain the relationship between
ethnicity, politics and resources. Cultural pluralism served as a framework for analysis and
explanation of the various forms of ethnic identity globally, including Sub-Saharan Africa,
thanks to its universalistic claims. It also draws its analysis from three main approaches:
primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Each of these approaches can be analyzed
using the Kenyan ethnic context. By and large, all three approaches can be presented in a
sequence that moves from viewing it as a deep-rooted fixed characteristic to thinking about it as
a fluid and changing cultural resource that people, and particularly political elites, can appeal to
in some instances. These theories should therefore be perceived as “ideal-types” or theoretically
pure conceptions of the world that may in the end explain how ethnic-politicization contributed
to animosity and marginalization of certain groups from political power.
The question of ethnicity and its role in Kenya’s post-election violence is central to my
study in various ways. First and foremost, my research hypothesis, theorizes ethnicity and ethnicpoliticization as an explanatory variable of “marginalization”. Secondly, ethnicity needs to be
addressed because numerous reports, such as the Waki, Ndungu and Kriegler reports, have
established ethnicity as a fundamental contributor of electoral violence. Thirdly, scholarship by
African and non-African scholars have related election related violence to the persistence and
saliency of ethnic identity and ethnic allegiance (Hornsby 2012; Lynch 2012; Wrong 2009).
Even though ethnic-politicization offers a theoretical explanation for the post-election violence
in Kenya, I will not ignore the standing debate and the growing literature that repudiates
ethnicity as a probable explanation. Opponents of ethnicity have not only cited the inability to
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measure ethnicity, but both liberals and Marxists have seen ethnicity as a distracting irrelevance
from the real issues of production, exchange and communication (Hornsby, 2012, p.804).
Ethnic identity is essentially a contested concept. Just as with democracy or art, the term
has been disputed endlessly with regard to its proper usage and its scope (Lynch, 2011, p.12).
Analyst have also debated whether ethnicity is the result of human choice it is an end in itself or
means to accomplish other ends (Hyden, 2005, p.185). Despite the term’s inherent ambiguity,
significant agreement exists among scholars of social science. Robert Bates provides a
comprehensive and compelling argument on ethnicity in his piece, “Modernization, Ethnic
Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa” (Bates, 1983, p.151). For
Bates, the primary factor that distinguishes ethnic groups from other social groups is the
symbolism which they employ. 	
  The symbolism is characterized by one or more of the
following: “collective myths of origin; the assertion of ties of kinship or blood, be they real or
putative; a mythology expressive of the cultural uniqueness or superiority of the group; and a
conscious elaboration of language and heritage” (Bates, 1983, p.153). Ethnic groups have a
distinct composition rooted in the notion of cultural peoplehood, wherein persons of every age
and stage of life –be it their status, wealth are linked through a conjoining of cultural similarity
and perception of common descent (Lynch, 2011, p.12).
Although the term ‘ethnicity’ is often employed in many commentaries on ethnic
relations it is rarely defined. Acquiring a working understanding of African politics thus
demands a deeper conceptualization of ethnicity, ethnic identity, and ethnic collective action.	
  
According to Rothchild & Olorunsola (1983, p.152) an ethnic group can be defined as a
community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including historical,
traditional and mythological origin. Ethnic groups are not isolated. In fact ethnic groups become
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aware of their existence by being in contact with others. It is this interaction among various
ethnic groups within a given space that gives rise to notion of ‘ethnicity’.
Other scholars have used the term ‘ethnicity’ to refer to ‘a kind of group identification; a
sense of belonging to a people that is experienced as a greatly extended form of kinship’
(Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, 2008, p.79). Eriksen (2002 p.12)
explains ethnicity as:
“…is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as culturally
distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a minimum of regular
interaction…thus also…defined as a social identity”
The underlying factor in the various definitions provided above is a sense of belonging.	
  
Unfortunately, due to its popularity, ethnicity has become an unwieldy concept and currently
suffers from both polysemy (whereby it has multiple definitions) and synonymy (close meanings
with other terms like “nation” and “race”) (Green, 2006, p. 17). In my analysis, however, I intend
to use the term ethnicity within the boundaries of three core elements, namely common descent,
a common history and a common homeland. This is because race and other non-ethnic nations
focus on physical or socio-political similarities which are not relevant to my analysis and overall
topic. Using the trajectory of common descent, history, and homeland will allow me to apply the
two main ethnic interpretations specifically primordialism and instrumentalism. I will also refer
to constructivism in order to understand how ethnicity may or may not have contributed to the
historical marginalization and arguably the electoral violence of 2007.
Within the vast body of literature on ethnicity, there are two main schools of thought:
primordialism and instrumentalism (Elischer, 2008, p.4). They relate the most to my work. These
theories have gained significant currency within the literature of electoral-related violence and
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ethnicity. According to the first school of thought, primordialism, ethnicity is a natural or “God
given” attribute that has existed since time immemorial. For its proponents, tribal allegiance is
based on “blood ties, attendant emotional bonds, and the historical memory of other opposition
groups (See Sangmpam: Opening Old Wounds p. 13). In understanding the underlying cause of
election-related violence, primordialists are quick to play the ethnic-card as a probable cause
because they believe that ethnic animosities and allegiance are deep-rooted, traditional,
irreducible and non-negotiable part of human identity (Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.68).
Primordialism provides the central assumptions of many people’s understanding of group origins
and differences, and it is implicit in the arguments of most nationalist, ethnic, and racial leaders.
Often, primordialists revisit the intricate social dynamic of pre-colonial African societies through
lineage the mode of production to re-affirm Africa’s glorious past. They rely on the fact that
African societies had a complex political and administrative structure that sustained the
community relations both internally and externally. People traced their patrilineal or matrilineal
unilateral decent from a common ancestor to include both living members and the dead
(Sangmpam, 1995, p. 617). They reiterate that Africa was not tabula rasa or a clean slate as
some Eurocentric scholars have implied.
However, instrumentalism, the second school of thought, does not deal with the complex
socio-political structures in pre-colonial Africa. Instead it blames colonialism and postcolonialism for the existence and saliency of ethnicity. In Politics and Class Formation in
Uganda, Mahmood Mamdani challenges the central assumptions of primordialism. Even though
Mamdani acknowledges ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ are potent political issues in Africa, he does not
concur with the primordial argument that ethnic conflicts are natural and expected. For him
conflict is not necessarily explained by tribalism. He questioned the tautological explanation for
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conflict in most Eurocentric scholarship, that is; “two tribes fight because they are from different
tribes” (Mamdani, 1976, p.3). Tribalism was not an explanation but an ideology that needed to
be explained. To understand any ideology one must first understand its historical origin and
development, and then identify its social base. As such, one may ask whose interest does the
ideology of tribalism articulate. Instrumentalism attempts to answer this question.
Instrumentalism dwells on the origin and significance of ethnic groups in relation to the
state. According to instrumentalism, the concept of ‘tribe’ and ‘tribalism’ did not exist among
African societies before colonial era, but was a product of colonial state structures. The theory
retraces the instrumental role of colonialism in the establishment of “tribe” and “tribal reserves”.
The central argument in this theory is that Europeans deliberately invented the idea of tribe so as
to legitimize their rule. In his article, “The Ideology of Tribalism,” Journal of Modern African
Studies (1971), Archie Mafeje takes an instrumentalist point of view. Mafeje does not deny the
existence of “tribal ideology and sentiment in Africa” (Mafeje, 1971, p.258). Using a Marxist
perspective, Mafeje argues that “tribalism” needs to be understood and conceptualized under a
new light, that is, within the modern parameter of capitalist mode of production. Essentially, he
differentiates between “the man who, on behalf of his tribe, strives to maintain its traditional
integrity and autonomy, and the man who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain a power
position, not in the tribal area, but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is to
undermine and exploit the supposed tribesmen” (Mafeje, 1971, p.259) For him, colonialism
provided the material as well as the ideological base of what is now called ‘tribalism’. The fact
that it works in various African countries, is no proof that ‘tribes’ or ‘tribalism’ exist in an
objective sense. The fact that it works marks a false consciousness on the part of supposed
tribesmen and simply reveals the exploitative nature of the new African elite as they distorted the
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notion of ‘tribe’ to conceal their exploitative role. In essence, tribalism is a distraction of the real
issue which is class identity and the role of capitalism.
The question that follows this argument is, why do the masses accept and internalize such
ideologies if they are constructed by colonial and post-colonial state elites? Mafeje provides a
short but powerful response to support his argument. According to him the ideas of the ruling
class are also the ruling ideas. In other words, the new elites have power over the material force
of society (means of production) as well as the ruling intellectual force (the means of mental
production). Therefore, the masses have no option but to follow because they lack the means of
mental production (ibid, p.259). To a large extent, some scholars find this argument as
tautological, incoherent and possibly offensive to the mental production of African people.
Charles Hornsby (2012), asserts that ethnicity is real and enduring political phenomenon not just
the consequence of structural precedent but also an independent social force and analytical factor
in its own right. In his book, Kenya: A History since Independence, Hornsby	
  discusses ethnicity
from a conceptual point of view as well as interweaving empirical data to analyze ethnicity both
a cause and consequence of politics.	
  According to the author, ‘tribalism’ or negative ethnicity is
not an intrinsic phenomenon or something unique to Kenyan or African situation (Hornsby,
2012, p.793) Instead it is a dominant feature of political debate evident in other parts of the globe
including Latin America, Asia, Middle East and even Europe. He gives the example of European
Union, a supra-national body with the same faults and strengths of post-colonial African states
(Hornby, 2012, p.798). A point worth noting in Hornsby’s argument is that ethnicity has endured
because it is a natural point on which society can compete. Competition for resources is
inevitable since politics is intrinsically a contest of national resources and political power. At
times, this competition takes the form of ethnic battle. Robert Bates (1983) observes that
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ethnicities “persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services from modern
sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members. Insofar as they provide these benefits to
their members they are able to gain their support and achieve their loyalty” (Bates, 1983, p.152).
According to Horwitz (1985) ‘ethnicity in the words of a cynic entails not the collective will to
exist but rather the existing will to collect’ (p.12). This means that ethnic groups are intrinsically
bound to exist and collaborate as part of their ‘existing will to collect’ resources. This description	
  
connotes a sense of ethnic identity to the exclusion of others. However, it also illuminates the
potential for negative ethnicity.
In her book, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya by Gabriella Lynch
(2011), discusses the theoretical and methodological importance of understanding the process of
ethnic politicization. In her analysis, common descent, common history and common homeland
are reflected by the geographic, linguistic and cultural connections of African societies in Kenya.
However, just as common language, cultural practices, and home area are used to assert ethnic
“sameness”, she also notes that there are distinct dialects, customs, and divergent histories of
migration that re-affirms ethnic differences. For Lynch, ethnic identity can only exist if the
similarities in cultural materials become relevant or salient and are attended by a sense of a
shared past or myth of collective ancestry and associated conception of rights and social justices
(Lynch, 2009, p.14). What is significant from her work is that ethnic bonds require first a sense
of linguistic and cultural similarity; second, an assumed history of union; and third and most
importantly some debate about what is “right” or “just” with regards to inter- and intracommunal
relations and group rights (Lynch, 2009, p.13). These shared rights do not have to be historically
accurate, but they cannot be invented from thin air. Instead, they must be built on cultural
experience (Berman 1998, p.312). A shared past does not have to produce a conceptually
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consistent or collectively endorsed moral frames, yet there must be an assumed connection
between the peoples past, their current position and their future potential. Essentially, what
Lynch is arguing here is that ethnic identity or ethnicity is socially constructed, a “set of descentbased cultural identifiers” (R. Cohen 1978, p.387). Such constructed communities tend to
struggle not because they exist but simply because they have come into existence out of a
process of “struggle”. Many of the ethnic communities found in present day Kenya are real
examples of such struggle. She provides the example of Kalenjin community as a recent social
construction. The term Kalenjin was first used as an ethnic signifier in the 1940s by a Nandi
radio presenter to open vernacular broadcast. Kalenjin essentially means “I say to you”. The
important point here is that the Kalenjin identity was not a product of European “invention” as
some scholars suggest. Rather, it was constructed by Africans themselves so as to unite Nandi
speakers who were classified as a separate “tribes” by colonialists. In short, uniting people under
the banner of Kalenjin was a form of resistance against colonial authorities, missionaries and
anthropologist (Lynch, 2009, p.36)
Constructed or negotiated over time, ethnic groups are situational (Mitchell, 1956) and
relational (C.Young 1965). Fedrick Barth (1969) also places ethnic boundaries at the center of
the discursive framework. Throughout his book, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The social
organization of culture difference, Barth focuses on the interconnectedness of ethnic identities
and interdependence of ethnic groups. Because ethnic boundaries are not clear-cut, as suggested
by constructivists, there seems to be a heated debate about who is considered part of the group.
The interesting aspect of Barth work is that ethnic groups continue to debate over what it means
to be “us”, yet there seems to be little confusion when it comes to conceptualizing “others” or
“them”. Conceptions of “them” are often more readily defined –as ‘enemies’. Because they
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conceptualize notions of what it means to be “them”, ethnic groups are reminded of who they are
and what differentiates them versus ‘others’ (Ignatieff, 1994, p.14).
Even though ethnic identities are often a recent construct, never fixed and unchanging,
they seem to enjoy a seemingly natural or primordial appeal that depends upon assumed
communalities and differences of history and culture. The main difference between
constructivism and primordialism is that constructivism is more of a pluralist and less of an elite
theory. Constructivists argue that a complex process, usually referred to as social construction,
creates identities. Societies collectively “construct” identities as a wide array of actors
continually discuss the question of who “we” are (Berman, 2010, p.30) Hence, ethnic identity is
not permanent, but rather fluid and highly malleable concept. As a result, groups appear and
disappear, change their names, adapt their cultures, fight over who is or is not a real member of
the group, and address a myriad of demands to public institutions and other ethnic groups
(Berman 2010, p.25).	
  Primordialists suggest that ethnicity is a long-term, pre-colonial, fixed
level of identity. From this perspective, people were Zulu, Hutu, or Kikuyu even before they
become South African, Rwandan, or Kenyan (Englebert & Dunn, p. 65). Naturally, this
viewpoint fails to recognize the intricate intersections between the various social identities –race,
ethnicity, language, class, religion. Alternatively, one can think of social identity including
ethnicity as a more flexible process of contestation; which people can use, or not, depending on
their circumstance at the time. Therefore, using the ethnic card may appear politically relevant at
one point or place, and not in another depending on the agenda of the individual or social group.
My study, “Marginalization and Democracy: Kenya’s 2007 Post Election Violence”
draws on the concept of ethnicity as outlined by Nelson Kasfir, which is an extension of Lynch
(2011) and Barth (1969) work. For Kasfir, ethnicity contains objective characteristics associated
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with common ancestry, these include but not restricted to language, territory, cultural practices
and the like. These are perceived by both insiders and outsiders as important indicators of
identity, so that they can become the basis for mobilizing social solidarity and which in certain
situations result in political activity. (Kasfir, 2008, p. 77)
Not only does Kasfir’s argument propose a fluid concept of ethnicity, but also he
emphasizes the nexus between politics and ethnicity. This is central to my study of electoral
violence because it shows that political actors have the leeway to involve ethnic considerations in
their various situations. His conception of ethnicity allows for specification when applying to
different political scenarios (Elischer, 2008, p.8). It is thus possible that ethnic identity could
have played a significant role in Kenya’s post-election violence in 2007. Banon et al. (2004,
p.13) concluded that the political salience of ethnicity is heavily dependent on the intensity of the
political competition and as well as the larger national context.

All in all, scholars of African politics including (Kagwanja, 2010); (Rothchild &
Olorunsola, 1983); (Mutua, 2012); (Mamdani 1976); (Kitching 1982); (Lynch, 2012); (Hornsby,
2012); (Englebert & Dunn, 2013); and (Wrong, 2009) amongst many others, have argued that
ethnic groups might be the most important political category or actor in Africa; and that ethnic
identity might be the most important driver of individual political behavior. Those who disagree
will still recognize the importance of ethnicity, but more as a consequence than as a cause of
other features of African politics.

The initial notion of “tribal Africa” was an invention of the colonial mind. While the
process of cataloging, demarcating, and administering Africans as members of supposedly
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bounded “tribes” reinforced a sense of ethnic consciousness. The fact that the provincial
administration became the key interface linking the state and society, also provided many
Africans with reason to invest in their relationships with “ethnic leader”. Essentially ethnicity
became a mode of distributing state largesse and as the principle instrument of state control –
Coming together as an ethnic group was seen as a way to access centralized resources and of
avoiding state excess (Lynch, 2011, p.17) and for men in particular it was a way to assert control
over local contexts in a moment of rapid social change (Lynch, 2011, p.18). Colonial officials
encouraged this tendency and often supported ethnic claims and offered them period public
forums. Therefore colonial experience encouraged Africans to think and act ethnically in three
main facets: first, the categorization and administration of Africans as “tribemen” as part of
colonial divide and rule tactic, the work and role of anthropologists and missionaries reinforced
this arrangement. Secondly, the growth of real and perceived economic social inequalities along
regional and ethnic lines encouraged the sense of backward and advanced communities, which
exacerbated the negative competition and lack of national cohesiveness. Thirdly, the association
of discrete ethnic groups with the ownership and control of geographic areas promoted
communal claims of land rights and political representation. Prior to the advent of colonialism,
African societies in pre-colonial Africa perceived themselves as flexible entities. Home guards or
“collaborators” often offered much of the information that was used to delineate Africans into
“tribes”. Primordialism was never a constant. These social constructions have been sustained by
the new African elites, regarded as betrayers of nation-building (Berman, 2010, p.22)

With regard to African agencies, analysts such as Terence Ranger have argued that “tribal
Africa” was invented by the colonialists for personal gain. Whatever the case, the important
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point to note is that ethnicity offers a theoretical explanation for the post –election violence. The
social inequalities created by the colonizers and later by the Africans have not only caused ethnic
animosities, but they have also encouraged Africans to compete for national resources and
political power. Such competition in the event of perceived electoral violence may culminate into
widespread violence. In order to address the problem we have to find ways of forming inclusive
structures of the common good, wealth distribution, and political consensus. There will be no
lasting peace unless "the country addresses the fundamental inequalities that turned neighbor
against neighbor and ethnic group against ethnic group.

2.3 Class Analysis
	
  

This section will be organized in four parts. First, I will define the concept of class.
Second, I will discuss the major differences between Western views of class and non-Western
and African views on class relations. I will show how the concept of class has been modified and
applied to third world countries, particularly Africa. Thirdly, I will analyze how class formation
in Africa paved the way for class struggle. The intersection between class and ethnicity proves to
be vital in understanding the nexus between class formation and class struggle. Fourth, to
conclude, I will provide a brief discussion of Kenya’s class system and its utility for my thesis.
Class analysis has traditionally been a powerful mode of understanding social systems and
politics. Even though Karl Marx is often credited with advancing class analysis, other scholars,
including Aristotle, have been recognized as the first political theorists to analyze political
phenomena in terms of class interests (Grundy, 1964, p.379).
Others scholars of class analysis are Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Henry George,
Thorstein Veblen, Gaetano Mosca and Max Weber. However, it is Marx and Engels who more
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than anyone else before them represented politics as the specific articulation of class struggle. In
recent history, scholarship on class analysis has significantly declined among western thinkers
and writers. Part of the reason is that class analysis has been stigmatized, as a programme used
by Marxist-Leninist to challenge the capitalist socialist order in the West. Class analysis became
synonymous with revolution. In rejecting the prognosis of revolution, some Western thinkers
have repudiated class as a tool of empirical analysis. Yet, class analysis has continued to gain
significant currency in theory.	
  The material production and its attendant social relationships are
essential to deconstructing the political, socio-economic relations of the society. In fact, most
societies cannot be defined outside material production; and the Kenyan situation is not an
exception to this rule. For this reason, I believe the relevance and utility of class analysis is
crucial to understanding African political affairs and more importantly political violence, as the
case of 2007 elections. Given the broad literature on class and class relations, this discussion will
focus on the Marxian perspective of class analysis. This is because Marx delineated the interplay
between class formation, class struggle, and their relations to the state and on social change. The
spirit, if not the substance of Marx’s theory, proves worthy to be developed in my study.
Generally speaking, Marxists have identified five modes of production: the ancient, slave,
feudal, capitalist and communist (Wolff, 2013, p.10). Each is distinguished by its unique mode
of organizing the production, appropriation, and distribution of the surplus (Wolff, 2013, p.13).
According to Wolff, capitalist, feudal, and slave models of production share something in
common. Each of these modes of production, is based on the exploitation of those who produce
the surplus (workers) by those who own the means of production and are able to appropriate and
distribute the surplus. Whether it is through persuasion or coercion, the owners of the means of
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production are able to appropriate and further widen the gap between themselves and the
workers.
According to Englebert and Dunn (2013, p.109) classes are socio-economic groups
defined based on relationship to the means of production (capital, labor, and land), with the
dominant classes changing as the modes of production change. Central to the class characteristic
in Marx analysis is the relationship of exploitation. Classes are those groups in society which
either exploit or are being exploited by other groups. A further implication of this theory is that
classes in themselves are of little interest, what is important is the relationship between the
exploiter vs the exploited. Marx is, if anything a theorist of class relations, not a theorist of
classes. (Kitching, 1982, p.442).
In Marxism and African Liberation, Walter Rodney (1975) presents a detailed synopsis
of Marx’s theory. He states that “Marxist thought starts from a perspective of man’s relationship
to the material world; and that Marxism, when it arose historically, consciously disassociated
itself from….all other modes of perception which started with ideas, with concepts and with
words; and rooted itself in the material conditions and in the social relations in society”.
This definition takes into account the following categories: (1) those who perform the
necessary and surplus labor; (2) those who appropriate the surplus and distribute it; and (3) those
who receive these distributed shares of surplus. De Ste. Croix provides a more detailed
conceptualization of class. According to him, class is a group of persons in a community
identified by their position in the whole system of production (p.44). As a social group, classes
are also defined according to the conditions of production and to other classes. This class
relationship is based on the collective social expression of exploitation, which is embodied in the
social structure. By exploitation De Ste Croix meant the appropriation of part of the product of
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the labor of others.	
  In order for exploitation to take place, it must not merely be a relatively small
number of people appropriating the surplus product which others produced, but the exploiting
class must control the conditions under which another class can produce.
According to Miliband (1977), class identity is a fluid concept, just as ethnicity. He states
that members of one class may not feel any form of antagonism towards members of other
classes. There may be mobility between classes; however, classes in themselves remain
irreconcilably divided, whether conflict occurs or not (Miliband, 1977, p. 27). In Marxist
perspective, domination and conflict are inherent in class societies, and are based on specific,
concrete features of their mode of production. They are rooted in the process of extraction and
appropriation of what is produced by human labor. Given that conflicts are inherent in a class
system and thus difficult to solve, eruptions, outbursts, revolts and revolutions become the most
visible manifestations of a permanent alienation of the less dominant class. There is no escape
from such outbursts, unless there is a total transformation of the mode of production. Class
domination has many different and related facets (political, economic, and cultural) and the
struggle against this domination is equally varied and complex. Class struggle assumes many
different forms of expression and different levels of intensity and scope (Zeilig, 2009, p.27). The
immediate localized form of “normal” struggle occurs at an economic level where wage earners
upraise against their employers through strike action. Or it may be fought at a cultural level
wherein a permanent struggle for the communication of alternative and contradictory ideas,
values and perspectives are offered. Or it may be fought on a political level such that the existing
political arrangements are restructured. And it may of course assume peaceful or violent forms.
In the Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels, the capitalist society is reduced to two
classes: bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Miliband, 1977, p.22). Because of economic
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considerations, these two opposing classes become a reflection of the fundamental contradiction
of capitalism, the contradiction between capital and labor. Throughout Europe’s history, these
two classes have confronted each other from different angles, from freeman and slave, patrician
and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman to bourgeoisie and proletarian in the
epoch of capitalism. Friedrich Engels describes the bourgeoisie as follows: "By bourgeoisie is to
be understood the class of modern capitalists who own the means of social production and
exploit wage-labor ". The basic economic trait of the bourgeoisie is then the ownership of means
of production and the exploitation of wage-labor. It is this economic supremacy that allows the
bourgeois class to gain political supremacy; it also allows the bourgeoisie as the governing class
to force society to accept its own ideology as the dominant group (Mbengo, 1978, p.16). As part
of its exploitative nature, the bourgeoisie seeks to develop production and technology so as to
yield more. This further increases the antagonism between the capitalists and the masses, which
in turn leads to exploited masses to become aware of their common interest and forge
organizations that will enable them to carry out a revolution. The concentration of decisive
wealth in the hands of a few minority, who monopolize and privatize the social product, leads to
the overthrow of capitalist production relations and the victory of the socialist revolution, in
which the working class plays an important role (Mbengo, 1978, p.17).
Engels describes the working class in the Communist Manifesto as a class of modern
wage earning workers, who are compelled to sell their labor force because they do not have their
own means of production. The working class is, therefore, part of the collective laborer groups
which produces surplus value from the position of sub-ordination. It is at the lower end of the
income scale. The working class is further divided into different strata: industrial wage earners,
factory workers, and the ‘modern proletariat’ (Miliband, 1977, p.25). The term working class is
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often used interchangeably with the term proletariat. Because the working class is always
seeking to organize itself, and to improve its working conditions and occasionally overthrow the
capitalist, it is seen as the most progressive social class.
Apart from the two principal classes, the other classes are the petty bourgeoisie and the
intelligentsia. The petty bourgeoisie constitute of a fairly small group who live on the proceeds
of their own work (and that of their family) and own their means of production (Mbengo, 1978,
p.20). Their economic position empowers them to gain both political and ideological advantage.
The petty bourgeoisie constantly seeks to preserve its wealth, and to consolidate and increase it
so as to gain security from it. The petty bourgeoisie includes medium and small businessmen,
shopkeepers, self-employed, craftsmen, artisans, and small and median farmers. What
differentiates the working class from the petty bourgeoisie is that the former earn wages, but the
latter use their own productive forces or some paid labor to survive. Another social category is
the large and growing army of state employees who are engaged in administration and in police
and military functions. State employees are neither part of the working class nor the petty
bourgeoisie. Lastly, the intelligentsia of capitalist society plays an important role in the
production process. In economic terms, the intelligentsia functions within the division of labor. It
is separated from physical work in society and conditioned to undertake higher education in
contributing to the production process (Mbengo, 1978, p.21).
What are the major differences between class in the West and class in Africa? According
to Miliband, the Marxist view and application of class struggle in the West is different from how
developing countries perceive classes and class struggle. While African Marxists have often
analyzed the intersection between class and other kinds of social conflicts such as ethnicity,
nationality and religion, Eurocentric Marxists primarily focus on class and class struggle as a
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product of economic development only. For Western Marxists, conflicts based on ethnicity,
religion, and nationality are not seen as directly or indirectly derived from, or related to, class
conflicts (Miliband, 1977, p.19). They do however, recognize that they exist within society but
do not discuss the intersection of these forms of conflict and class conflicts. Moreover, classic
Marxist theory focuses on the struggle between two main classes: the bourgeoisie on the
capitalists, who own the means of production, and the much larger proletariat or ‘working class’,
who must sell their labor to maintain a position in society.
In Africa, class struggle is not restricted to bourgeois and proletariat class antagonism,
rather more classes are considered. They all contribute to the struggle within the boundaries of
the state. Richard Sklar (1979) concurred with this argument, stating that “African classes
coalesce around the state rather than the means of production, and that class struggles are not
dominant mode of class action on the continent.” (Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.111).
Class analysis is an important analytical tool in Africa and elsewhere, provided one does
not apply it with undue dogmatism. The vast majority of Marx’s work concerns capitalist
society. He sought to understand and critique this form of class structure. In the case of Africa, it
is unlikely to revolve around a conventional capitalist mode of production and to follow a pattern
of class struggle as delineated by Marx. In Africa, it is clear that class is perceived differently
than class in advanced capitalist societies. As a result, class relations and class conflict assume
different forms other than those encountered in capitalist societies. This is because Africa has a
unique history and trajectory of development compared to other parts of the world. For example,
colonialism and external capitalist domination impacted its economic, social and political
structures. The bourgeois theory represented in Western Marxism has to be adapted and applied
to the reality of “underdevelopment” in Africa.
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Under imperialism, capitalism expands and develops on a world scale, subordinating precapitalist modes of production and associated social formations to its demands. In understanding
the historical process of global capitalist political economy, it is important to distinguish between
the classic form of capitalism that developed in Western Europe and the forms of capitalism
which imperialism imposed on underdeveloped periphery of the world economy (Seddon, 2009,
p.57). In Africa, the forms of capitalism that exist today are the outcome of a long and
distinctive historical process. In what follows, I will consider the actual history of capitalist
development and class formation and the popular struggles that took place in Africa with the
advent of colonial rule.
The African case is illuminating with regard to the colonial imposition of the capitalist
system. It is clear that capitalism was a new concept to Africans, and it soon proved to be the
most powerful mode of production, as it restructured the entire pre-colonial mode of production
in a matter of three to four decades of colonial rule. However, this does not mean that the
existing mode of production was weak. On the contrary, some scholars have discussed Africa’s
pre-colonial mode of production. Kwame Nkrumah (1970), Wamba-dia-Wamba (1976), Amilcar
Cabral, and Walter Rodney (1975) have presented arguments with regards to Africa’s precolonial history. The main question they raise is: did classes exist in pre-colonial Africa? And if
so, was there a class struggle? To understand and describe the nature of relations of production,
one must revisit the ancient social forms.
In his article,	
  “Sociology of Primitive Societies, Evolutionism, and Africa” S.N.
Sangmpam attempts to answer this question using a Marxist Hegemonic theory developed by
Antonio Gramsci. Sangmpam argues that Marxist theories fail to ask whether hegemony exists in
the non-West.	
  He writes that “Hegemony exists in most societies, although it manifests itself in
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different forms; in some places it is manifested through class relations, in others through other
non-class relations, including lineage relations” (Sangmpam, 1995, p.623). As the dominant
mode of production in pre-colonial Africa, the lineage system is an example of a non-class
hegemonic structure. Though physical coercion was not used, Sangmpam argues that ideological
coercion was used by the leaders as a means of extraction. Ideological coercion refers to control
by using rituals and myths to form “an imaginary relationship between individuals or subjects (s)
and a “bigger subject”. This ideological coercion thus “regulated the relations of ownership, the
extraction of surplus product, the relationship between rulers and the ruled, competing individual
or group interests, and the distribution of resources.” Therefore, hegemony and ideological
coercion was used in pre-colonial Africa as a means for the rulers to control the population
because these were not class societies.
In almost every village in Africa, the senior lineage was accorded high marks of
deference.	
  (Lineage in this discussion refers to descent –a real or fictious common ancestor).
The head of the lineage indirectly controlled the labor process and the fund. The head of the
lineage was responsible for the over-all process of production. Everyone in society –male,
female, children and elders –had a place in the production process. The types of production range
from hunting, fishing, gathering, agriculture, and animal husbandry. The social relations of
production were dominated by the lineage system. This refutes the claim made by some
Eurocentric scholars, including Thornton (1983), Vansina (1978), and Leo Zeilig (2009) that
class relations dominated in pre-colonial Africa. Although production took place, class relations
as experienced in advanced capitalist societies and discussed above could not exist in precolonial Africa. This is because all the means of the production,	
  including land and sometimes
livestock, belonged to the community. Means of production were not based on capital or
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individual property. For this reason, class and class struggle could not exist in pre-colonial
Africa. There was lack of exploitation. For Marxists, exploitation is a central characteristic of
capitalist class. However, in the case of pre-colonial Africa everyone contributed to the
production process based on their age or position in the lineage system as opposed to their capital
accumulation.
This important distinction has been made by other African scholars, including Kwame
Nkrumah, who argued that production relations in pre-colonial Africa were based on
“communalism”. In his last publication, Class Struggle in Africa (1970, p.13), Nkrumah points
out five major types of production relationships known to man, namely communalism, slavery,
feudalism, capitalism and socialism. In essence, he differentiates the production in slavery from
capitalism and communalism. Nkrumah connects the lineage mode of production to
communalism. When land was allocated to an individual for his personal use, he was not free to
do as he pleased without the knowledge and permission of the community.
With the arrival of the colonialists, the existing mode of production was transformed into
capitalism and class-based exploitation. Capitalism, individualism and the tendencies toward
private ownership grew (Nkrumah, 1970, p.14). Under the colonial rule workers depended on a
wage income to settle their annual taxes (Mamdani, 1976, p.150). The indigenous people were
seen as a source of capital through their cheap labor, which in turn would support the high
demand for goods and materials in the western hemisphere. In the first phase of colonial
capitalism, all labor was reduced to the lowest common denominator, that of unskilled labor
producing raw materials on the land. (Mamdani, 1976, p.143). The main purpose of the colonial
state was to produce commodities for the metropolitan market. The economies of the colonies
became connected with world capitalist markets. This led to the destruction of political
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autonomy and the material base of the pre-colonial ruling groups. There was an expansion of
private farming and the method of small commodity production (Nkrumah, 1970, p.14). Besides
undermining the indigenous mode of production, it also created entire new classes. The class that
the colonial state created was the working class/the wage laborers, peasantry, petite bourgeois,
landed/landless class.
The colonial state created an economy that was based on economic dependency and
capitalism. Although Karl Marx anticipated aspects of underdevelopment theory –for instance
the growth of monopoly capitalism, and relationship of advanced capitalist countries with excolonial states, it was dependency theorists who elaborated Marx’s interpretation to make sense
of Africa’s political economy. The period following independence, Marxism as a theory and
ideology dominated the debates in Asia, Africa, Latin America as well as many parts of the
metropolitan world. Its omnipotence and proliferation was more profound in intellectual debates
among African Nationalist leaders who sought to critique the crisis in the capitalist-imperialist
mode of production (Rodney, 1975, p.1). In the first ten years of independence, even states that
were not explicitly “Marxist” expressed an allegiance to socialism, and an admiration for Soviet
Union (Zeilig, 2009, p.34). Such leaders included Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Julius
Nyerere amongst others (Zeilig, 2009, p.34). Adapting the ideas of Marxism seemed optimal for
these nationalist leaders because they regarded it as applicable to the African realities. Tom
Mboya, for example, maintained that socialism was intrinsic to the African traditional culture.
African post-colonial scholars came with a Marxian background to investigate whether
there are social classes in Africa, whether there is a class logic to African politics, and to what
extent the state might be an instrument of class domination? One of the first responses to this
question came from Tom Mboya, who asserted that “there is no such division into classes in
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Africa” (Zeilig, 2009, p.35). The logic behind his response was that African socialism has an
entirely different history compared to European socialism which focuses on the division between
capitalist class and an industrial proletariat. Therefore, there was no reason for Africa to argue
over the ideology or even define their actions based on doctrinaire theories (ibid, p.35).
The second response came from Nkrumah and Nyerere who also argued that classes did
not exist in pre-colonial Africa. In an effort to shed light on Africa’s pre-colonial history of
lineage modes of production, both leaders stressed on the importance of ‘communalism’ and
Ujamaa as form of resisting western capitalist penetration. However, these philosophies faced
various challenges throughout post-colonial period. The newly independent African states were
facing various economic hardships, particularly the oil crisis in the late 70s and early 80s.
Although the economic crisis was a global capitalist crisis, much of the pain of adjustment was
borne by developing countries. Loans from the west turned into debts, and more and more
African states found their options constrained and their macro-economic policies increasingly
shaped by the conditions imposed by western governments, private banks and their financial
institutions such as International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Unfortunately, the cost of economic liberalization and the austerity policies that
accompanied privatization seemed to have affected the poorest and most vulnerable groups. The
poor and working class, particularly, felt the pain of these policies. As wages went down,
popular struggles led mostly by the working class resisted against the austerity policies through
street demonstrations, marches, strikes and other forms of social movements. These popular
struggles were later reinforced by their collaboration with trade union movements, labor
movements and working class-action and even elements of lumpen proletariat and petty
bourgeoisie.
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Apart from the working class, another specific group that was negatively affected by
these policies is women.	
  Colonial administration and western missionaries’ structured the sexual
division of labor in a manner that placed men in senior roles in public offices, reflecting their
roles as “head” of the family and bread winners. With the conditions placed by financial
institutions, most African states were compelled to cut down on government expenses such as
subsidizing public health and education and providing jobs to support lower income households.
As a result, numerous men were left jobless which in turn forced African women to seek
alternatives to generate income for household consumption. Apart from rural to urban migration,
more and more women found themselves working in informal sectors for cheap labor and other
manual jobs. This change in the gender roles ultimately affected the gender inter-relations in the
household as well as the labor force.
African scholars such as Samir Amin (1972, 1976), Walter Rodney (1981) and John Saul
(1979) et al. reviewed national development plans so as to understand the crisis of
underdevelopment2 in third world countries. Andre Gunder Frank (1966) first elaborated
dependency theory in the context of Latin America. African scholars applied this theory to
Africa’s stagnation and underdevelopment. More importantly they used the theory to show how
post-colonial African governments took policies that affected the existing means of production
by privatizing land and by owning extractive industries and whatever little manufacturing
existed. The modernized nationalist “bourgeoisie” became a “new class of elites” who continued
to exploit the modes and relations of production to satisfy their own interests.
Underdevelopment theory is thus partly a correction and partly an expansion Marx’s
interpretation of history. Dependency theorists such as Mahmood Mamdani view the relationship
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between developed Western states and underdeveloped states as an exploitative one, wherein the
growth of core capitalist states took place at the expense of peripheral post-colonial states.
Contrary to the modernization theorists, African Marxists believe that underdevelopment is not a
natural condition faced by all early societies. Instead it was a deliberate and systematic
construction by colonialists to control and manipulate the economies of ex-colonial states for
their own interest. And the modernized nationalist “petty bourgeoisie” in Africa became a new
class of elites (comprador), which helps imperialism to continue exploiting the resources of
Africa while the comprador class benefits from those relations (Nyong’o, 1987, p.96).
Leonard Markovitz (1977) presented a strong argument that imperialism only changed
the economic basis of power of the governing classes. According to him, African traditional
societies did not disintegrate, they were only disrupted. In fact the disruption of traditional
economies became the trajectory for powerful alliances between the European masters and the
dominant groups. Therefore, in reality the ruling class remains the “old class” of European
colonialists, who are controlling the productive forces of the countries through a number of
auxiliary bureaucrats and technocrats. These bureaucrats and technocrats become the “new
class”. Traditional capitalist interests persist in Africa, but in a modernized form.
After his overthrow, in February 1966, Nkrumah focused his stance on class and class
struggle in Africa. He no longer denied the existence of class in Africa (Copans, 1985, p. 29). He
stated that “there is a struggle, oppression and exploitation, thus classes must exist” (Nkrumah,
1970, p.25). He goes on to note that 'Some have suggested that the social classes that exist
elsewhere in the world are unknown in Africa. Nothing is further from the truth. Africa today is
the field of a very violent class struggle'. Walter Rodney reiterates Nkrumah’s argument in his
article “Aspects of International Class Struggle in Africa, the Caribbean and America”. He states
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that “Nkrumah was engaging in ideological mystification under new facades such as
‘consciencism’ while doing little to break the control of international bourgeoisie or the
Ghanaian petty bourgeoisie over the state. Rodney makes the point that national and pan-African
movements require leadership that is loyal to the masses- the working class and the peasants.
At a political level, the state unites the ruling classes and divides the working classes. The
ruling class controls the state apparatus and the institutions while the working class remains
confined to the level of production. For Richard Sklar (1979), class relations in Africa were not
simply about capitalists vs. workers, but more importantly the role of the state in generating and
consolidating the various classes. The colonial state created classes through its capitalist
economic base; the state in post-colonial Africa became even more pronounced in socioeconomic affairs. As a result, class formation in Africa could not be discussed without
highlighting the role of the state.
One of the major differences between class analysis in advanced capitalist societies and
developing capitalist societies, such as Africa, is the lack of strong indigenous class of large
scale capitalists. Given the lack of industrialization and the limited spread of industrial capitalism
in various parts of Africa, class relations could not be defined only through industrial
‘production’ or exploitation. The major industrial, extractive, financial, and commercial
enterprises were mainly owned and controlled by foreign interests (Miliband, 1977, p.31). As a
result, in post-colonial Africa, the indigenous capitalist class was economically rooted in the
medium and small-scale enterprise, and partially dependent upon the foreign interest implanted
in the country. In effect, the mass of the working population is of peasant character, and the main
relations of production in these countries tend to be between landlords and peasants (Miliband,
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2013, p.32). As a result, the nature of class struggle in African situations tends to assume a
different a different form from those encountered in advanced capitalist societies.
The state role becomes crucial. Therefore, the other major difference between Western
views of class and African interpretation of class is the formation of the indigenous African
bourgeoisie thanks to the use of state power. The African capitalist state was directly responsible
for the emergence of an entire new class –petty bourgeois – who later became part and parcel of
colonial economic and social structure (Nkrumah, 1970, p.15). The African petite bourgeoisie
bear the hallmark of a fairly distinctive process of development because unlike classes in the
west, this emerging class was constructed to indirectly facilitate colonial exploitation and
domination even after colonial rule had ended. Ideally, the state represents itself as a state of all
classes or a state above all classes –a guardian of the general interest of society. For Africa, a
“veneer of Parliamentary democracy concealed a coercive state machinery” that was run by an
elite of bureaucrats with practically unlimited power (ibid, p.16). The ruling class in postcolonial Africa manipulated the state machinery to consolidate their economic prosperity and
extended the rewards of the state to support their immediate families, kin and loyal supporters
through neo-patrimonial politics of exclusion. In other words, they presented their own sectional
interest in the guise of the general interest (Mamdani, 1976, p.13).
Today, Marxist analysis in Africa seems to have taken a downward spiral. Similarly,
movements have become a less prevalent and underused concept. However, I argue that the
theory of classic Marxism, that is socialism from below, is still relevant in understanding social
revolutions in the form of class struggle. As long as inequality exists within a given space (state),
classes will seek to restructure the system. Marxist writers have attempted to find solutions to
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improve the conditions of African working class, as well as to diminish the gap between the
ruling class and the masses for a more equitable society.
Frantz Fanon, the activist, psychiatrist and revolutionary writer made a compelling
argument in his book, Wretched of the Earth (1961) about the relationship between the working
class, the class of nationalist leaders and the European workers. According to Fanon, the class of
nationalist leaders betrayed their people (working class) by accepting “the dividends that the
former colonial powers handed out”. He goes on to describe the nationalist leaders as “a sort of
little cast, avid and veracious” (Zeilig, 2009, p.174).
To a large extent, the dominant mode of thinking in Africa today is inherited from the
colonial masters and their creation of the state. Not surprisingly, therefore, the very concept of
class has been dogmatically applied and often ignored. The petty bourgeoisie leadership since
independence has been an obstacle to further the development of the African revolution by either
exploiting the working class or denying that there are any class differences between themselves
on the one hand and the workers and peasants on the other (Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1976). The
apologists for one party-state system seeks to deny the existence of classes and class struggles in
order to reject the demand of democracy. Wamba takes the case study of Congo-Brazzaville to
explain his point. His point is that ‘one classless community’ leads to ‘one people’, ‘one party’,
‘one leader, father figure, father of the nation’ (Nyong’o, 1976, p.101). In other words, neocolonial regimes use the demagoguery of “oneness of the community” to equate it to “oneness of
community interest” or oneness of class, which does not make sense.
In his book, Big Men Little People (1999), Alec Russell describes how the African petty
bourgeoisie betrayed the nationalist movement by legitimizing their control over property
through the capitalist system and by later using coercive means such as militarization. In present
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day Africa, class relations are still determined by relations of power not economic production
(Englebert & Dunn, 2013, p.111). Whereas in pre-colonial Africa hegemonic power is
manifested through the lineage mode of production, today hegemonic power and status is derived
through the state. Gaining access to the state is therefore how one gains access to resources. In
this sense, political corruption becomes the primary means of accumulating wealth. The end
result is cultivation of clientalism as national resources are distributed both vertically and
horizontally from state to local elites rather than merit-based. The richest in Kenya benefit from
significant proportion of the surplus product, labored by workers and peasants and equally
receive a disproportionate share of the product when monetized and circulated. The poorest in
Kenya produce little or no surplus labor. Instead most of their labor time is expended in the
pursuit of basic subsistence. Over the years such inequalities in production circulation of state
resources have contributed to class antagonism and resentment across all social groups.
Following independence, the new Kenyan elites, who assumed control, entrenched themselves in
the economy by taking over the former settler farms and the major agricultural units of
production. They also consolidated their hold on political power through constitutional
amendments that stifled opposition political parties and centralized power in the executive. Party
leaders were rewarded with positions in government and access to the settler farms in the White
Highlands. Clientelism flourished and emerged as the main means of cementing class relations
between elites.
By examining these relations and their impact on the lower classes, class analysis helps
me to partly verify my hypothesis about class marginalization and electoral violence.
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CHAPTER  3:  ROOTS  OF  MARGINALIZATION:  LAND,  ETHNICITY  AND  CLASS  
FORMATION  
	
  

In this chapter, I will analyze the intersection of land tenure, class formation and ethnic relations
to understand social marginalization through the state apparatus. The Kenyan state is partly
responsible for consolidating marginalization of social groups by implementing land policies that
favored colonial ethnic reserves and class stratification. Often the state set the stage for social
realities of class and ethnicity to converge. The creation of a taxable base among rural Africans,
and the expansion of commodity production, were critical aspects of the penetration of the
colonial state. The dislocation or rather paradigm shift of articulating rural societies in terms of
clan and family to a wider framework of interaction, culminated in the emergence of ethnicity as
source of loyalty. The rural-urban migration during the colonial and post-colonial period served
to strengthen the social realities of class and ethnicity and the interplay between the two. Towns
served as crucibles in which class and ethnicity fused together, the rural sectors experienced
patterns of restratification which often tended to fragment the rural communities across ethnic
lines. (Kagwanja, 2010, p.55)
The chapter has three sections. In the first section, I will be discussing state and class
formation in precolonial, colonial and post-colonial Kenya. The land question is integral to the
formation of classes in Kenya because land is not just a primordial inheritance but also a means
to access of production and wealth. The second part of the analysis focuses on how the state
ethnicized the land question through politics of exclusion, neo-patrimonialism and eventually
ethnic profiling of various groups. The third section in a summary of argument in light of the
land tenure issue.
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3.1 State and Class Formation
	
  

The class stratification of Kenyan society stemmed from the changes in production forces
as the country transitioned from peasant mode of production to capitalism mode of production.
Class analysis in Kenya can be subdivided into three major eras: pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial.
Colonial stratification undermined traditional land tenure and imposed a racialist system
of administration. With time, this provided the breeding ground for inequality and resentment to
flourish within the alienated majority, that is, the working class. The trajectory of colonialism
changed the economy by facilitating the emergence of an African petite bourgeoisie. It increased
the importance of domestic and foreign markets for peasant agriculture and pastoralism and the
subjugation of women and the emergence of a predominantly male wage-labor force.
To gain a deeper understanding of the intricate relationship between land and class in
present day Kenya, it is necessary to understand how colonialism encroached upon pre-colonial
African communities (Kikuyu, Masaai, Luo etcetera), thus laying the foundation of new social
and economic order. But to do so, I will revisit some relevant aspects of pre-colonial mode of
production that shaped the transformation of the country’s political economy (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.58)
Agriculture and animal husbandry were the main sources of subsistence in pre-colonial
society, but they were not the only economic activities. One important activity that proved
particularly adaptable to the colonial economy was trade. Oral histories from veteran kikuyu
entrepreneurs provide an account of how kikuyu traders exploited the commercial opportunities
offered by pre-colonial societies. Traders led caravans numbering 30-200 over Nyadarua
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Mountains to trade the various products of kikuyuland for the livestock of the pastoral Masaai
(Leo, 1984, p.38). The entrepreneurship of long distance traders was closely tied to the land. This
is because most of the products –as well as the animals that represented the profits –were
agricultural goods. The advent of European settlers saw the reciprocal relationship between trade
and agriculture grow into larger scale production. The traditional form of barter exchange was
replaced by cash trade system for the reminder of the colonial period and after independence.
The relationship between land transaction and class formation among the kikuyu ethnic
community is noteworthy. This is because the kikuyu grievance over land transaction turned out
to have the greatest long-term impact on Kenya’s politics. Also because the kikuyu represent the
largest percentage of ethnic group in the country. In pre-colonial era, the basic unit of kikuyu
society was mbari, or lineage, which consisted of the descendants of a single man. The members
of mbari, who usually numbered in the hundreds, were the joint owners of a piece of land, called
their githaka (Leo, 1984, p.30). The original acquisition of a githaka took place when a man
undertook the first clearing of virgin land or when he purchased land. Thereafter, his descendants
would inherit pieces of that land for their own use. After the death of the founder of a mbari, the
lineage would select a muramati, a leader of the mbari in matters of the land. According to
Christopher Leo (1984), “The murumati had no more cultivation or building rights than his
brothers” (p.30). Instead land was distributed to members of each successive generation
according to their need for it. In addition, there was a variety of means for those who had no
rights to become tenants of the githaka. For example, land could be distributed based on family
ties or friendship, in exchange for livestock or for labor or commodities. This ensured that
marginalization and exclusion of “others” did not prevail. When the githaka became
overcrowded some members of the mbari could move out to new land and form a new group
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(Leo, 1984, p.32). However, Europeans claimed unrestricted right to unoccupied land. Such
seizures robbed the kikuyu land tenure system of its dynamic element and brought about
distortions, not only in land tenure but also in the social system as a whole.
When the first Europeans arrived in the Kenyan highlands, they found a society largely
untouched by capitalism. Social organizations were focused on the extended family and the
people earned their livelihoods by agriculture, cattle keeping, handicrafts and barter. The
colonial era brought both the benefits and disruptions of capitalism to Kenya. Europeans
introduced modern agriculture, commerce and industry. In the process new wealth was created
side by side with new poverty, and each was contingent upon the other. (Leo, 1984, p.27) Much
of the wealth was based upon the exploitation of agricultural land, while some poverty stemmed
from the loss of land and exploitation of labor upon the land.
Europeans were not familiar with African land tenure systems and there was a tendency
to assume that githaka rights were nothing more than temporary rights of usufruct rather than the
permanent rights that they in fact were (Leo, 1984, p.28). The assumption made it easy for
Europeans to claim any piece of githaka land that was temporarily not being used. Africans on
the other hand, may not have understood in the early days that when Europeans offered money
for land they were after permanent and inalienable rights. In some instances, they may have
believed they were granting the kinds of tenancy rights described above: distribution based on
friendship, in exchange for commodities without involving permanent rights. The sense of
private property vested in the family was highly developed even among the Gikuyu, however it
did not necessarily mean the exclusive use of land by the owner, or the extorting of rents.
Europeans misinterpreted this act by stating that land was under communal or tribal ownership,
and as such the land become ‘mali ya serekali’ which means government property. Having
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coined this new terminology of land tenure, the British government began to drive away the
original owners of the land (Kagwanja, 2010, p.60).
An area totaling three million acres was reserved for European agriculture and Africans
were barred from owning land within it. Colonial economy in Kenya converted the peasants
existing communities from independent peasants producing crops for their subsistence, into
peasants dependent on agricultural wage-labor. Africans were compelled to work partly by force,
partly by taxation, and partly by preventing them from having access to enough land or profit
crops to enable them to pay taxes without working for wages. The wages they received were
extremely low compared to their contribution in the production process (Leys, 1975, p.34)
Through the establishment of Kenya Land Commission, the British settlers were able to
acquire the most suitable land for cash crop farming with more rainfall and higher yielding
potential compared to reserves where African or rather ‘natives’ were restricted to. The largest
proportion of the arable land was mixed farmland, supporting a variety of crops, notably cereals
and vegetables, and dairy cattle as well. The squatter system became the legal framework
supporting the exploitation of proletariat or working class by the “bourgeois” –white settlers who
owned the means of production such as land and technology. Squatter system assured Europeans
farmers of a constant supply of cheap labor, while at the same time maintaining the
exclusiveness of their rights of ownership and permanent residency in the highlands (Leo, 1984,
p. 29). Under the squatter contract, the squatter agreed to work a specified number of days per
year and in return the settler allowed him and his family to live on the farm and cultivate a plot
of their own. Africans were forbidden to reside in the white highlands in any status other than
that of their respective labor contracts. The white settlers imposed limits on the squatters’ stock
and on the size of their cultivation plots, to increase their workloads, and even to get rid of some
	
  

77	
  

	
  
	
  

of them. In Marx’s central analytical perspective the exploiting class can determine both the
conditions under which another class can produce and the level of that class’s subsistence.
Therefore the European capitalist class determined the value of African labor power which the
African working class sold (Leo, 1984, p.45)
Unfortunately, the migrant squatters were no longer assured of their native land rightsgithaka (ancestral home). This legislation further implied that European settlers could grab all
‘unoccupied’ land in native reserves, leaving the poor African working class with limited access
to land. To squatters the enforcement of such regulations meant that they were gradually being
reduced from quasi-peasant status to landless laborers (Leo, 1984, p.36). It also meant that their
low income-wage was insufficient to sustain their needs and that of their family. Their previous
incentive of cultivation rights and opportunity to keep substantial number of livestock in the
European ranches was no longer insured. Another obstacle for squatters was the kind of tasks
and skills they were restricted to perform in the production process. Most squatters were
deliberately kept ignorant of modern agriculture and animal husbandry so that they remained
mere cogs in a machinery. Their restriction to manual labor and other simple routine tasks kept
them from retrieving their peasant status. As such, squatters and other wage laborers sought offfarm labor market for their resources to begin accumulation (Kitching, 1982, p.370).
The discovery of informal sector provided the poorest households with prospect of
upward mobility. As population pressure resulted in congestion and declining productivity in the
native reserves, and as the ongoing process of stratification turned that pressure into an
impoverishment of those who lost out in the land scramble, so it become ever more necessary for
the poorest male labor power to find an outlet elsewhere and for its subsistence pressure to be
taken off the land (Kitching, 1982, p.378). Population pressure led to migration into white
	
  

78	
  

	
  
	
  

highlands in search of wage labor, adding to the number of kikuyu squatters already in the
highland. The population growth also spawned the upsurge of urban migration and
unemployment by African labor force. The growing labor abundance only necessitated a greater
intensity of labor exploitation by the capitalist class. This is not a contradiction as Marx explains
in Volume I of Capital that “a large and growing reserve army is often a perquisite of greater
exploitation, as it helps ensure the docility and pliability of the work force in employment.”
(Kitching, 1982, p.380) In essence, the increasing ‘surplus’ of labor slowed down the rate of
increasing wages –particularly for the unskilled laborers. The implication of urban migration was
manifested through the widening gap between wages of unskilled workers in urban areas such as
Nairobi, Kisumu and Mombasa and those of skilled or white-collar employees. To this date, the
gap in social classes of urban population continues to separate or rather marginalize the unskilled
working class from the skilled white-collar employees. As a result, the agrarian class system
established by the British settlers’ transformed local societies consisting of cultivators,
herdsmen, and petty traders into a landless class, a peasantry and a petty bourgeoisie (Leo, 1984,
p.20) In short, colonialism produced class formation within African society.
Not all Africans fared as badly under colonialism as did the squatters. For some, colonial
economies evoked a chance of missionary education, a relatively well salaried job, or a profitable
enterprise. For Africans to take advantage of such opportunities they needed to acquire the
necessary skills and capital accumulation to participate in the fast growing modern sector of
Kenyan’s economy. In the process, the kaleidoscope of classes and class fractions characteristic
of a nascent capitalist economy took shape: a peasantry, the most prosperous part of which soon
began to build an agricultural base for capital accumulation; a petty bourgeoisie, including
traders, merchants, and a salariat; and wage workers, many of whom –by virtue of part-time
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pursuit of petty trade and or continued attachment to land –were more akin to an embryonic petty
bourgeoisie, or a peasantry, than a proletariat (Leo, 1984, p.49) These classes remained fluid
over time because people moved freely back and forth and also because peasants practiced two
or more occupations as wage laborers and traders at times.
Colonization engendered social classes through three main avenues. First and foremost,
colonial modern economy introduced a different type of mobile trade from that of kikuyu and
Masaai traders in pre-colonial communities. It involved buying surplus produce from squatters
and transporting it to markets in urban cities and towns such as Nairobi, Eldoret and Kisumu. In
urban areas, there were outlets for African entrepreneur talents ranging from butcher shops,
small restaurants, teashops and maduka (provision stores). While in countryside towns Africans
traded in farm produce (Leo, 1984, p.51). Regardless of urban or rural settings, modern trade
contributed to class formation by changing class consciousness and changing the relations to the
means of production. For Karl Marx, classes become truly classes when their members become
aware of their specific economic interests as distinct from those of people in other classes. Once
this happens, classes conflict with each other and class struggle becomes the engine of history
(Englebert & Dunn, 2013 p.109)
The second mode of class formation in colonial era was education. Education through
missionary schools, government schools, technical training programs and university degrees all
provided the avenues for Africans to acquire a class position in the Kenyan society. In the eve of
Kenya’s independence, graduates of secondary and tertiary education were offered the
opportunity to serve modern sector of the economy as business entrepreneurs, top leadership in
political administration and civil service. As long as their education was sufficient, the postindependence wave of Africanization secured their position as petty bourgeois.
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The third mode of class formation is related to the second case in terms of economic
consolidation. Richard Sklar (1979, p.168) notes that once a dominant class forms it attempts to
reconstruct the existing organization of authority in accordance with perceived needs (Englebert
& Dunn p.112). Economic domination is consolidated as the elites use their power and control of
the law to acquire substantial plots of land and provide the best education for their children, who
will become the next generation of elites. The new class of African elites used the state
institutions to gain access to resources and state power. This was done by transferring the assets
from foreign companies and investors through the wave of nationalization in order to accumulate
personal wealth. In this context, political corruption becomes the primary means of
accumulating wealth. Politically the ruling class may embrace authoritarian ways and military
rule in order to protect itself from the challenges of growing class consciousness among the
masses. In some cases, politicians have used “tribalism” to divide the lower classes and prevent
them from gaining class consciousness and overthrowing the government. This is arguably one
of the reasons for the failed coup-d’état in 1982 and subsequent 1992.
The re-Africanization of white highlands in early 60s transformed the land issue into a
prime site of ethnic and class competition over resources left by European. The settlement
scheme involved the government buying farms from ‘willing settlers’ and turning them into
settlement schemes designed to suit different social classes. There were schemes for peasant
laborers and squatters, and also schemes for capitalist farmers (new economic and political elite)
with interest in commercial farming. The class dimension in the resettlement scheme was evoked
through the skewed bias for those with operating capital. Therefore those with ability to pay 10%
deposit for the cost of the scheme secured larger plots. The landed elite remained in control of
both the politics and economics and used their upper hand to accumulate benefits. For example,
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they financed violence through militia groups and gangs to deflect attention from the soaring
inequality in land ownership to inequalities in distribution of political power (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.54)
Independence made little or no structural difference, in fact, there was a continuity of
socio-economic trends from the colonial to post-colonial stage. The process of differentiation,
which is the relative gap between the richest and poorest African household gained momentum.
Some African households gained access to the very highest income and to forms of wealth which
had previously been monopolized by Europeans and Asians (Kitching, 1982, p.316). The
intensification of the widening gap was facilitated by the inequality in access to the state
resources. In short, the post-colonial state become the very foundation of economic prosperity.
One of the most important social classes to be developed was that of African petite bourgeoisie
also known as bureaucratic bourgeoisie. This is because the bourgeoisie in African countries bear
the hallmark of a fairly distinctive process of development.
An understanding of the development of African bourgeoisie requires viewing it as part
of the broader process of class formation. Before I begin, however, a clarification is in order. My
interest here is not to underline the functional or economic character of this bourgeoisie, i.e.
whether its operations were predominantly merchant or industrial. The point of this analysis, as
will become clear, is to underline the political characteristic of the African bourgeoisie. The
African bourgeoisies developed by and large as a comprador class to help establish the western
capitalist imprint on development. Under colonial rule Europeans imported immigrant
bourgeoisie from India to East Africa and from Lebanon to West Africa to mediate on their
behalf for market relations with indigenous chiefs. Colonial era later foresaw the development of
a substantial indigenous bourgeois stratum (Nyong’o, 1987, p.84). In this sense, indigenous
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African bourgeoisie has for the most part been a very recent, post-independence formation. In its
creation, the direct employment of the state power has played a central role. Thus, having a state
connection has been vital for an individual to become a member of this class and to prosper as
one (Nyong’o, 1987, p.84). This is indeed true of the Kenyan state following independence. This
is why the development of an African bourgeoisie has had a more top-down character than
anywhere else. Here state position acts as a lever for capital accumulation rather than being
rewarded for it. The high stakes in the Kenyan political system partly stemmed from “class
consciousness” of the political elite who viewed public office as a means to gain access to state
resources, ‘privileges’ and opportunities. This individualistic culture of personal improvement
“up the social ladder” and notion of “human progress” was ingrained within the western
philosophical tradition. Most Kenyan elites were exposed to the British culture and education
which sustained capitalist system through the exploitation of cheap labor and consumerism of
western goods. A ‘winner takes all’ political system means that political contests have become
all the more charged because of what is at stake; those who achieve political power benefit from
“corruption and misuse of public resources” for personal gain. The objective is therefore, to
secure control of the state in order to eat. This is partly why elections in Africa, whether single or
multiparty affairs are usually a “predictable hoax” (Nyong’o, 1987, p.89). And also why the
typical method of resolving contradictions inside the bourgeoisie is a coup not an election.
Criticism is seen as sabotage and opposition is normally depicted as treason.
In summary, the colonial state changed the pre-colonial mode of production which was
lineage system to capitalist mode of production. European administration and private enterprise
introduced two explosive novelties: wage or salary employment and formal education. The latter
was often the vehicle for African entry into the former; it was the predominant vehicle for access
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to the higher levels of wage and salary positions. European settlers introduced the notion of
money or cash to acquire land, industries and properties of the indigenous communities through
the idea of “willing buyer, willing seller” (Nyawalo et al. 2010, p.69). The Europeans also
introduced ‘permanent’ private property which was unheard of among the indigenous African
communities. The European capitalist mode of production also facilitated the conditions for a
new social class to emerge, the petite bourgeoisie. The Kenyan petite bourgeoisie become
voracious consumers of western products, while grassroots’ cheap labor provided the raw
materials to support the capitalist machinery. The petite bourgeoisie was given access to state
resources by the departing European settlers which they used to consolidate their landholdings,
natural resource endowment, off-farm businesses and investment in education. Their desire for
material possession manifested through their greediness to accumulate immense wealth at the
expense of the masses. Over time, this tendency has created inequalities and unevenness among
the various social classes: peasantry, working class and petite bourgeois amongst others.
Peasant agriculture and pastoralism became increasingly geared to production for
domestic and foreign markets; and changes in the sexual division of labor led to the greater
subjugation of women—particularly in the poorest households—and to the emergence and
stratification of a predominantly male African wage labor force. The colonial state divided the
country into producing and non-producing areas or regions. Some of the inequalities arose from
the fact that some households inhabited land which was not suitable for intensive production. For
many years, the bulk of state resources were concentrated in the ‘high potential areas’ leaving the
semi-arid pastoral communities lagging behind in all spheres of development (Mutua, 2008,
p.27). Because of their resource base, some regions such as Rift Valley and Central province,
have been privileged over others in the development process of the country. The
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institutionalization of social inequities over the years created widespread marginalization and
resentment across the various ethnic groups and social classes.
In Kenya, the ruling class or rather the African petite bourgeois took charge of production
and circulation of surplus product, principally through the state power. The Kenyan petite
bourgeoisie took advantage of the basic political relation between the state (rulers) and the
popular classes (the ruled) to amass the resources that belonged to the people. The ruling class
resorted to patronage system in rewarding loyal allies and extended family with state resources.
This generated widespread exploitation of all social classes, particularly working class. Class
struggle manifested in numerous forums including political rallies and formation of local gangs.
The Kenyan state had failed its obligation of protecting its citizens as part of the social-contract

3.2  Ethnic-‐Politicization  
	
  
The recent post electoral violence and the conduct of the preceding electoral campaigns
brought into sharp focus the underlying ethnic fissures in Kenyan society. The historical origins
of socio-political marginalization and economic inequality can be traced back to colonial
manipulation of ethnicity and ethnic groupings. I argue that land reforms through settlement
schemes and the land purchase programme ethnicized the land question and subsequently laid
the foundation for ethno-political conflicts.
For Kenyans, ethnicity is defined along tribal lines; a sense of belonging is attached to
common tribal roots. This sense of belonging could impact a society positively or negatively.
Positive ethnicity diverts the focus from ethnic competition to individuals contributing towards
developing regions in the country. For instance, where individual members of an ethnic group
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join efforts to raise funds for development of their rural village it could be termed as positive
ethnicity. Negative ethnicity connotes a sense of belonging harnessed to perpetuate exclusiveness
in ethnic relations and as a point of competing against other ethnic groups. An example of
negative ethnicity is when certain communities are perceived to be favored by those in authority
while ‘others’ are left marginalized from national resources and political power (Mutua, 2008,
p.19). Those that are believed to be ‘favored’ or ‘chosen’ manage to secure and build up
resources. In the process, they may develop a sense of superiority and have been known to
engage in disparaging the identities of other communities (Nyawalo, 2011, p.36). In the long-run
marginalized communities harness resentment against the government and particularly the rival
ethnic group; this may culminate into widespread violence also identified as ethnic conflict.
Ethnic conflicts on the other hand, are described as conflict between two or more ethnic groups
over identity, borders and resources. This is because all ethnic groups seek to secure more power
or access more resources in order to evade becoming oppressed by ‘others’.
Historically, Kenyans have used social identities such as ethnicity and religion to
determine their votes for political leaders. Given the fluid nature of social identities –race,
religion, class, ethnicity and nationality, people may fight for control over resources using
different avenues depending on the situation at hand. These include: ethnic conflict, class
conflict, national conflict etcetera. A clear example of the fluidity of ethnic identity in the
Kenyan situation is where ‘traditional’ tribal identity shifted from individual tribes to regional
identity in post-independence era. In this case, the point of identity becomes regional such as
western, eastern or central as opposed to Kikuyu, Luo or Kamba which is tribal. It is this
potential to negatively manipulate the existence of distinct groups in a plural society that presents
a potential for societal instability.
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Ethnic relations and conflicts over land
According to Peter Kagwanja (2010) settlement schemes and the land purchase
programme contributed to ethno-political conflicts from the 1960s. Lumumba (2005) concurs
with Kagwanja on the argument that Kenya’s recurrent and persistent ethnic conflict was laid on
the eve of independence in 1963, when both administrative and ethnic boundaries were
conveniently made coterminous (Kagwanja, 2010, p.61). According to Lumumba, the decades
following independence witnessed a similar pattern of land-ethnic relations reminiscent of
colonial policies in the twenties and thirties. He elaborates that “while land is a necessary starting
point for explaining why ethnic conflict persists in the country, it is not sufficient to unravel all
the forces that have given rise to ethnic animosities” (ibid., p. xvii) Some of the issues he
discusses include: rural-rural migration (for the purpose of land consolidation); rural-urban
migration that has pitted in-migrants against natives of an area); ethnic animosities stemming
from inequitable division of the national cake, land disputes, political wrangling; and political
marriages and separations of convenience among potentially antagonistic ethnic groups; lack of
inspiring, nationalistic and neutral political leadership. (ibid., p. xvii)
•

The Pre-colonial period
The conceptual, legal and sociological policies of British colonizers interfered with the

process of evolution and expansion of a large number of pre-colonial ethnic groups in East
Africa. Bantu speaking communities such as the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru inhabited the richest
agricultural lands in central Kenya. These communities grew beans, peas, sweet potatoes,
sorghum, arrowroot and millet besides keeping livestock. Their produce allowed them to sustain
their population increase as well as nurture a constant trade with neighboring agro-pastoral
communities such as Maasai and Akamba. On the other hand, in western Kenyan the Luo and
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Luhya reared animals and cultivated crops. The Luhya were characterized by internal and
external rivalry as they confronted their neighbors over land and pasture. Among the major
causes of fighting were periodic draughts and famine (Kagwanja, 2010, p.48). Similarly, the
Kalenjin communities in Rift Valley and Mount Elgon Region were involved in intensive intertribal warfare throughout the nineteenth century. Regional trade among these communities
provided inter-ethnic linkages and coexistence that militated against land based conflicts.
The Nilotic-speaking groups such as Turkana, Maasai, and Nandi pastoralist controlled
the largest portion of Kenya’s pre-colonial territory. The Maasai in particular had conquered and
assimilated several ethnic groups in their movement downward to present day Tanzania. The
Maasai had found Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities living in most of western and eastern
highlands, through their colonizing tactics they managed to deprive the movement of these two
groups to fertile grazing lands (Kitching, 1982, p.78). However, the Maasai power dwindled
tremendously toward the end of the nineteenth century mainly due to internal wars among
Maasai groups, natural disasters and livestock diseases. This allowed the Kamba, Kikuyu and
Kalenjin raiders to encroach on Maasai grazing lands and absorb survivors of the Maasai wars
(Nyawalo et.al, 1982, p.28). This pre-colonial ethnic-land relationship is important. It sets the
stage for how ethnic groups related to each other prior to the advent of European colonizers.
Secondly, it enables the readers to understand why ethnic animosity has persisted in Kenya.
Lastly, the importance of revisiting pre-colonial ethnic relations with regards to land is to show
that ethnicity thrived in most pre-capitalist African societies. Therefore colonial rule did not
balkanize African societies into ‘tribes’ as suggested by instrumentalists.
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•

Colonial period

According to instrumentalistm, colonialism and the post-colonial state elite engendered and
fostered “ethnic” allegiance by imposing alien land-tenure relations on prevailing traditional
Kenyan society. The land policies fostered by colonial and post-colonial administrations
benefited certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. With the arrival of the British settlers,
new land policies and legislation were arbitrarily drafted so as to prevent land speculation that
had occurred in other white settlement areas. The area north of present day Nairobi was occupied
by the agricultural kikuyu and was particularly attractive to the settlers because of the water
abundance and other natural resources. In fact, approximately 60,000 acres of kikuyu territory in
Kiambu-Limuru district was transferred to settlers’ between 1903 and 1906 (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.49). Maasai pastoralist faced a similar fate, two treaties of 1904 and 1911 respectfully resulted
in the loss of prime grazing land especially in Laikipia region. From then onwards the process of
land contestation has been battled out in court by young educated Maasai members who felt
aggrieved by the contracts of the treaty. Some of these cases have been dismissed due to
technicalities while others are still ongoing.
Apart from the Maasai, other ethnic groups have protested against land measures
introduced by the colonial government, such as forced labor, doubling of taxation, and the launch
of kipande (identity card). These complaints led to the establishment of a Land Commission in
1932 to look into the grievances. Unfortunately, the Commission faced various challenges
including lack of transparency and accountability in its policies. For economic reasons, the
commission deliberately created land reserves based on ethnic groupings. The policy of land
reserves was reinforced through kipande system, which in turn provided a pool of cheap labor for
European farmers (Leo, 1984, p.42). Many landless kikuyus migrated to the Rift Valley region,
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or were descendants of squatters outside the reserves. The Land Commission results were bitterly
disappointing for the African populations as they endorsed segregated system of land holding.
The segregation of land was not just based on class, but also legal dimension in terms of
introducing the notion of “land-titles” and eventually fuelled ethnic animosity, because the
policy of reserves strengthened the basis for tribal allegiance.
The use of the term tribe and tribalism especially when applied to the African situation is
fairly controversial. Instead the term ethnicity is seen to be politically correct. However, for the
sake of this analysis, I will refer to the term tribe from time to time especially because the term is
familiar to most readers and has long been used by many political leaders and scholars of ethnic
politics. Ethnic marginalization stemming from colonial rule can be analyzed using an
instrumentalist approach. According to the theory of instrumentalism, colonial and post-colonial
state elite engendered ethnic allegiance its saliency and persistence by imposing alien land-tenure
system through the policy of reserves and artificial tribal boundaries. The kipande system was a
clear example of how colonialists imposed the notion of ethnicity and ethnic allegiance on
African societies (Leo, 1984, p.45). Similarly, the categorizing and counting of ethnic groups by
the colonial state was an active intervention into the process of ethnic social and political
creation. According to Bruce Bermen (2010 p.22) the colonial state was acutely conscious of
Africans living in ‘tribes’ and they used the instruments of the modern state power to define and
classify Africans through scientific instruments like maps and census. Such maps and census
were later adopted by the post-colonial state to assign individuals and communities to what were
believed, often erroneously, as ancient primordial identities. The social construction of ethnic
differences was also spurred by European missionaries who produced grammars and dictionaries
that later turned local dialects into the standardized written language of an entire ethnic group.
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Ethnic animosity between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin/Maasai took a downturn spiral
after the release of Jomo Kenyatta. Prior to his release, Oginga Odinga addressed a large crowed
in May 1961 stating that Africans should not buy land in the white highlands from departing
Europeans because the land was rightfully theirs. The Kalenjin and Maasai concurred with
Odinga based on their primordial beliefs. However, Kenyatta soon undermined their concerns.
Kenyatta stated that land should be bought so as to respect property rights. This statement
aggrieved many not only because land was not seen as something to be purchased but also
because it created divisions within the nationalist movement in 1960’s. This was later reflected
by political ideology and ethnic-politicization around economic interests. Ethnic groups as
Robert Bates observes, “persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services
from modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members (Bates, 1983, p.154).
Insofar as they provide these benefits to their members they are able to gain their support and
achieve their loyalty. The alliance of the Kalenjin groups in Rift Valley and the Coastal
communities was simply based on fear and suspicion of the Kikuyu.
Land question had informed the politics of transition to uhuru –independence. African
leaders had formed political parties along ethnic lines. For example, the two main parties KANU
(Kenya African National Union) and KADU (Kenya African Democratic Party) were divided on
a number of issues mainly evoking from ethnic animosity. KANU was led by Jomo Kenyatta
with membership support from large Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups, while KADU was under the
leadership of Ronald Ngala. KADU’s aim was to protect the interest of its members –
KAMATUSA (an acronym for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu). KADU argued for
restoration of precolonial land (read Rift Valley) to its primordial inhabitants, that is Kalenjin,
Maasai and their related groups. As such, KADU advocated Majimbo system which is a federal
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structure of government in which primordial ethnic groups could recover their territories. On the
other hand, KANU mostly made up by GEMA3 members preferred a unitary government and
respect for property rights.
It is important to stress the connection between ethnicity and land as a potential
underlying cause of historical marginalization and resentment. Through its legitimacy, the state
became central in mediating the connection between land and different ethnic social groups. As
part of its re-Africanization process, the Kenyan government provided land to African
communities. However, given the nature of Kenyatta’s government most of this land was given
to civil servants and people of political influence. Their position and allegiance to government
enabled them to access to large land holdings in the former highlands. This arbitrary transfer by
the state fostered social marginalization of minority groups. In addition, the state also recognized
the formation of land purchase companies by different ethnic groups. Some of the private land
companies that mobilized support from their respective ethnic regions include: Sinendet Farmers
Companies (a predominantly Kipsigis/Kalenjin company); Ngwataniro Mutukanio (Kikuyu Land
Company) (Kagwanja, 2010, p.84). Therefore, the settlers’ farms became primary sites of intense
competition between and among different land purchase groups, which were distinguished by
their ethnic or class competition. Kikuyu vs Kalenjin was the most intense inter-ethnic
competition as the two groups sought to undermine each other in buying the best and largest
farms in Rift Valley Province. Accessing land rights in the highlands through the land purchase
programme did not evolve inter-ethnic animosity only (Kagwanja, p.74). The highlands also
became a sphere for informing national politics and determining the future of Kenya as a nation
state (Kagwanja, 2010, 74). Class composition of those in leadership and ethnic composition of
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the land buying companies became a factor for intensifying inter-ethnic rivalry over the control
of large farms in the highlands. Often elite members used this inter-ethnic rivalry to wage wars
against rivals, to improve their social bases of power, and to consolidate their political positions
and that of their ethnic groups.
As already noted, settlement schemes and the land purchase programme contributed to
ethno-political conflicts from the 1960’s (Kagwanja, 2010, p.77). The various economic and
socio-political groups realized that control of land would provide them with the means to buttress
social bases of support. In fact, all groups struggled to find a place in the settlement schemes for
their landless constituencies even if they opposed the principles in which they were organized.
The kikuyu had overwhelming influence on officials in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement,
and the financial institutions that provided the loans for land purchasing. Indeed various analysis
and national statistics conducted during the 60s and 70s on composition of public sector
positions showed that members of the Kikuyu community dominated the senior positions. This
included having relatively more cabinet ministers and permanent secretaries than other ethnic
groups (Kagwanja, 2010, p. 77).
There are several factors that prevented animosity from erupting into violent ethnic
conflict at the time. Part of the reason is that KANU settled the matter by including KADU
leaders in government. However, this only reduced the danger of ethnic violence rather than
resolving the underlying factors. On the other hand, there was suspicion and mistrust among
various Kalenjin sub-ethnic groups, and particularly between the numerically larger groups such
as the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen and Keiyo.
Apart from retracing the instrumental role of colonialism back to the invention of the
term ‘tribe’, instrumentalism also maintains that tribal allegiance arose as a direct result of
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colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’. Tribal allegiance in the country-side or villages was
reinforced through the historical demarcation of land by the colonial administration also known
as tribal reserves. Settlement schemes also played a role in tribal allegiance because it developed
the notion of ethnic collectivity in combatting colonial market forces. In urban areas such as
Nairobi, Nakuru and Kisumu, colonialists contributed to the construction of tribal allegiance by
profiling ethnic groups into hierarchically structured migrants. Tribal allegiance was reinforced
through ethnic profiling	
  in terms of access to education, jobs, social services and even political
power. The colonial state and its auxiliary agencies such as the Christian missions and
ethnographers were able to disseminate and consolidate the similarities and differences among
Kenya’s ethnic groups based on physical and cultural features. Such an understanding reinforced
tribal allegiance because ethnic groups felt that “ethnicity” or “tribe” was an imprint of their
primordial history and identity. The interpretation of tribal allegiance based on primordial
linkages (blood ties, its attendant emotional bonds and the historical memory of the other
opposition groups) was consolidated in Kenyan society from colonial era. The divide and rule
tactic managed to set tribes against each other by reinforcing the primordial ethnic differences in
a negative way. In so doing, the colonial state was responsible for producing and cementing
tribal stereotype and ethnic profiling in everyday relations –politically, socially and
economically.
For instance, among the Kalenjin, there is the belief that Kisii are witches and so the sight
of a Kisii next to a Kalenjin’s field of maize tends to raise the suspicion that s/he might have
bewitched that Kalenjin’s crops. At times the concerned Kalenjin may force the Kisii ‘witch’ to
remove the bad omen from his crops which in turn may create tension or conflict between the
two (interview, respondent 6). Such stereotyping and prejudices can also be found with other
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ethnic groups in Kenya. Gikuyu, for example, are believed to be industrious, money lovers,
conmen and even deadly thieves. Ethnic profiling exacerbated the relations of ethnic groups.
It also distorted the perception of an entire ethnic group (Kikuyu) as money hungry
community and criminal gangs such as Mungiki. However, the aim of Mungiki since the 1980s
was to revive indigenous Gikuyu culture and religion, but also to liberate the Kenyan masses
from Moi’s political oppression and economic exploitation. Through decades of political
‘brainwashing’ mainly by the state, people perceived Mungiki as a terrorist group that was
ethnically charged to kill non-kikuyus.
Orange Democratic Movement opposition leader, Raila Odinga, manipulated and
convinced other tribal groups of the evil intentions of Kikuyu “mafia” in appropriating social
resources. However, in reality there were many poor Kikuyus that remained disfranchised from
political power and state resources. Raila’s campaign leading towards 2007 general election
highlighted the catchphrase of “forty one tribes against one” and “Kenya against the Kikuyu”
rhetoric. Other examples of ethnic profiling in Kenya is the perception that Luo men (14%) are
uncircumcised. In her article, “ ‘Not men enough to rule!’: politicization of ethnicities	
  and
forcible circumcision of Luo men during the postelection violence in Kenya,” Beth Ahlberg
(2013) posits that part of the ethnic animosity between Kikuyu and Luo groups stemmed from
the issue of circumcision. For Kikuyu circumcision is not just a transition from boy (kihii) to
manhood, but also part and parcel of primordial traditions. Due to ethnic-politicization, Kikuyu
men referred to Luo as kihii –a derogatory and demeaning term that insinuates a man of little
value that is “not man enough to rule” (Ahlberg & Njoroge, 2013, p.458). Lastly, the coastal
people are seen as inherently lazy and less educated. For this reason, fewer jobs in public offices
are offered to people from the Coastal region.
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Kenyan historian Macharia Munene (1998) traces back ethnic profiling and tribalism to
colonial invention and manipulation of political ethnicity (Kagwanja, p. 94, 2010). The colonial
powers also established new elite positions through chiefs, dominant clans, or families in
leadership position, which, in turn, provided the opportunity for some groups and individuals to
amass wealth at the expense of others. All in all, the division of land by the colonialists,
compounded by the colonial construction of community prejudices, promoted negative ethnicity,
which has further been non-constructively exploited by subsequent post-independence regimes.

POST-COLONIAL ERA:
The role of ethnicity in shaping the character of Kenya’s political parties and party
system can be analyzed as a cause and consequence. In post-colonial era, ethnicity became not
only a basis of political support, but also of political marginalization. In order to secure control
of the state and access the resources, Kenyan politicians realized the gravity of forming ethnic
alliances and cross-ethnic coalitions. In post-colonial era, ethnicity became the source of political
support to gain political power. For this reason, it was not uncommon to find political parties
that drew support from ethnic allegiance. The consequence of political parties and ideologies
based on ethnic clientelism is skewed distribution of public resources, poor governance, and
failure to adhere to democratic procedures. Therefore, social marginalization is a direct
consequence of ethnic-politicization. Kenyan post-colonial elites favored their co-ethnic groups
at the expense of ‘outside’ groups so as to secure their win. Ultimately, favoritism and neglect of
other groups in terms of goods and services caused long-term resentment that harbors ethnic
violence.
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This raises two subsidiary questions: First, how does ethnic politicization create the
conditions favorable for tribalism to flourish? Secondly, how does ethnic profiling or rather tribal
stereotypes by political leaders lead to social stratification in the political economy of the
country? Many political analysts and African scholars have attributed the saliency and
persistence of “tribal stereotypes” to the nature and uniqueness of African politics (Mamdani
(1976), Anyang Onyongo (1987), and Moses Onyango (2010)). To deal with this issue, I will
now provide empirical evidence from the Kenyan situation using two theories: primordialism
and instrumentalism.
The role of ethnicity intensified through the state patronage system. In this regard, a
constructivist perspective on ethnicity would strongly argue that Kenyan politics has predictably
revolved around ethnic coalitions to win competitive national elections. Kagwanja (2010)
identifies three party types in Kenyan politics: the mono-ethnic party, the multi-ethnic alliance
type, and the multi-ethnic integrative type. According to him Kenyan parties have increasingly
incorporated diverse communities, yet they have consistently failed to bridge the country’s
dominant ethnic cleavages (Kagwanja, 2010, p. 7). He proves his point by demonstrating how
the four major ethnic groups have consistently developed diverse political ideologies and
systems that reinforce the existing cleavages rather than real multi-party coalitions. In essence,
the ubiquity of multiethnic party coalitions reflect the demographic reality that Kenya is a
country of ethnic minorities as opposed to the clear burification in countries like Rwanda and
Burundi (Kagwaja, 2010, p.8). Since colonial days, political tribalism and inter-ethnic struggle
for control over the state has revolved around the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and the Kalenjin groups.
Because of the dominance of these four tribes at the national political stage, the vast majority of
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the other thirty eight Kenyan groups and racial minorities oscillate between moral ethnicity4 and
political tribalism. In most cases, the “other” marginalized groups, often smaller in size, are
mobilized into one of the political alliances of the larger four political tribes during elections. In
fact, marginalized ethnic groups in Kenya have rarely produced a successful presidential
candidate for general election. In situations where candidates from minority ethnic groups are
able to gain popularity, the state uses the candidate’s popularity to falsely convince the citizens
that indeed democratic procedures are engraved in the constitution.
Another way in which political parties in Kenya mobilized and pursued their interest as
ethnic blocs is through post-colonial land redistribution patterns. The land redistribution system
after colonial rule created historical injustices as some groups were left marginalized from access
to their ancestral land. Grievances over unequal land distribution are an important instrument for
ethnic and class disparities and rewards. Kenya’s ethnic fractured system has roots in how the
colonial administration sought to address the land question. The reforms pursued through the
settlement schemes and the land purchased programme ethnicized the land question and laid a
firm foundation for political violence in 2007 (Kanyiga, 2010, p.74). The colonial
administration’s approach was not prompted by the general need to resolve landlessness but
aimed at obtaining a stable economic foundation and ensuring that white settlers obtained the
best return from their sale of land. This being so, the administration had to satisfy Kikuyu
because they were the most dangerous land-hungry constituency. Giving preference to the
Kikuyu in the resettlement effort led to antagonism with other communities, such as the
Kalenjins.
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The balkanization of certain areas such as the Rift Valley has contributed to this historical
injustices. In order to secure their property native communities such as Kalenjin and Kikuyu
have intentionally sold land in their possession to members of their own ethnic group in an effort
to balkanize the region and avoid domination from ‘outside’ groups. This form of ‘selective
discrimination’ has created feelings of ‘superiority and inferiority’ among some ethnic groups as
well as exacerbating the inter-ethnic relations in terms of political and economic considerations.
The Kenyatta era (1963-78)
On the eve of independence, land bought from the white farmers was sold to state owned
ventures and to wealthy African families, including the Kenyatta family. According to Sang
(1997), large scale ranches amounting to over fifty thousand acres of land were bought by the
Kenyatta family. The ranches include Gicheha, Tangi Sita ranch, and Mugie Limited. From 1974
up until his death in 1978, Kenyatta appeared to be forging an economic aristocracy and a ruling
dynasty drawn from his immediate and extended families and a political family of Kikuyu
loyalists from his home district of Kiambu. According to Miller and Yeager (1994, p.51), Mama
Ngina, Kenyatta’s second wife, acquired substantial wealth that encompassed large tracts of
uncultivated and agricultural land, as well as business ventures in road transport, the ivory and
wildlife-trophy trade, and mining. Other high ranking officials followed suit, including the
permanent secretary in the Ministry of Lands and settlement. Land grabbed from pastoral groups
half a century earlier ended up in the hands of political elites, who later redistributed the lands to
members of their own ethnic groups and partially to Mau Mau freedom fighters.	
  Former Mau
Mau combatants were given priority to settle in the Rift Valley “as a reward for their
contribution to independence”, but more importantly to avoid Kikuyu unrest over land dispute
(International Crisis Group, 2008, p.7). Nonetheless there is still a large group of Mau Mau
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veterans and their descendants that never received any land. Land was also used as a resource to
buy the support and votes of allies and co-ethnic coalitions as a reward for their loyalty. In most
cases, the new tenants did not have any primordial connection to that piece of land, instead they
used the land as collateral for accessing private loans to improve their social status. The
concentration of land in the hands of a wealthy minority, particularly among the Kikuyu political
elite, left the majority of Kenyans with bitter resentment. Similarly, the new land policies
neglected the rights of native communities over their ancestral homes, resulting in inter-ethnic
conflicts. Ironically, such systematic marginalization was instigated and authorized by the
political elite and state bureaucracy despite their allegiance to serve the nation-state.
According to Moses Onyango, Kenyatta’s government inherited and embraced the entire
colonial economic system, including the concept of ‘willing buyer, willing seller’, imposing
taxes, ‘modernization’ and alienation of indigenous African communities from their native
homes (Nyawalo, 2011, p.36). Kenyatta’s government supported and acknowledged the
existence of Kikuyu banks, using Kikuyu lawyers and businessmen as a stepping ground for
privileged Kikuyu to acquire land from the departing whites under a subsidized scheme.
Privileged Kikuyu members were re-settled in large numbers in previous ‘white highlands’ of
Rift Valley, while the claims of the previous dispossessed ethnic groups such as the Kalenjin and
Masaai was completely disregarded. The Masaai and Kalenjin initially thought they had been
only temporarily displaced by the whites. Upon realizing the intent of the patrimonial
government, they began a series of claims against the state. This was the genesis of “ethnic
animosity’ based on land policies in Kenya. On the other hand, the Kikuyu who settled in the
Rift Valley were aware that such policies were unfair to native communities. Nonetheless, they
continued to reside in the land since they bought it under ‘legal terms’. Other Kikuyu elite
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argued that they deserved the land because their community suffered the most from colonial
oppression (Kanyiga, 2010, p.68). They argued that Kenya became an independent African state
thanks to the uprising and resistance of their people –the Mau Mau freedom fighters, since their
community rose up against the oppression of the white settlers. However, this was not entirely
true given that many Kikuyu political elite betrayed their community by collaborating with white
settlers and missionaries against the poorer Kikuyu Mau Mau freedom fighters. The repercussion
of Kenyatta’s land policy recurred in various post-colonial uprising by marginalized ethnic
communities including the Likoni clashes in 1997 and the dissemination of madodoa policy in
post 2002.

In the post-colonial era, numerous politicians strategically disseminated the ideology of
“madoadoa” throughout the nation to intimidate and possibly evict immigrant minority groups
that posed a threat to the constituencies through their vote power. Members of minority groups
residing in cosmopolitan regions such as Rift Valley were politically and socially excluded as
social outcast. Madoadoa is a Kiswahili term that means “spots” or “stains;” it is often used as a
metaphor to refer to immigrant communities (Kagwanja, 2010, p.55). Politicians suggested that
ethnic minority groups with different political opinion from the larger society ought to be
“evicted”, “expelled” or even “killed” so as to eliminate stains. Examples of such minority
groups included newly resettled ethnic communities (Kikuyus) in cosmopolitan areas such as
Rift Valley by the state through the land resettlement programme. Rift Valley had traditionally
been home to Kalenjins, Maasai and Turkana communities. The madodoa phenomenon was later
stretched nationally to refer to other regions in the country, which were perceived to be
opposition strongholds especially in the national politics up to 2003. Such manifestations of neopatrimonialism was a reflection of Kenyatta’s regime. During Kenyatta’s era the provincial
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administration under the Office of the President illegally and disgracefully evicted opposition
sympathizers from their ancestral homes. Rift Valley and Coastal province were prime sites of
such injustices.
Under Kenyatta’s government there were numerous political assassinations and fall outs
along ideological lines that is worth discussing. In the latter half of 1960s two major groups were
formed. The radicals under Vice President Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kagia supported the East
while moderates like Tom Mboya (Minister of Economic Planning) followed the West. The two
groups disagreed on land tenure rights, land distribution and compensation for Whites among
other issues. A state-managed election was later formed to settle the dispute. However, Oginga
lost his seat. Oginga then formed an opposition party known as Kenya’s People’s Union (KPU),
but he was detained along with his top officials (Kagwanja, 2010 p.54). His detention and the
mysterious assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969, one of Kenya’s most prominent Luo leaders,
who was  regarded  as  the  political  heir  of  Kenyatta,  caused an uproar throughout the country. In
response, Kenyatta decided to amend the constitution. KANU was placed ‘above the law’. The
dissatisfaction of the masses continued despite the transfer and grabbing of farm land and public
resources by influential individuals.
All in all, Kenyatta’s era caused wide spread dissatisfaction.	
  Under economic hardships
of 1973 (oil based world recession), Kenyans of all ethnic affiliations, less tolerant of his public
display of nepotism, began criticizing his regime. In a similar fashion, Tom Mboya and Josiah
Mwangi Kariuki, a flamboyant Kikuyu MP, challenged Kenyatta’s kikuyu power base. David
Throup and Charles Hornsby (1998, p.33) suggested that ‘tribalism’ in Kenya is a natural
phenomenon given the diverse ethnic differences and the deep-seated divisions stemming from
primordialism. M.Rutten & Owuor (2010), on the other hand, proposed a different view.
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According to them, power hungry leaders such as Kenyatta stirred up tribal sentiments when
they found it convenient to do so. Their aim was to divert the attention of the masses from the
“real dynamics at work –the emergence of rapacious bunch of mercenaries whose own class
interest transcended ethnic bounds” (Kagwanja, 2010, p.54). Politicians and businessmen often
acted as leaders of ethnic land-buying companies in a bid to enhance their social status instead of
support poor families such as Kikuyu peasants and Mau Mau freedom fighters.
The Moi single party era (1978-92)
Subsequent regimes after Kenyatta’s government, particularly Moi’s single party era,
witnessed a similar form of neo-patriomonialism, politics of exclusion, and most importantly the
emergence of state violence. Following the footsteps of Kenyatta, Moi built his power around
smaller ethnic groups which nurtured Kalenjin ethnic nationalism just as Kenyatta had done to
Kikuyu nationalism. As a result, Kalenjin’s believed it was indeed their turn to ‘eat’ and exploit
the opportunities that come with political power (Wrong, 2009, p.81). Moi targeted Kikuyu
capital by closing down Kikuyu owned banks which he perceived as a threat to his political
dominance. The Kikuyu elite blamed Moi for the economic problems in the coffee industry, tea
factories and Kenya cooperative creameries in central province.
Nonetheless, Kikuyu continued to dominate in non-political spheres such as the transport
business, hotel, and real estate and so on. The rise of nepotism and ethnicization of power
provoked Kikuyu elite and other marginalized communities to attempt a coup d’état in 1982.
However, the coup failed, which in turn increased ethnic animosity particularly between the
Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo. Moi favored the Kikuyu less, and increased his support for Kalenjin
elite. However, Moi realized that the numbers favored the Kikuyu (22%) compared to his ethnic
group –Kalenjin’s (12%), which is an important aspect of multiparty politics (Kagwanja, 2010,
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p.87). As a result, through the madoadoa policy, Moi’s regime fostered land clashes in the Rift
Valley that mainly targeted Kikuyu as ‘foreigners’ in the region. For the remainder of his single
party era, Moi supported Kalenjins through education opportunities and lucrative jobs in
government.

Moi Multiparty era (1992-2002)
The advent of multiparty politics from the middle of 1990 was characterized by state
violence mainly in Nairobi and other urban areas where the populace demanded the release of
Kenneth Matiba, Raila Odinga and Charles Rubia who advocated for multipartyism and
democratic rule (Kagwanja, 2010, p.55). KANU politicians also revived majimbo discussion
which centered on the return to ancestral home as opposed to devolution of power (Mutua, 2010,
79) Immigrant communities in cosmopolitan regions were asked to vote wisely if they wished to
remain. Between 1992-1997 several ethnic conflicts erupted based on land, ethnicity and
political differences. In fact, the year 1993-1999 various institutions were erected, in an effort to
investigate the existence of politically motivated ethnic. Among these were “the Kiliku
Committee, the Government Standing Committee on Human Rights, the Law Society of Kenya
and a Judicial Commission of Inquiry also known as “the Akiwumi Commission” (Rutten and
Owuor, 2010, p.56) Unfortunately, the reports generated by the various institutions reported that
more than 6,000 individuals were killed in ethnic clashes between 1991-98 (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.56) Yet, no action has been taken regarding the matter. (Kagwanja, 2010, p.56) As a result,
aggrieved families and marginalized minorities continued to harbor grievances from such
politically instigated clashes.
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In summary, the existing societies of pre-colonial Africa had complex political and
administrative structures that sustained the community’s dynamic relations both internally and
externally. The political and administrative structures were based on the lineage system to
demarcate the social identifications such as allegiance and social relations. In post-colonial
Africa, ethnicity became not only a basis of political support but also political marginalization of
ethnic groups. The antagonism between dominant versus subordinate ethnic groups stemmed
from various factors including the impact of colonial intrusion on state and market relations.
Ethnic antagonism intensified in post-colonial era as opposed to colonial era because the struggle
for independence outweighed ethnic divisions. In the new political order, that is post-colonial
state –religious, racial, and tribal groups competed for state resources such as schools, roads, and
civil service jobs. Furthermore, rural-urban migration exacerbated the existing antagonism
because previously isolated ethnic groups came into close proximity with each other, for the first
time. The modernization process accelerated under post-colonial regime, and the spread of
higher education did not generate greater harmony as anticipated by Eurocentric scholars.
Instead, modernization process produced ethnically chauvinistic professionals and intellectuals,
who became the ideologists of ethnic hostilities. These ideologies were later transformed and
intensified under the banner of “tribal stereotypes”.
3.3 Land Question as the Matrix of Political Conflict
	
  

The Land Question does not consist of just a single issue but of several issues, each of
which has its own components. These include (1) land use and agrarian production; (2)
population growth/movements and changing settlement patterns; (3) class formation; and (4)
ethno-regional identities. These individual issues have become embedded in the larger and
continually changing socio-political and economic structures. This dynamism, in turn, affects the
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content of the Land Question. The Land Question, therefore, cannot be reduced to a single issue
and solution. Nor is the reform of the land tenure system and its relation to agricultural
production and/or land use the only important consideration.
The reform programme was introduced in response to a growing economic and political
uprising in the “African native reserves” that were created by the colonial administration
government in an effort to alienate and preserve lands for settler agriculture. The rapid spread of
the Mau Mau peasant resistance movement culminated in a deepening political crisis. The
colonial state initially believed they could contain the natives through the introduction of land
individualization. It was also assumed that the transformation of customary tenure would lead to
increased agricultural production in the reserves and, thereby, weaken the ideological bases of
the peasant resistance movement. However, contrary to the expectations of the colonial
authorities, the land reforms opened the door for more problems rather than solving the existing
issue. The land reform system generated more disputes regarding ownership of land and resulted
in a more skewed distribution of land. It also produced and reinforced ethnic-based interests in
land, and made the Land Question more complex than ever.
The post-independence government retained the colonial land laws and pursued the same
land reform objectives without necessarily modifying the system. In spite of the complex issues
that developed around it, the land policy did not change (Republic of Kenya, 1965). Policies
tended to emphasize optimum land utilization and presumably “equitable redistribution.” This
led to the neglect of inequalities in land ownership, one of the most important dimensions to the
growing socio-economic inequalities in Kenya. This situation persisted, even though large tracts
of under-utilized and/or idle land existed, including in high potential agricultural belts such as
the former White Highlands (Kanyiga, 2010, p. 66). Apart from the land reform policy, land
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market and political patronage have continued to be pre-eminent factors in regulating access to
private and public land. With regard to public land, granting of rights tended to be linked to
concerns about procuring and maintaining political support, particularly in Kenyatta’s regime.
The economic constraints that the country has been experiencing since the late 1970s
have also had an equally important role in shaping the diverse context of the Land debate.
Although Kenya’s economy grew tremendously in the ‘60s, the oil crisis of 1973 and the
subsequent drought of 1974 set the country on the path to an economic recession (Kanyiga,
2010, p.72). Alongside a deteriorating economy, there was also change in the class and ethnic
content of politics. For example, Moi ascended to the presidency in late 1978 after the death of
President Kenyatta, who had already established a tight patronage network that rewarded some
of his cronies with public resources –the former settler lands. In effect, Moi had to construct his
own political support base. This he did through deconstructing the constituencies established by
his predecessor. But Moi’s support base rapidly declined with the spread of the country’s
economic difficulties. To retain support, Moi opted to rely extensively on direct forms of
political patronage (Kayinga, 2010, p.74). Public economic institutions, especially state-owned
corporations were tasked with providing resources for this purpose. The focus soon shifted to
land in the prime areas of the coast where the tourism industry was booming in terms of
providing the country with foreign exchange. On the other hand, traditional agricultural
commodities began declining. As a response mechanism, land was given to maintain or expand
patronage networks and to get support from different sections of the political elite. This had the
effect of making them indifferent to the spreading political and economic crisis ravaging the
country. Those who obtained these grants, especially in the coastal belt where there is land suited
to tourism, generated capital for investments in the growing urban real estate, insurance and
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financial institutions. Meanwhile, the re-introduction of multipartyism in early 1992 was
accompanied by the reactivation of ethnic-based interests in land (territorial claims) which led to
intense ethnic conflict among several groups. The overall result for Kenyan society was class and
ethnic marginalization and political frustration of the marginalized.
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CHAPTER  4:  MARGINALIZATION  AND  ELECTORAL  VIOLENCE    
	
  

This chapter discusses the empirical findings about electoral violence. On the basis of chapter
three, I will focus on three main variables of marginalization in order to verify my main research
hypothesis.
4.1 	
  Human	
  Geography	
  of	
  Electoral	
  Violence	
  

What are Kenya’s demographic makeup and political geography, which constituted the
background to the 2007-08 crisis? Kenya, officially the Republic of Kenya, is a country in the
African Great Lakes region of East Africa. Its capital and largest city is Nairobi. Kenya lies on
the equator with the Indian Ocean to the south-east, Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west,
South Sudan to the north-west, Ethiopia to the north and Somalia to the north-east. Kenya
occupies a total of 582,650 km2, an area twice the size of Navada and slightly larger than France.
Its population had jumped from 8.5 million at independence in 1963 (Leys, 1975, p.40) to an
estimated 38 million people in 2008. Kenya is considered the economic powerhouse of East
Africa and remains a country of major importance within the African continent.

Kenyans are an inherently agrarian society, which means that land is very important
(Adebayo, p.147) Competition for land among Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups, including the Arabs
and a small white and Asian population, is accentuated by the fact that over 80% of the land is
either arid or semi-arid, and over 75% of the population is concentrated in the remaining high
potential agricultural belt that runs north west from Nairobi to the Ugandan border (Adebayo,
2012, p.140).
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The majority of the country’s workforce is engaged in agriculture, hence the overreliance on land. However, the diminishing land opportunity in rural areas, particularly the
agricultural belt (Rift Valley), has engendered migrations to urban areas in search for jobs and
better standards of living by the largely unemployed young people, who comprise 60% of the
population. The demographic growth of the youth stratum (15-35 years) expanded the electoral
register by 6 million to nearly 14 million voters (Kagwanja, 2010, p.4). This increase in the
proportion of younger voters turned general competition into an important axis in electoral
politics.
The geographical features of the Rift Valley are unparalleled in most parts of the world.
The highlands provide adequate rainfall for farming and agriculture, which is the economic base
of the Rift Valley people. The region has other important geographic features such as the extinct
volcanoes Mount Longonot and Mount Suswa, in addition to Lakes Baringo, Bogoria, Magadi,
Nakuru and Naivasha amongst others. The Elgeyo Escarpment is a major tourist attraction in the
province. However, agriculture, not tourism, is the Rift Valley’s economic flagship. Tea estates
are lush in Kericho District. In addition, the horticultural sector is fast growing, providing extra
economic empowerment in the Rift Valley. Cattle rearing and other forms of animal husbandry
are also practiced to a large extent here. The economic potential of the Rift Valley is immense
and remains to be fully exploited. Apart from horticulture and tea plantations of which Kenya is
a main leader in the world market, tourism industry is the second highest foreign exchange
earner. However, the violent clashes of 2007 adversely affected both sectors as workers were
displaced from the fields and foreign advisors urged their citizens to refrain from traveling to the
country (Adebayo, 2012, p.140).
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The major stakeholders in the elections and post-election violence include the political
parties, religious institutions, ethnic groups, youth, land squatters/owners and the demographic
distribution of resources. The three main tribes involved in the 2007 post-election violence were
the Kikuyu’s, Luos and Kalenjin. However, other ethnic groups were also heavily affected by the
violence. The Kikuyu with their ancestral homeland in Central and Eastern provinces, constitute
the largest of the groups, they are only about 22% of Kenya’s nearly 38 million people, although
the old map below indicates 20%. Next to the kikuyu are the Luhya (14%), located mainly in
Western Province. (Adebayo, 2012, p.145). The Luo (13%) mainly inhabit the Nyanza Province
followed by the Kalenjin (12%), who mainly reside in the central and northern parts of the Rift
Valley. The Kamba (11%) live in the South Eastern Province, the Kisii (6%) in Nyanza and the
Meru (6%) in Eastern Province (ibid, p. 147). The remaining ethnic minorities constitute the
marginalized communities in Kenya. These include	
  communities found in the North (Turkana,
Pokot, Oromo) and those in the North East i.e. Rendille and Somali. The Swahili/Arab
communities in the coast of Kenya are also considered marginalized because most of its subethnic groups such as the Mijikenda, have remained impoverished despite the booming tourist
industry in the Coastal Province. The Maasai in the South are also considered marginalized
communities due to their small population as well as limited resources.
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Besides valuing land and their ethnic groups, Kenyans, like many Africans, are deeply
spiritual and value their faith and traditions. Kenya is a predominantly Christian society, with
45% being Protestant and 33% being Roman Catholic. Islam is the second largest religion in
Kenya and is practiced by about 11% of the total population (Adebayo, 2012, p.150). Other
faiths practiced in Kenya include Hinduism, traditional religion and Baha’i. With the majority of
Kenyans attending church, the church can and does play a key role in politics. The Church’s role
in politics stems historically from the way in which British used Christian missions to penetrate
communities and spread the Christian gospel intertwined with British culture (Adebayo, 2012,
p.146). During this colonial era, the church was intimately tied to politics. The Catholic and
Anglican Church were fundamental in the movement for constitutional reform following the
1992 elections.
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4.2 The making of a crisis
	
  

4.2.1 Political marriages and separations of convenience among potentially antagonistic
ethnic groups from 2002 to 2005 referendum.
In the run-up to the 2007 election, Kibaki led the Party of National Unity on a platform
highlighting the country’s economic growth. The motto Kazi Idendelee (work continues)
emphasized the road to economic recovery and prosperity (Kagwanja, 2010, p.3). While Odinga
led the Orange Democratic Movement promising constitutional change and more effective anticorruption measures. A new constitutional order, devolution and equitable distribution of
resources were presented as the agenda for ODM term in power. Equally, ODM portrayed itself
as a coalition that defends the poor and the weak from neo-patrimonial politics of exclusion that
had shadowed Kenya’s post-colonial politics from Kenyatta’s government to Moi and
subsequently Kibaki. ODM publicly stigmatized “Mt.Kenya Mafia” as corrupt politicians and
businessmen who had betrayed the 2002 reform agenda under the NARC government. Both,
parties PNU and ODM, used subtle and not so subtle forms of ethnic polarization and fear of
ethnic domination or displacement to mobilize support.
Kibaki’s first administration (2003-2007) witnessed a stunning success in economic
recovery as growth rose from 3.4% in 2003 to 7% in 2007 (Kagwanja, 2010, p.6). In comparison
to his dictatorial predecessor Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi, Kibaki’s administration
managed to lower the poverty level from an estimated 56% in 1997 to 46% in 2006 (Ibid, p.6).
On the other hand, per capita income rose for the first time since the 1980s (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.6). Kibaki’s government fostered macro-economic discipline. Deficit spending was reduced,
the business environment improved, more state-operated enterprises became privatized, and the
government attracted substantial new investment especially from China. The steady 6% growth
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rate during the second half of Kibaki’s tenure allowed Kenya to become financially self-reliant.
New projects funded included free primary education and the creation of Constituency
Development Funds (CDFs). Providing free Primary Education was one of Kibaki’s strong
points.
Some analysts have argued that despite the increase in gross domestic product, income
inequality among the social classes continued to widen. In essence, the growth was only
benefited by those in power, multinational corporations and business tycoons. The ordinary
“mwanainchi” continued to experience lower living conditions. Moreover, the economic record
in GDP was not matched by an equally robust political stewardship. As mentioned above,
corruption and cronyism continued to manifest in government offices. The legal and institutional
framework erected by the government was not successful in combatting corruption. Instead, the
institutional frameworks, such as electoral commission, the administration of the police, and
particularly the judiciary system became largely impotent. The record of prosecuting and
convicting high-level corruption, such as the Goldenberg5 and the Anglo Leasing6 scandals
proved to be ineffectual (Murunga, 2011, p.15). The NARC government failed to stamp out
mega corruption as well as state violence through youth militia groups. The 2007 election took
place against the background of meteoric growth in the Kenyan population. Deepening poverty,
widening inequality between the political class and the masses, and youth unemployment.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

The Goldenberg Scandal, is the longest running case of massive high level corruption in Kenyan history. Kamleshi
Pattni, a businessman, reportedly devised a scheme in which his company, Goldenberg International Ltd, was
accused of exporting gold and diamonds worth hundreds of millions of dollars. This fraudulent scheme defrauded
the government of public funds. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars were stolen. The case has not been
settled to date (Mutua, 2001, p.100).
6
Anglo Leasing scandal is another major corruption undertaken by high-ranking officials in Moi’s government. It
involved government funds being used to pay “shadowy” foreign companies for services ranging from forgery-proof
passports to naval ships and forensic laboratories (ibid, p.100). 	
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Another aspect of the background to the election was the political tension arising from
the disintegration of the ruling coalition NARC and the defeat of the constitution in the
November 2005 referendum (appendix:interview). The 2005 referendum broke into two main
components –Odinga’s ODM party was formed based on a “No” vote while Kibaki’s NAK party
supported a “Yes” campaign (Lafargue, 2009, p.38). The “No” 0vote stood for the amendment of
the constitution, the reduction of executive power, the reinforcement of parliamentary control
over government, the supervision of judicial independence, and the decentralization of central
government responsibilities. Kibaki and his coalition –National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) led the
“Yes” campaign, which supported the continuation of the Kenyan constitution (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.4). The Yes campaign suffered a significant defeat in the referendum as ODM won on a margin
of 58.3% against 41.7% -which was viewed as a vote of no-confidence (Kagwanja, 2010, p.4).
ODMs victory in the 2005 referendum made ODM leaders and party supporters confident that
2007 election would equally be a victory. However, ODM faced challenges in the coming
months as Kalonzo Musyoka broke-away from the ODM coalition forming his own presidential
party under an ODM-Kenya ticket. These political marriages and separations of convenience
among potentially antagonistic ethnic groups set the background to the political tension that
broke-out in post-2007 election.
4.2.2 Poll surveys and Propaganda
Several factors probably contributed to the erosion of Odinga’s lead in the polls. PNU
aggressively attacked ODM on its majimbo agenda, in addition PNU publicly attacked ODM
leadership and particularly Odinga’s primordial ethnic practices of circumcision. PNU leaders’
subtly referred to Odinga as “uncircumcised boy” which had immense implication on his
personal character and leadership. This propaganda appealed to members of the Bantu
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communities, who viewed circumcision as a vital social value, often associated with cleanliness
and respectability. Arguably, this strategy enabled PNU leaders to gunner support from Kikuyu
and other Bantu communities –GEMA ethnic groups in particular –from poor background and
migrant communities in Rift Valley (Ahlberg, 2013, p.15)
The polling surveys conducted by various research industries in the run-up to the
elections achieved considerable reaction from members of the political class, citizens and
international community at large. The polling experience in Kenya’s 2007 election warrants
attention for several reasons. First and foremost, more polls were conducted in the run-up to
2007 elections by more firms than in any other previous pre-election period (Wolf, 2010, p.21).
Secondly, media coverage of poll surveys made it difficult for key political actors to ignore poll
results, thus ensuring that they became central subjects of the campaigns. Apart from presidential
contestants (Kibaki, Raila, Musyoka) the polls were also taken seriously by political campaign
strategists and especially voters. As a result, the prominence and general acceptance of the preelection polls made it likely to remain a fixture in Kenyan public life (Wolf, 2010, p.21). In what
follows, I will discuss the role and implication of poll surveys in Kenya’s post-2007 election
violence. To do this, I will divide my discussion into two lessons; the first lesson focuses on pollution versus political opportunity, while the second focuses on expectations and violence. Each
had a long-term effect on the country’s political culture.
With the return of multiparty politics in 1992 various research firms, both domestic and
international opinion surveys, began to sprout. The full blossoming, however, awaited the
departure of autocratic President Daniel Arap Moi in 2002 (Kagwanja, p.22). Some of the
companies that emerged include: Strategic Public Relations, Infotrak-Harris, Consumer Insight,
and the famous Steadman group that later became Synovate –a leading international market
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research firm (Wolf, 2010 p.22) These research industries provided legitimacy to political
pluralism by allowing frequent expression of competing views on leadership preference and
policies. More importantly, these surveys allowed marginalized communities from various
backgrounds in Kenya to voice their opinion on the matter.
Lesson one: ‘poll-ution’ versus political opportunity –refers to the idea that electionrelated polls constituted a threat to the Kenyan political class because it gave a voice to the
inchoate –and thus a largely silent –public. Such a platform allows Kenyans, particularly those
from rural areas, and from “marginalized” communities to express their satisfaction or
dissatisfaction regarding their living conditions and their aspirations from suitable political
candidates (Wolf, 2010, p.24).
Lesson two: expectations and violence. In the aftermath of the post-election crisis two
key issues were raised with regards to direct causal link between opinion polls and political
violence. J.Gathongo, a political analyst suggested that in the event that opinion surveys were
never carried out and distributed by leading media houses, then perhaps ODM would not have
seen the need to contest the results nor would they resort to large scale violence as the case of
2007. But because the results from pre-election opinion polls created an impression that Raila
Odinga would win the forthcoming election through a “Yes” (orange) ticket, it made it even
more difficult for ODM partisans to accept the results without pointing out the anomalies in
vote-tallying (International Crisis Group: Kenya in Crisis (2008) Africa Report N°137). The
flawed performance of ECK was viewed on live television, which in turn gave ODM supporters
more reason to challenge the results. Another aspect of the poll is that it split the entire nation
into two antagonistic camps –Yes (orange) versus No (banana). The bilateral nature of the
division equally fostered ethnic animosity as the two leaders came from historically antagonistic
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ethnic groups. Opinion poll figures contributed to a frenzy, making the election a close call.
Eventually the high stakes in the election combined with the extreme competiveness provided a
breeding ground for the riots to occur. Each camp, believed they were right and each camp
wanted to belong to the winning side. That is why Kibaki hastily took the oath of office, while
Odinga refused to challenge the results in courts, stating that he will “take the case to the courts
of public opinion” (Washington Post Foreign Service, 31 December 2007)7
As indicated earlier, opinion polls were taken seriously by all stakeholders –voters,
political campaign strategists and even presidential candidates. Opinion polls encouraged more
informed bargaining between the key players before Election Day and more strategic choices by
Kenyan voters. When campaign battle lines are intense, underlying socio-economic grievances
exist, and the integrity of the electoral commission is subject to doubt, close results such as the
2007 elections are more likely to be rejected if they fail to replicate or at least reflect the preelection opinion polls (see appendix- respondent 3). My argument therefore is that opinion poll
surveys did indeed influence the voting pattern, and they also contributed to the political tension
by increasing the risk faced by the key players.
The second issue about expectations and violence is therefore whether the polls had
convinced Kibaki and his team that rigging was the only way in which they could win the
election (Wolf, 2010, p.33). However, I do not consider opinion polls among the proximate
causes of the violence itself. In any case, even if the opinion polls were not published by research
industries in the pre-election period, I believe that the violence may have still occurred, if the
spontaneous reaction by the masses against the perceived rigging of election is an indicator at all.
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  "Incumbent Declared Winner in Kenya's Disputed Election." Washington Post. The Washington
Post, 31 Dec. 2007. Web. 09 Apr. 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐
dyn/content/article/2007/12/30/AR2007123002506.html	
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The people were angered by the flawed performance of ECK –an independent electoral
commission that was responsible for overseeing a democratic transition of governance.
A few months after the post-election violence Kenya’s major survey firm, the Steadman
group now known as Synovate, released controversial results on how opinion polls may or may
not have contributed to the violence. According to the Social, Political, Economic and Cultural	
  
Barometer (SPEC), 69 percent of Kenyans were aware of at least some opinion polls.
Additionally, more than half (58 per cent) stated that they thought these polls had influenced
their voting in one way or another. Some used the opinion polls to get a better idea of their
preferred party and candidate’s chance of winning. Others stated that the polls encouraged or
discouraged them from contributing to the campaign as spokesmen or even not voting at all.
4.2.3. Majimboism as politics of exclusion
Apart from the disintegration of the ruling coalition NARC and the defeat of constitution
in November 2005 referendum, Majimbo is arguably the third factor that caused political tension
in the run-up to election.	
  As already indicated, Majimbo is a Kiswahili terms that signifies
“devolution”. However, some political analysts and scholars, including Makau Mutua, have
argued against Majimbo policy as a form of ethnic cleansing rather than implied “federalism”
(2008, p.190). In the pre-election period, ODM resuscitated the Majimboist debate with regards
to federalism and land policy. ODM strategically used Majimbo policy to mobilize the support of
marginalized ethnic groups such as Kalenjin and Swahili in Coast Province. The Majimbo
campaign tapped on the emotional sentiments of “exploited” groups who yearned for regional
autonomy. ODM managed to accumulate huge support from Rift Valley and Coastal province
based on this policy (Kanyinga, 2010, p.70). However, they did not provide a deeper
understanding of what this policy would involve. To the local residents in Rift Valley, Majimbo
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system evolved to imply eviction of communities that had settled in that area during and after the
colonial period. To Kalenjins and Mijikenda communities Majimbo simply meant getting back
the pre-colonial land which they were primordially assigned. However from a policy point of
view, ODM propagated Majimbo system as a policy of devolution that allowed people to make
decisions on matters about their region. Understandably, this argument was attractive to
marginalized communities that lost their land to dominant immigrant communities. Nonetheless,
PNU accused ODM of fomenting ethnic cleansing of migrant communities under the guise of
Majimbo (Kanyinga, 2010, p.80). PNU members viewed Majimbo policy as a threat to national
cohesion because it promoted “othersim” by eliminating “non-natives” and “non-belonging”
ethnicities. To a large extent, majimboism was an extension of madodoa policy which sought to
create ethnic animosity in the form of hate speech. According to PNU, Majimbo policy would
lead to the eviction of hundreds of people from certain regions on the basis of historical claims to
territories (Kanyinga, 2010, p.80). Orange movement tried to dissociate itself from the violent
and ethnic chauvinist stigma attached to the Majimbo debate, but also knew the confusion would
rally maximum support among the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu (commonly known
as KAMATUSA) communities (International Crisis Group: Report N°137, 2008, p.17). When
the electoral conflict broke out the implication of Majimbo policy was witnessed in Rift Valley
province, where Kikuyu families were evicted from their landholdings forcefully. All in all, the
outbreak of the violence in Rift Valley was framed in terms of a discourse on territorial claims.
The Kalenjin’s believed they had a primordial right to Rift Valley as their “ancestral home”,
while the Kikuyu claimed to have individual property rights. Many of the Kikuyu who were
evicted became internally displaced people (IDP) despite having title deeds to their land. In fact,
they did not place any political claims on the land they owned (Rift Valley); instead, they
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considered that their title deeds conferred absolute ownership. Conflict between individual
property rights and group territorial and political claims rapidly accentuated the conflict
(Kanyinga, 2010, p.81) Hateful discourse by the political class through the state machinery
created resentment that slowly built up and exploded after the electoral fraud occurred.
4.3 Electoral Fraud
	
  

The December 2007 general election was the fourth that the country had conducted since the
re-introduction of multiparty democracy in November 1991. Few expected Kenya to explode
into violence as nearly 14 million registered voters went to the polls on 27 December 2007 to
elect a president and 210 parliamentarians in the latest multiparty election. Then electoral fraud
occurred.
Electoral fraud essentially involves the introduction of bias into the administration of
elections. It can take place at any stage of the electoral process, from voter registration to the
final tally of ballots. It covers such activities as forging voter ID cards, burning ballot boxes or
padding the vote totals of favored parties and candidates. According to Thad Hall, Michele
Alvarez et al. (2008, p.3) electoral fraud can be defined as “systemic manipulation of domestic
legal provisions and/or electoral rules and procedures that run counter to widely accepted
democratic principles and international standards, and that purposefully distort the will of
voters”. It is clear from this definition that electoral fraud violates the principle of democratic
equality. Invariably, such a breach of democratic principle has immense implications for a new
developing state like Kenya. In Kenya successful rigging of elections and electoral fraud has
culminated into corruption of democracy at the state level. This is because electoral fraud
involves various personnel and government officials to carry out.
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Ultimately such corruption introduces the concept of ‘moral economy,’ which legitimizes the
inequalities in the distribution of values. By and large, moral economy categorizes all human
communities through principles of redistribution and reciprocity of obligations between rulers
and ruled, rich and poor in specific social contexts. This concept reinforces the practice of
colonial clientage involving reciprocal but unequal relationship between ‘big men’ and ‘small
boys’ (Rusell, 2000, p. 5). Those who breach the principle of democratic rule in elections
through electoral fraud or irregularities do the same. Similar to former European officials, postcolonial African elite have used “corruption” at the electoral level to reward those who are loyal
to them by giving them access to state resources in exchange for favors such as vote buying and
irregularities. Voting irregularities are also within the scope of fraud, because they change the
election result. 	
  
In the case of Kenya, electoral fraud was manifested through vote buying, ghost voting,
ballot stuffing, vote tallying falsification, intimidation and violence (Wolf, 2010, p.20). The first
type of irregularity took place during the voter registration exercise. There were up to 15% dead
voters registered. The second type of electoral fraud took place in ethnically homogenous
constituencies through deliberate and miscalculated inflation of results (ibid, p.22). GyimahBoadi (2007) took an afro-pessimist point of view to suggest “Elections (in Africa) tend to be
rigged, and incumbents have been keen to rig to the extent that they can get away with it –which
has often fuelled post-election conflicts, and in some cases, triggered violence” (Wolf, 2010,
p.20). Therefore, the masses reacted to the electoral fraud not only because rigging took place,
but more importantly because the failure or lack of institutions enables political elites to get
away with such crime. Hence people lost faith in the judicial system and overall functionality of
the state institutions
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Prior to the election date, the Electoral Commission of Kenya chair Samuel Kivuitu, was
confident that the election would be peaceful and the ensuing transition would be smooth. The
results that streamed in the following day showed that ODM leader Raila Odinga, was leading in
the polls. However, on 29th December the margin shrunk quickly to a mere 38000 votes with
nearly 90% of the votes counted. In other words, 180 out of 210 constituencies had voted, and
the remaining uncounted votes were coming from Kibaki’s stronghold, that is central and eastern
province where GEMA ethnic groups are located. Samuel Kivuitu publicly expressed his
suspicion on television by suggesting that the results were delayed because “it was being
cooked” (Kagwanja, 2010, 198). This was the first official evidence that indeed ballot rigging
may have taken place. Once gain on January 1st 2008, Kivuitu acknowledged in a press meeting
that he does not “know if Kibaki won the elections” (Lafargue, 2009, p.251). Because of such
statements, the ECK appeared to be involved in the fraudulent activities.
Tensions reached a dangerous peak when leaders of both camps, Kibaki for PNU and Raila
Odinga for ODM quarreled in the full glare of cameras over the accuracy of the results. The
news was distributed by leading media houses to all parts of the country. The crisis exacerbated
on 30 December after the police was called in to disperse people in the counting hall at the
Kenyatta Conference Centre where Kivuitu nationally declared Kibaki as the victor. According
to Kivuitu, Kibaki led the presidential poll with 4,583,360 votes (46%) over Odinga’s 4,352,880
(44%) and Kalonzo Musyoka’s 879,896 (9%) (BBC News, 2007).8 Kibaki was quickly sworn in
for a second term at the State House despite calls for postponement in announcing the results
(Kagwanja, 2010, p.108). The “twilight robbery”9 was solidified by the merging of ODM-K
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leader, Kalonzo Musyoka with PNU coalition as Vice president. This bolstered Kibaki’s victory
from (46% to 56%) with Kalonzo’s 9% presidential poll (Kagwanja, 2010, p.108).
With regard to parliamentary votes, ODM secured 99 seats out of 210 possible seats. PNU on
the other hand, won 43 seats. This discrepancy produced a hang parliament while deepening the
crisis (ECK 2007). ODM rejected the results and claimed victory with Odinga calling on Kibaki
to concede defeat and order a recount of the vote. In a response, the PNU coalition accused
ODM for fraudulent activities in Nyanza and Rift Valley turfs, where discrepancies evoked from
the polling station tallies did not reflect the Electoral Commission results (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.110). Kivuitu conceded that irregularities may have occurred and but these were a matter of the
courts. The independent review commission also known as Kriegler Commission reported in
2008 that “the conduct of the 2007 elections was materially defective that it is impossible –for
IREC or any other agency –to establish true or reliable results for both presidential and
parliamentary elections” (Kagwanja, 2010, p.109). ODM flatly rejected the idea of filing a case
with the high courts because to them the courts were packed with cronies that Kibaki had
appointed five days prior to the election. Indeed Kibaki had appointed five new judges prior to
the electoral dispute. ODM also disregarded the idea of calling in neutral commonwealth judges
to mediate the dispute (Africa Policy Institute, 2008). As a result, the disputed results culminated
into a deadly violent conflict on a national scale.
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Official 2007 Presidential Election Results.
Province

Registered
Voters

Mwai Kibaki
(PNU)

Raila Odinga
(ODM)

Nairobi

1,275,445

Coast

1,178,537

North
Eastern
Eastern

315,756

Central

2,186,936

Rift
Valley
Western

3,358,381

Nyanza

2,041,680

Grand
Total

14,296,180

313,478
47.4%
197,354
32.8%
97,263
50.4%
840,805
52%
1,643,421
96.4%
916,112
35.7%
312,300
32.5%
262,627
16.8%
4,583,360
45.97%

288,922
43.6%
353,773
58.8%
91,440
47.4%
83,595
5.2%
30,655
1.8%
1,584,271
61.7%
639,246
66.6%
1,280,978
81.7%
4,352,880
43.65%

2,374,763

1,564,682

Kalonzo
Musyoka
(ODM-K)
52,974
8%
38,878
6.5%
4,498
2.3%
726,782
45%
11,231
0.7%
34,334 1.3%
6,729
0.7%
4,470
0.3%
879,896
8.82%

Table 1: Summary of 2007 Kenyan presidential election (source)- International Crisis Group:
Kenya in Crisis (2008) Africa Report N°137

In summary, all national and international observers, including the Kenya Democratic
Elections Forum (KEDOF), the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth secretariat, the East
African community and the International Republican Institute (IRI), reported that while the
voting and counting of ballots at polling-station level was orderly and satisfactory with a few
exceptions, the tallying and compiling of the results was manipulated, dramatically undermining
the credibility of the results Kivuitu announced on 30 December. (International Crisis Group
report, 2008, p.10). Several illustrations of the rigging was provided including a detailed
testimony by four national observers who participated in the counting of votes.
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One of the first indicators of rigging was the delay in the announcement of presidential
results. The prolonged wait for the results raised suspicions because presidential ballots are
traditionally counted and tallied first in polling stations (Kawanja, 2010, p.112). Secondly, the
announcement by ECK chair on 29 December regarding his loss of communication with some of
his returning officers, who had switched off their phones also provoked suspicion (International
Crisis Group report, 2008, p.8). In fact, the chair was unable to explain the delays even in nearby
constituencies such as Nairobi and Central Province. Under pressure from ODM agents who
pointed out the discrepancies in results from ECK’s tallying center and those announced at
constituency level, Kivuitu agreed to an audit of the results. Despite the results already been
aired on live television. During the audit, it was clear that the results of 44 constituencies were
untrustworthy, because it was not supported by the proper legal documentation (International
Crisis Group report, 2008, p.9). The original statutory forms, 16 and 16A were missing, these
forms are used to record the results officially and should have been signed by returning officers
and turned in for counter-signature by party agents (ibid, p.10). Another malpractice was the
supervision of elections by commissioners from their own “home province” or “ethnic
constituencies”. They also went ahead and handpicked the returning officers; for example, in
central province Kikuyu returning officers were appointed despite the recommendation by ECK
provision to not appoint returning officers from their community (International Crisis Group
report, 2008, p.8).
The third illustration of electoral fraud was demonstrated through inconsistencies between
presidential and parliamentary tallies and instances of more votes than registered voters
(Kagwanja, 2010, p.109). According to the testimony reported by national observers, the
parliamentary result from Maragwa in Central Province was 115 per cent turnout. However,
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ECK officials later decided to manually change these results and make them credible by reducing
this to an 85.27 per cent turnout (International Crisis Group report, 2008 p.7). A senior ECK staff
member was also recorded in a conversation saying that “the discrepancies are planned
systematically and are not accidental….it involves most Commissioners who clearly organized
how the tallying was to be carried out (International Crisis Group: Africa Report N°137 2008
p.7)
Rigging thus appears to have taken place at two stages. One at the constituency level and one
at central ECK level –Nairobi Headquarters. The assignment by ECK commissioners of
returning officers to their provincial strongholds was the first act of fraudent activities. Evidence
showed that some of the chosen returning officers tampered with the vote count and sent to
Nairobi inflated returns for their preferred candidate. The discrepancies between the results and
turnouts of the parliamentary and presidential elections was an example of fraud at the
constituency level. The second form of fraud was witnessed in Nairobi, within the ECK premises
where the results were changed to give Kibaki a 230,000-vote victory. The disappearance of
returning officers in PNU strongholds in particular, and the lack of either stamps or proper
signatures of party agents on the statutory forms presented evidence that fraud may have taken
place through the ECK senior officials. According to a report by International Crisis Group,
senior ECK officials responsible for tallying the results in the main computer rooms changed the
results as they were coming in. Staff members were also coerced to accept and compile the
results without support documentation.
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4.4 The role of DIGITAL Revolution
	
  

The 2007 contest was Kenya’s first election to tap into the digital age. With the spread of
communication through the latest social media –Twitter, Facebook, online blogs and sharing of
images through smartphones, the use of technology was prevalent in the 2007 election. Previous
elections in Kenya 1992, 1997 and 2002 had not experienced anything close to 2007 digital
revolution. This was due to the increase in the proportion of younger voters and also the
advancement of technology in a globalized world. These new forms and spaces of information
technologies facilitated the rapid spread of propaganda as much as “truth”. According to
Cheeseman, so much election-related information was exposed to Kenyan voters, that it became
hard to distinguish facts from fiction (Kagwanja, 2010, p.98). Some of the media space was used
to educate voters about election-related matters such as what political parties stood for, who was
contesting, and on what grounds. The number of media house (both print and electronic) had also
increased significantly compared to Moi’s authoritarian era. Television stations (KTN; NTV;
CITIZEN; K24; KISS TV; FAMILY TV) and print newspapers (The Daily Nation; The Standard
amongst many others) emerged in the new democratic era as independent stations. They
provided a platform for the political parties and candidates to communicate their message to the
electorate. Similarly, they provided a platform for public to communicate their concerns,
opinions, and needs, to the contestants and the ECK.
After the violence broke out, people continued to use these media particularly the internet
and SMS, to coordinate humanitarian relief and also to warn each other of possible attacks. The
Kenyan Diaspora communicated with their families and friends and continued to stay informed
about the developments through the Internet, “smartphones” (for those who had them), and
social networking spaces –Facebook and twitter posts. The ‘digital revolution’ added an
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advantage and made the 2007 election unique to some extent. However, some scholars including
Roger Southall lean more towards the negative contribution of digital revolution than the
positive aspects. Southall stressed that the new information age augmented the negative force of
“ethnicity” or “tribal profiling” rather than neutralizing the existing ethnic animosity (Kagwanja,
2010, p.10). Essentially the battle for votes (pre-election period) and then lives (post-election
period) was fought in cyberspace through the internet, emails and especially text messages
(Kagwanja & Southall p.4) Mobile phones in particular were used to incite and mobilize
unemployed youth gang in slums.
The term ‘hate speech’ is not used in international law. However, it has become widely used
in international spaces for both academic and non-academic work. In my research I use the term
hate speech to refer to offensive expressions (spoken language mostly) that often reflect deeprooted social tensions and attitudes that may be embedded in cultural, religious, linguistic and
ethnic backgrounds. In the case of Kenya, hate speech was used to incite and promote ethnic
violence of groups. It was also used to defame political leaders on the basis of their ideologies
and ethnic backgrounds—the idea of circumcision is an example of such.
The following are some examples of text messages drawn from a study on responses to hate
speech by the Institute for Human Rights and Business in Kenya.
“Fellow Kenyans, the Kikuyus have stolen our children’s future. Hope of removing them
through the ballot has been stolen. We must deal with them the way they understand, violence.
We must dominate them.” (Lafargue, 2009, p.6)
“We say no more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter them right here in
the capital city. For justice, compile a list of Luos and Kalus(ph) [ethnic communities] you know
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at work or in your estates, or elsewhere in Nairobi, plus where and how their children go to
school. We will give you numbers to text this information.” (Lafargue, 2009, p.7)
In an effort to combat hate speech during the post-election violence, the government
attempted to shut down the mobile network operators (which they ultimately did not do-for fear
of breaching democratic rights) but instead, on December 30 2007, the government ordered a
blackout of mainstream media (television, radio and newspapers), which for the most part are
state-owned. Both print and electronic media were blamed for inciting fellow Kenyans and
spreading fear through horrific images of PEV victims.
The Kriegler report stated that the government’s action exacerbated the violence: “Indeed the
information blackout, engrafted onto the ECK’s [Electoral Commission of Kenya] lamentable
failure to keep the people of Kenya informed, could well be seen as a direct link in the chain of
causation that led to the tragedy” (Lafargue, 2009, p.9)
Unfortunately, very few politicians were arrested for contributing either directly or indirectly
to the hate speech in media and social networking spaces. The role of media and digital
revolution was pushed aside without providing accurate statistics on the content and number of
inciting messages that were circulating (Wachanga, 2011, p.33). Such information may have
been used to curb future reoccurrence. A few human rights groups, civil society and NGOs
attempted to conduct “media and hate speech” studies. However, people were cautious about
giving information regarding inciting messages for fear of implicating themselves in the
violence.
During the election violence, ethnic communities used metaphors that portrayed their ethnopolitical enemies in bad light, often referring to their enemies by names other than the ethnic
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name. The Luo became ruriri rwa thamaki (a tribe of fisher folks) and kihii (uncircumcised boys)
to the Kikuyu, for instance. What these radio stations did broadcast was, therefore, a true account
of facts that were not true, but one that were deliberately propagated to serve in the construction
of narratives in the service of particularly premeditated political purposes (Alhberg, 2013, p.8).
Most metaphors used during the Kenyan PEV existed before and had been accepted even as a
rich source of ethnic stereotypical humor (Wachanga, 2011, p.16). They did not have any of the
atavistic undertones they acquired during the electoral period. The context of deployment framed
the meaning and potency of use. There are several Kenyan comedians who have thrived on these
ethnic metaphors. The potency of a metaphor lies in the meaning attributed to it. The meaning is
as fluid and transient as context changes. This not only challenges the notion of metaphors with
determinate meaning, but also problematizes their instrumentalization by the media, in our case
the radio stations. They served as a rallying cry and a call to arms, not because of the totality of
what can be inferred from them, both positive and negative, but their accentuation of differences.
These differences were exploited during the PEV not because of the metaphors but in spite of
them. In other words, the metaphors became (1) substitutes for some other things such as land
and education and (2) an effective vehicle to foreground differences even as they obscured the
real raison d’être of the violence.
4.5 Electoral Violence: A Description
	
  

In December 2007, a dispute over flawed presidential vote count led to street-protest as
Kenyan masses expressed their disagreements over the outcome of the competition. The protest
later matured into the deaths of more than eleven hundred civilians, the large-scale displacement
of people, and threats to the efficacy of the Kenyan state. Notably, the Waki report accused the
Kenyan government for deliberately using militias and security apparatus such as the police and
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general security unit to intimidate or silence the opposition throughout the electoral process- preelection and post-election period (Murunga, 2011, p.39)
Drawing from the literature on PEV, including Godwin Murunga’s article on
“Spontaneous or Premeditated”, there is a clear correlation between the abuse of electoral
processes and the eruption of election-related violence. In his piece, the author correctly argues
that ‘electoral process is an alternative to violence as it is a means of achieving governance.’
However, in the event of manipulation of electoral process such as the 2007 Kenyan elections, it
is clear that the legitimacy of the government is questioned, leading to alternative means of
achieving a legitimate form of political expression. Therefore street protest by youth and slum
dwellers became a means of achieving governance where the ballot box failed. In Kenya,
electoral violence in 2007 was an alternative means of achieving legitimacy.
The existing literature on electoral violence in African states, particularly the recent
Kenyan case, has been very Eurocentric. Some scholars have demonized the continent for its
curse of electoral violence. Arguably, the experience serves to cement the long held afro-‐
pessimist notion that Africa’s soil is not conducive to the growth of democracy.
Elections in Africa are periods during which the stability and security of the state hangs in
balance; as such, it is often the case that elections in the continent are approached with much
trepidation. The literature decries the political fragility of a majority of African states, even those
that have long been considered stable and touted as bastions of peace. Kenya presents a potent
example of an African country that had long painted a picture of relative peace while
camouflaging the political and economic fragility that gradually ate it from within.
Another western school of thought analyses electoral violence in Africa as “an integral
and normalized element” perpetuated by warring factions in order to carry out ethnic cleansing.
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Jeffrey Gentlemen, reported in the New York Times that PEV in Kenya seemed “to have tapped
into an atavistic vein of tribal tension that always lay beneath the surface in Kenya but until now
had not produced widespread mayhem.” In his account of the 2007 events, the writer alludes to
physical violence without addressing the centrality of symbolic violence. This creates the
impression of a darker and bestial Africa. Similar to numerous Eurocentric scholars of electoral
violence, the writer neglects the fact that violence is not simply about ethnicity, instead it is the
ways in which ethnicities relate to political and economic power that explain the nature and
extent of political violence. More correctly, emphasis and focus should be placed on the
interpenetration of historical and current political developments whose origins can be traced to
the early stages of state formation in Kenya.
Contrary to this Eurocentric view, the reports gathered by the Independent Review
Commission (IREC) and the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) have
systematically outlined the state’s capacity to facilitate the proliferation of political violence.
Therefore, the description of violence as “spontaneous ethnic clashes” is a facade considering
that much of the violence was in fact sponsored by the state. Drawing from my own personal
experience as well as my findings from the externship, I will argue that the Kenyan people are
relatively calm and resilient. However, the political class is generally thought to be indirectly
involved in inciting violence as they encouraged non-state actors such as Mungiki and other
youth militia groups to take violent action. This is so because historically politicians have
‘depended on violence to build electoral influence’ (Murunga, 2011, p.18). In the Political
Economy of Kenya, Susanne Mueller agrees that the prevalence of violence in the Kenyan
society is harbored within the politics of the nation wherein the political elite deliberately
integrate ethnic-politicization so as to undermine government institutions. Such ethnicization is
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manifested through the weaknesses of the Electoral Commission, of the administration of the
police, and of the judiciary system. While previous studies have ignored the issue of state
capacity to facilitate, finance, and deploy non-state actors in inciting political violence. I
acknowledge this factor as an integral aspect of the underlying causes of post-election violence.
The literature on PEV identifies three forms of violence: spontaneous,
planned/premeditated, and state-directed violence. In the case of Kenya, all three forms played a
role. I will discuss them in relation to my leading hypothesis. The masses can engage themselves
in spontaneous electoral violence. Spontaneous riots and protests were the first to occur. These
protests were extensive, giving credence to the view that post-election situation was primarily a
social revolt against a state instituted coup d’état. Protests took place immediately after the
announcement of Kibaki’s second five-year term and evoked disaffection with the final tally of
the presidential results. Irregularities of vote tallying was revealed, contested and played out in
the national media which in turned heightened the masses spontaneous eruption. ODM
supporters were outraged that victory was snatched from their leader, Raila Odinga, by ECK
officials through election rigging. Cumulatively, spontaneous protest and violence served to
drive home the point that votes only count when they are counted equally. The pattern of
spontaneous violence was repeated in at least two other provinces. In Western province (with the
exception of Lugari) and Nyanza (excluding Kisii), the initial violence was a direct consequence
of political differences (Murunga, 2010, p. 17) It is not easy to distinguish the spontaneous
protests from the premeditated violence in Nairobi and Rift Valley area, because of the
widespread mix of forms of violence that occurred there. We cannot totally rule out genuine
protest against flawed elections, though these must have been few and overshadowed by
premeditated and state sponsored violence.
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Protestors used random items in sight, including boulders and large equipment’s from
nearby stores to block the roads. While other times they lit up fires on road blocks thereby
damaging the tarmac. This showed sporadic and uncoordinated use of violence. This contrasts
with places in the Rift Valley, where trees were systematically cut down and used to block the
roads. By seeking to cripple government operations, protesters aimed to put the government
under pressure, hoping that leaders will be relented to verify the results.
Violence was sparked off in large measure by the expectations that opposition leader
Raila Odinga would win. The popularity of ODM in most parts of the country compared to the
Party of National Unity (PNU) explains the widespread nature of the protests. It was evident not
just in the lead of presidential campaign, but also in the geographic spread of the ODM
parliamentary and civic representation in Kenya. This popularity translated into an almost
unassailable lead as people anticipated the opposition’s victory.

4.6 The Role of Transition Institutions
	
  

Before the 2007 elections, Kenya was regarded as Africa’s emerging model of peaceful
transition, from a repressive one party state led by a despotic leader for twenty four years, to a
bright future in democracy and development. In order to understand the underlying cause of
violence it is crucial that I revisit the role of institutions such as the Electoral Commission of
Kenya, the civil society groups, the office of the presidency and the judicial system in facilitating
or curbing the occurrence of violence. Throughout my analysis I will be referring to the theory of
institutionalism and democratization in deconstructing the role of electoral institutions. In the
research hypothesis, I assumed that violence was an inevitable result when electoral fraud takes
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place against the backdrop of existing historical marginalization of social groups. In what
follows, I will be testing this hypothesis, through an in-depth discussion of the role of transition
institutions.
As the wave of democratization hit Africa in 1989, many analyst focused attention on the
role of elections as a prominent variable in redefining political order. Elections appeared to be
appropriate benchmark for change in leadership, and even regime, something that was elusive to
African states. The euphoria of multipartysim was part of a global “third wave” of
democratization that swept throughout the continent. Yet, many remained skeptical about its
viability in transforming African authoritarian states into democratic liberal states. It became
clear that the reconstruction of the political order required more than mere elections or hasty
electoral transitions of the 90s. Indeed, many African states resisted the wave of democratization.
Kenya was among those countries. Africa’s kleptocratic regimes understood that there was little
room for corruption, patrimonial clientelism and state violence in a “democratic” space. Political
liberalization signified a total reconstruction of what they were used to. Moi’s repressive regime
sought to escape this transformation. However, external pressure from donors (especially
western countries such as United States, and ex-colonial master –Britain) reinforced the need for
Moi’s government to make the changes. The civil society equally pressed for changes. In the
case of Kenya, it was the influence of the civil society, particularly the lawyers in the Law
Society of Kenya and human rights organizations in conjunction with National Council of
Churches in Kenya (NCCK),10 that ultimately convinced the opposition party to demand for
changes in the constitution (Mwaura & Martinon, 2010, p.42,). According to the civil society,
democracy could only be achieved through constitutional review. Hence it became imperative to
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restructure Moi’s regime (Lafargue, 2009 p.198). After much resistance from KANU’s
government, Moi succumbed to the popular demands in December 1991. The parliament
annulled the one party system and restored multiparty democracy.

African countries adopted three main approaches to consolidate their newly formed
democracy. The first path involved the legalization of opposition parties through an amendment
of the existing constitutional framework. This approach was mainly taken by countries with
strong one-party regimes. Unfortunately, the addition of opposition groups was often fruitless
since they were weak and fragmented. In fact, they only served on “paper” but had little
pragmatic value. The second approach was national constitutional conferences, which served to
re-write part of the constitutional order so as to overthrow the seating government. This approach
was mainly adopted in French-speaking countries such as Benin, Congo Brazaville, and Mali
(Mutua, 2008, p. 16). The model was unable to take root in English speaking countries, like
Kenya. The last model involved managed transitions by military oligarchs who were tired of
years of misrule and lack of political vision to steer the country in the right direction. Nigeria
was among such countries in Africa that used this path. The outcome of the above reforms
depended on the history of the country, the strength of its social forces especially the civil
society and the competing political interest by those in power (Mutua, 2008 p.16).
The debate surrounding the reconstitution of political order in post-colonial African states
became a central argument among reformist movements across the continent in the post-1989
period. The debate was divided into two major camps, those who supported institutionalism
versus anti-intutionalism. Proponents of institutionalism argued that a new democratic
institutions were vital in regaining political order in African states as well as speeding up the
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process of modernization. Institutions were seen as a tool to combat authoritarian neopatrimonial regimes and abolishing widespread impunity and corruption. Most of these
arguments resonated with Samuel Huntington’s piece on Political Order in Changing Societies
(1968). Huntington argued that developing countries such as Kenya could only attain
modernization if they constructed strong institutions and not vise-versa. Otherwise it would lead
to political decay. He compared institutions in the west versus institutions in the non-west and
came to the conclusion that culture and institutionalism are important ingredients in achieving
stability. He claimed that societies deficient in stable and effective government are also deficient
in mutual trust among its citizens both in terms of national and public loyalties, and in the
organization skills and capacity” (Huntington, 1968, p.31) This discrepancy between the West
and non-West, according to Huntington, is due to the lack of institutionalized institutions in nonWestern countries. He writes, “The existence of political institutions…capable of giving
substance to political interests distinguishes politically developed societies [the West] from
underdeveloped ones [non-West]” (Sangmpam, Reader, p. 156).
Similarly, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan also put forth a cultural and institutional
argument stating that “democratic consolidation requires that citizens develop an appreciation for
the core institutions of a democratic political society—political parties, legislatures, elections,
electoral rules, political leadership, and interparty alliances” (Sangmpam, Reader, 214).
In support of this argument, Makau Mutua writes that “the obvious place to start the
process of regenerating the political order is the constitution, the one document that defines the
sum total of the powers of the state, their distribution, and limitations imposed on the
government” (Mutua, 2008, P.17). In Other words, undemocratic or illegitimate state cannot
reconstruct political order unless it revisits the constitution, which is the foundation of legal
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framework in a state. In the case of Kenya, the state resisted a substantial redrafting of the
constitution for fear that it may leave the political class with less powers. In fact, most of the
undemocratic aspects of the constitutions remained intact apart from re-introducing
multipartysim.
Up until 1991, Moi had amended the constitution thirty two times to buttress the
executive branch. The institution of presidency had immense powers in controlling public
resources and in every decision making process, including elections. Because of this, Moi was
still able to use extra-state violence to frustrate democracy and secure his victory in the 92 and
97 “multiparty” elections. According to Kagwanja, KANU’s victory was massively assisted by a
“badly splintered” opposition elite as well as an entrenched culture of impunity relating to
informal violence (2010, p.3). In fact, it was during the era of transitional democracy that Moi
increased the number of urbanized militia groups in various parts of the country. One of the
prominent militia group sponsored by Moi at that time was Jeshi la Mzee (old man’s army) as a
tool to break the wave of constitutional reforms. The militia group was used to diffuse any public
rallies held by opposition groups. As a result, opposition politicians followed suit and equally
recruited their own private militia groups as bodyguards, which in turn contributed to the
breakdown of public order. In short, Kenya’s transition to democracy was filled with violent
upturns. Violence, displacement and dispossession were used to punish communities who did not
support Moi’s rule. By the time Moi stepped down in 2002, Kenya had become a “cesspit” of
numerous militia gangs and “tribal” bandits and myriads of unknown private militia, supporting
both camps (KANU and the opposition groups) (Kagwanja, 2010, p.111). All in all, the
amended constitution proved to be inadequate.
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Despite the change of power from Moi’s regime to Kibaki “democratic” government, the
constitution remained intact. Prior to Kibaki’s victory in 2002, an informal Memorandum of
Understanding was established between the then opposition party (NARC) and Moi’s
government. The aim was to introduce the position of Prime Minister as a viable solution to
moderate the personalized powers of presidency, which had been accumulated by former
President Moi. Once elected, however, Kibaki opted to retain the status quo. Even though MoU11
was not a legally binding document, Kibaki’s action not to abide by its pre-election agreement,
opened the doors for misunderstandings and resentment among political leaders and public at
large. As a result, part of ministers serving NARC government opted to quit the party. This
group was led by Raila Odinga. Kibaki remained unaffected by the move, which in turn had
immense implication in terms of increasing the polarization of politics along ethnic lines
(Republic of Kenya: Waki Commission, 2008, p.30).
Institutionalism may argue that the 2007 elections were, in essence, a reflection of failed
attempts by the power elite to agree on how to devolve power from imperial presidency to a
reformed, but integrated executive (Mutua, 2010, p.17). Thus the “weakening” of state
institutions was a major precipitating factor in the electoral violence of 2007 (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.14). Kibaki’s team was seen to be seeking to “kikuyunise” the state rather than sharing the
fruits of growth (Lafargue, 2009, p.194). Strengthening public institution is crucial in terms of
countering ethnic consciousness and the culture of impunity. According to Jerome Lafarargue,
the civil society led by Lawyers were convinced long before the politicians understood that
institutions did count, and that change would follow suit institutions were built.
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Another institution that was at the center of controversy in the 2007 elections was the
Electoral Commission of Kenya. Throughout the election period one of the major questions was
whether the Commissions was capable of conducting a free and transparent election (Mutua,
2010, p.17). Given that democratization entails ingredients such as frequent elections, free press,
respect for human rights, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and a greater role for civil
society, it was crucial that the ECK in accordance to Article 41 and 42 of Kenyan Constitution
adheres to these rules in its conduct (Ajalu, 2000, p.133). In 2007, the term of office of 22 ECK
commissioners expired before the election date. The constitution stipulated that electoral
commissioners ought to be elected through an official meeting between the president and the
opposition group. However, Kibaki opted not to consult the opposition, and further appointed
five new commissioners, three days prior to the election date (Lafargue, 2009, p.190). Since the
constitution provided the president with exclusive power, the appointment of ECK officials was
seen as his prerogative. With no provision to seek legal redress, the opposition kept quiet.
Because of such arbitrary private appointments, the institution of the electoral commission was
partially responsible from an institutionalist perspective. In the following days, the validity of the
ECK as an institution was constantly questioned, so was the judiciary as an organ of the state.
The Chief Justice was waiting to swear in Kibaki even before the release of the results.
Kenya’s post-election violence was described as a crisis of democratic transformation
that is typically experienced by countries facing a closely contested election or election dispute
(Africa Policy Institute, 2008). During an interview with Professor Anyang Nyong’o on 4th
January 2015, he explained that the PEV in itself was not an ethnic conflict rather it was a
political conflict with ethnic undertones that was caused by state interference in the transparency
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of the election. In our conversation, he referred to the manipulation of ECK by state officials as a
fundamental breach of democratic rule that ultimately contributed to the violence.
The Waki report asserted that the constant and systematic violation of the constitution
may have triggered post electoral violence. The report blamed the subordination of the
independent electoral commission, the police, and the judiciary to the executive power as a
breach of rule of law, since they did not exercise their power as an independent entity.
Proponents of constitutionalism/institutionalism may argue that constitutional vacuity was the
underlying cause of the violence. Lack of a culture of constitutionalism has engendered the
politics of ethno-regional exclusion and negative competition by concentrating immense powers
in the office of the presidency, minimizing public participation, and rendering state institutions
ineffective.
On the other hand, Professor Yash Pal Ghai (2009, p.2) argued that blaming a “bad
constitution” for enormous powers vested in the office of, or illegally appropriated by, the
president; the centralization of power in Nairobi; the lack of public participation; and the lack of
autonomy, effectiveness and legitimacy of state institutions was not the challenge facing Kenya
nor was it responsible for PEV. Enactment of a constitution is distinct from the adherence to its
values, institutions and procedures. A constitution by itself makes no difference. Kenyan society
determines the extent to which the constitution shall be observed, manipulated, or disregarded,
and therefore the extent to which constitutional reforms will have meaning (Ghai, 2009, p.4).
The notion of a constitutional order is broader than merely the text of the constitution. It
represents a fundamental commitment to the principles and procedures of the constitution and
therefore emphasizes behavior, practice, and internalization of norms.
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Going well beyond institutions, proponents of anti-intutionalism argue that “institutions
are created by society-rooted politics,” and therefore the problem lies within the political and
social relations of groups (ethnic, class, religious) rather than institutions themselves. In his
article, “Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions,” Sangmpam argues that ‘new
institutionalism’ is not any different from ‘old institutionalism’ as both “fail to subordinate
institutions to society-rooted politics” (Sangmpam, Reader, 572). Sangmpam then proceeds to
explain how rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism are similar to ‘old
institutionalism.’ By viewing institutions as the problem, one is likely to look for institutions-assolutions.
One of the major institutions that played a role in Kenya’s post-election violence was the
non-governmental organizations (NGO). Given their analytical focus and their application of
social science, most NGO tend to be oriented towards neo-institutionalism. This makes them
carry out studies on institutions which they consider ‘social actors’. Their goal, essentially, is to
suggest changes and if possible improvements which in turn can help the overall functionality of
these institutions (Lafargue, 2009, p.191). However, these institutions do not have a normative
approach; they simply seek to find recommendations. Looking at the post-election violence, their
interest in using such an approach was clear.
According to institutionalists, political parties, which are another example of institutions, are
basically inconsistent in their operation since they act as an election machine only when
activated during campaigns. NGO’s also blamed the ECK for the post-election violence, stating
that it was unreliable insofar as organizing elections (Lafargue, 2009, p.192). In December 2007,
the rigging of elections took place within the space of ECK offices. Another institution blamed
by the NGO is the police force. They cited the autocratic culture of the Kenyan police and their
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lack of professionalism and preparedness in their duties as a major contributor the violence.
Electoral violence according to NGO’s is a matter of general law, which is handled by security
forces.
However, the question debated between proponents of institutionalism and antiinstitutionalism still stands: Are institutions solely responsible for the violence? What about
violence emanating from societal politics? Anti-institutionalists believe that the problem lies
beyond institutions and is rather ingrained in politics of society. In the case of Kenya’s postelection violence, anti-institutionalists have proposed issues of ethnic consciousness, class
struggle among other socio-political factors.
Drawing from my research hypothesis, which correlates higher social marginalization from
political power and state resources to the likelihood of political violence in the event of electoral
fraud, it is clear that institutions are not necessarily the paramount cause of the violence. Instead,
I continue to argue that “weak or lack of institutions” in the case of Kenya’s post-election
violence were merely a by-product of other societal issues stemming from historical
marginalization. These included ethnic animosities, land disputes and general class struggles
among all social class, especially the petty bourgeoisie. Institutions cannot be corrected unless,
existing animosities in society are dealt with. Therefore, reducing the analytical focus to
institutions does not explain the entire crisis, nor will it produce solutions that can eradicate
socio-political problems. There are other states in developing countries that have far weaker
institutions than Kenya, yet they have not succumb to such events. NGOs’ neo-institutionalism
approach assigns too much influence to the law than other social factors. Now I turn to my social
variables, ethnic and class marginalization.
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4.7 Ethnicity and Electoral Violence
I have demonstrated in the previous chapters that Kenya’s history of ethnic politicization
is embedded in its colonial past. Continuity from colonial tactics of ‘divide and rule’ has been
projected in the neo-patrimonial structure of the state as well as in the politics of ethnic identity
in land distribution and ownership. As Charles Hornsby states in his book, Kenya: A History
since Independence, Kenyan politics cannot be understood without understanding Kenyan
ethnicity (Hornsby, 2012, p.1) Ethnicity has played a significant role in telling the story about the
people as communities and their collective behavior. It is not, however (and never was) a
primordial constant, but instead an area of conflict that stems from genuine differences of
languages, culture, and economic interests between peoples living within the boundaries of the
nation-state. This struggle for resources at the center has defined and structured ethnic identities.
In Kenya, a certain form of ethnic conflict has been enduring despite various attempts to build a
national identity. In essence, ethnicity has shaped the political system, and has in turn been
shaped by Kenya’s politicians and the institutions they inhabit. Sometimes this struggle for
national identity has been associated with violence. “The problem of ethnically focused political
violence in Kenya has come to the world attention in 1969, 1991-3 and 2007-8; each time worse
than the last” (Hornsby, 2012, p.2). From the various interviews I have conducted, coupled with
the supporting literature review compiled in this research, I argue that the persistence and
saliency of ethnic violence lies in the land rights, economic disparity, elite survival strategy and
state abuses. In the following analysis of marginalization and electoral violence in Kenya’s 2007
election, I present various cases and scenarios in pre-election and post-election period that
support the argument that ethnic politicization contributed to the violence.
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From the establishment of constituency boundaries through the allocation of Cabinet
posts to employment practices of parastatals and even ethno-coalition political parties, ethnicity
has permeated the Kenyan state. The potency of ethnicity in the Kenyan state can be attributed to
the complex ethnic distribution in which more than 40 ethnic groups, a few larger ones but no
single dominant group favored a system in which coalitions of communities were required in
order to seek and maintain power. Politicization of ethnicity in Kenya’s first parties –KANU,
KADU, the APP, the BPU and NPUA was partly an extension of colonial construction of ethnic
reserves and the majimbo Constitution, but more importantly it was meant to discourage a classbased or national party (Lafargue, 2009, p.187). Kenya’s stunted democracy combined with Mau
Mau war reinforced the need of a political system based on concentrated local support. This
policy ensured that political competition was based on a safer ethnic basis instead of disruptive
class basis where any ‘outsider’ –be it Asian, European or Arab would replace them from the
benefits of Uhuru- a Kenyan metaphor for benefits of independence. Ethnicity is simply a natural
point on which to compete, since politics is intrinsically a contest of national resources and
political power. The older generation of politicians viewed political events through an ethnic
lens. As such, voters will support politicians who they believe will represent their interests, and
the person seen as most likely to do so is someone from the same ethnic community as
themselves. Since 1963, it has proved virtually impossible for anyone “outside or foreign” to
represent a rural community at the parliamentary level. Kenya’s Parliament was poorly designed
to ‘ground’ ethnicity or geographically focused cleavages, especially in multiparty era. Today,
the geographical and, therefore, ethnic bases of wealth is still structured according to Kenyatta’s
neo-patrimonial politics of exclusion. According to 2004 data, 11 of the richest constituencies in
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Kenya were all in Central Province and the top four were found in Kiambu District, which is the
ancestral home of Jommo Kenyatta (Hornsby, 2012, p.803)
The 2007 election campaigns started soon after the 2005 referendum. During this period,
ODM and PNU both underwent characteristic political and ethnic alignments and realignments.
Most Kenyan political parties have been reduced to focusing on the party leader’s ethnic group.
In fact, it is clear from the literature on ethnicity and voting that multiparty democracy has
strengthened the belief that “to be a Luo was to support Odinga; and to be a Kikuyu was to
support a Kikuyu leader such as (Kenyatta, Kibaki or Matiba); to be Kalenjin was to support
Moi” (Hornsby, 2012 p.804).This is true of the post-election results where 94% of Kikuyus
voted for the Kikuyu candidate (Kibaki) and 98% of Luo’s for the Luo candidate (Odinga).
Kalonzo Musyoka, a Kamba, though he had a lesser chance of winning the election compared to
his counter parts with strong voting pull, his ethnic group still backed him up as he received 85
per cent of their votes –Machakos constituency.
Once ethnic cleavages are established, they tend to become self-sustaining. The KikuyuLuo dichotomy did not exist before 1961 (Oginga versus Kenyatta); similarly the KikuyuKalenjin discourse was constructed in the Moi era. These discourses have been transported and
manipulated by elites through ethno-nationalism political ideology to produce a multiplier effect.
Kenya’s new generations have largely consumed these ideologies and demagoguery. Sebastian
Elischer (2008), a researcher for the German Institute and Global Area Studies therefore argues
that ethnicity provides a stronger rallying ground for political activity than party structures. In his
study, he comes to the conclusion that indeed multiparty democracy in Kenya has exacerbated
Kenya’s dominant ethnic cleavages. According to him, Kenya by nature promotes a mono-ethnic
party system wherein the interests of the dominant ethnic group carries the most weight.	
  For
	
  

147	
  

	
  
	
  

example, in the 2007 elections, ODM party was perceived to be Luo dominated because
opposition leader Raila Odinga was a member of Luo community. On the other hand, PNU was
viewed as a Kikuyu party. However, this was not the case. Both parties had members from
various ethnic groups including a sizeable number of followers in Nairobi, the Coast and Rift
Valley province. This is because, when it comes to elections, political parties opt for coalition of
ethno-regional leaders to improve their chances of winning. Taking into account the large ethnic
dispersion in the country, politicians have no choice but to mobilize voters outside their ethnic
bloc. Drawing from the table below, it is clear that both ODM and PNU incorporated this form
of diversity in their respective coalitions of convenience.
Presidential Candidate Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu) -PNU

Raila Odinga (Luo) –ODM

Main Member Parties DP, FORD-K, FORD-P, KANU
LDP, KANU (Ruto)
(Kenyatta/Moi), New Kanu (Biwott)
Influential Figures

Moody Awori (Luhya)
Musikari Kombo (Luhya)
Nicolas Biwott (Kalenjin)
Symon Nyachae (Kisii)

Musalia Mudavadi
(Luhya) William Ruto
(Kalenjin) Charity Ngilu
(Kamba)
Najib Balala (Arab from
Coast)

  
Table  2:  Main  Alliances  in  the  2007  Elections
Source:      Sebastian

Elischer (2008): Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment:
Political Parties and Party Systems in Kenya  

Even though political parties prefer a powerful coalition of ethno-regional leaders, with
alliances at every level, this does not stop them from openly appealing to the parties dominant
ethnic support group. For example, in the run-up to elections, PNU strategist exploited ODM’s
anti-kikuyu rhetoric to prey on ethnic fears of “Mount Kenya Region” communities. PNU
alleged that if ODM won the coming elections it would carry out massive genocide against
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Kikuyu with no less than one million Kikuyu causalities (Kagwanja, 2010, p.116). Often the fear
of domination or extermination, whether based on propaganda or truth, can unite people beyond
their various sub-ethnic differences. An example is Gikuyu, Embu, Meru (GEMA) communities.
As Mount Kenya communities, they took these threats seriously and voted as a bloc for fear of
extermination. Surveys conducted by Synovate in pre-election period showed that Kikuyus were
significantly more concerned about becoming victims of political violence, with 66 per cent
stating that they always or often feared violence (Kagwanja, 2010, p.116).
ODM continued to build its campaign on the anti-kikuyu rhetoric. The subtle appeal to
anti-kikuyu domination was key to reinforcing their support base which was mostly Luo,
Kalenjin, Luhya, and Coastal communities. Using the banner of “forty-one tribes against one” or
“Kenya against kikuyu”, the opposition leader managed to reawaken the resentment of
historically marginalized populations in Kenya from various class and ethnic background. The
Kalenjin saw Odinga as their best chance for revenge against Kibaki’s government. Media and
technology was often used in the battle for ethnic support. ODM circulated a list of senior state
posts held by Kikuyu elite and businessmen in government, particularly in the Treasury, the
Kenya Revenue Authority and the Central Bank (Hornsby, 2012, p.748). To break the antikikuyu rhetoric that was gaining momentum, the government released a list of public service and
parastatal heads so as to dispel this “myth of Kikuyu’ bias. But to Kenyans, ethnicity was not an
imagined frame of reference, but a reality. Many had felt alienated from the state power and
national resources. These groups included minority ethnic groups: KAMATUSA, Mjikenda
communities, Taita, Kamba etcetera. Their regions were not as developed in terms of
infrastructure and agriculture as Central Province. Privatization by political elites and influential
businessmen eroded their chances of access the states resources (see appendix respondent: 5).
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Often in marginalization, ethnicity, class and land (productive force) converge. ODM campaign
highlighted kikuyu domination of government, and the commanding heights of the economy,
including banking and trade, as well as blaming kikuyu success for the marginalization suffered
by the other groups (Chege, 2008, 133).
With the announcement of Kibaki’s victory and the widespread belief that PNU had
rigged the results, protest and violence erupted throughout the country. Initially, the protest was a
non-violent demonstration against the “corrupt” ECK and pro-Kikuyu government. It soon
descended into a mass slaughter and eventually took an ethnic dimension. By January 1st 2008,
text messages with the hashtag (#41on 1) circulated inciting other communities to rise up against
pro-government ethnic groups and mainly against “kikuyu” election rigging (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.115). Over the coming weeks, Luo, Kalenjin, Mijikenda and Masaai men took up arms against
pro-PNU communities in their midst. The Kikuyu were identified as the enemy and described in
Kalenjin vernacular radio station KAAS FM as madodoa. Angry Kalenjin youth translated this
as spotted hyenas that ought to be expelled from the region (Kagwanja, 2010, p.121). Kikuyu
property was vandalized, their crops in the field were torched down and victims were killed
based on their ethnic background. However, the ethnically charged violence mainly affected poor
peasant families, small farmers and traders who fled by foot, bicycle and even handcarts to safety
in internally displaced persons camps (IDP) and church compounds (Kagwanja, 2010, p.120)
Unfortunately, the churches, which were considered to be a safe refuge, became their death trap.
On January 1st 2008, an estimated 200 Kalenjin youth set the Kenya Assemblies of God a church
in Kiambaa, Eldoret on fire, burning alive and beyond recognition more than 35 women, children
and disabled people. Out of the 35 individuals, 28 were Kikuyu (Hornsby, 2012, p.764). This
inhumane act of ethnic violence was not spontaneous, instead it was a premeditated act of
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cleansing organized by Rift Valley leaders. A structured high command was established to
execute the ethnic cleansing and to run training camps for young Kalenjin fighters after taking
their oath –Mumiat (Kagwanja, 2010, p.120).Retired officers trained the youth in combat
techniques, traditional war cries and how to burn and kill. Local security was overwhelmed,
afraid and in some cases divided because of their primordial allegiance to their ethnic group.
Some Kalenjin chiefs and police joined the attacks while some Kikuyu police were forcibly
disarmed by their Kalenjin colleagues.
In Kibera slums supporters of ODM party, took an ethnic perspective of the event. Luo
mobs vented their anger on poor and helpless Kikuyu neighbors who they perceived as PNU
supporters and ‘enemies’. Kikuyu youths in the slum were forced to defend themselves and
mobilize groups take revenge against any non-kikuyu in their residential area. Kibera slum in
Nairobi became the epicenter of the violence, due to its high population density, lack of proper
policing and centrality in political conflict. Kibera was also seen as a stronghold of Odinga since
it was his constituency. Other slum districts of Nairobi with various ethnic groups including Luo
and Kikuyu residents faced similar degree of violence (Mathare, Korogocho, Huruma,
Kariobangi and Dandora). Dozens were killed, and police had to be deployed in large numbers to
separate the warring groups.	
  
In other words, the range of reasons for looting and violence grew as the days wore on
and as the violence escalated from a mostly local to a national phenomenon. Though this had
everything to do with the opportunity provided by the post-election crisis, not all this violence
was planned as murderous acts of ethnic cleansing. In Western, Luo Nyanza and Coast province,
as well as in selected instances in Nairobi, this violence constituted the interface between
spontaneous protest and planned violence. This would also explain why in these places,
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excluding Nairobi, the highest numbers of deaths and injuries were caused by the police, while
citizen-to-citizen deaths were considerably fewer.
In Kisumu, protestors destroyed government owned buildings and looted what was left
including Nakumatt and other mega-grocery stores. Demonstrations, barricades and looting
continued across Nyanza, Rift Valley and other major towns (Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, and
Kisumu). Food shortages worsened. Properties worth billions of shillings were burnt. Many
Asian businessmen fled. The shilling collapsed; foreign tourism virtually ceased, horticulture
exports declined, stock exchange dropped 25 percent and the economy went into a free fall.
Following the reports of the Church incident, tens of thousands of Kikuyu IDPs began pouring
into Central Province -the Kikuyu homeland. Ethnic ‘self-defense’ units in the worst hits areas
became more organized especially in slums where politicians supported youth militia groups and
gangs (Hornsby, 2012 p.765). One of such militia groups was the return of Mungiki. Mungiki,
was initially formed in the 1980s as a resistance group seeking to liberate the Kikuyus from
Moi’s oppressive regime and to spearhead a cultural revival of traditional Kikuyu way of life
(Kagwanja, 2010, p.121). In 2007 post-election violence, Mungiki emerged and operated openly
in urban slums, towns and hot spot areas. On Nairobi-Nakuru highway, Mungiki organized
impromptu checkpoints where passengers in buses and matatus12 were asked to produce their
national identity cards. The cards indicated one’s place of birth and origin, which enabled
Kikuyu militia groups to commit ethnically charged violence on Luo and Kalenjin members by
lynching them (Sunday Nation, 3 February 2008). Media reports claimed that Mungiki was
administering oaths to young men from IDP camps and some parts of Central Province –mostly
among GEMA communities –and dispatching them to Rift Valley for retaliatory violence.
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Mungiki was viewed by some as heroes and as an effective counter against Kalenjin warriors.
However, their linkage to top Kikuyu politicians was constantly implied by various media houses
both locally and internationally. According to Kenya National Human Rights Commission and
the Waki Report, “Mungiki was used by some civil servants, ministers and members of
parliament to fight back against Luo and Kalenjin attacks” ( Kagwanja, p.122). Although the
retaliatory attacks by Mungiki is largely based on speculation, it however points to the critical
role played by the state in instigating violence through ethnicity. However, not all militia’s
groups and youth gangs in the post-election period was made up of Mungiki members. Some
petty criminals took advantage of the chaos to rustle property and land.
Violent reactions to disputed elections, were largely based on “bad” politics, such as
Madodoa and Majimbo policy that were re-introduced in the campaign period 2003-2007 by
both camps. In Kenya, political elites have perfected the cynical manipulation of ethnic emotions
and identities to the detriment of the larger nation (Mutua, 2010, p.189).	
  Political elites
deliberately conflate their interests with those of their ethnic bases through demagoguery and the
worn appeal to “my people”. The diversity of the society and the numerical strengths or
weaknesses of the various groups, including their location relative to the larger national
resources, becomes an important tactical tool used during political campaigns. Elites exacerbate
social cleavages (ethnic, religious, linguistic, gender) because they use their specific cleavages as
props for political power in order to bargain for a piece of the national cake.
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4.8

State  Power,  Class  and  Violence    

	
  
	
  

Mamdani suggests that political power only makes sense when analyzed in the context of
concrete moments of accumulation processes and the struggles shaped by those processes (Ajalu,
2000, p. 149). Thus, the role of state power, class, and violence in the context of Kenya’s PEV
can only be understood through the post-colonial state, its forms of accumulation, the character
of the classes that controlled the state, and, more importantly, how state power has been
mediated politically (ibid, 2000, p.149). This discussion will be partially drawn from my analysis
in chapter three.
In many ways, the post-colonial state is merely a “child” of the colonial state. It imitated
the colonial state in a number of ways. Firstly, the administration and the civil service became a
powerful arm of the executive, which provided the state with legitimacy to enforce laws. The
civil service was endowed with the task of safe-guarding the interest of the colonial state, which
was often equated with the interest of the political elite. In an effort to ensure the survival of the
colonial state, the civil service engendered laws and policies which in turn chocked political
freedom and eliminated any form of threat including the formation of political parties. Secondly,
the colonial state was formed for economic reasons. Kenya’s colonial history supports a form of
class-based society, wherein the state created conditions and policies that privileged the
accumulation of wealth for a small minority –colonial elite. The post-colonial state “inherited”
these two features. The political elite or the petty bourgeoisie became the central actor.
Kenyan political elites viewed themselves as a ‘class’ of their own with a distinct identity
and social economic interest. Unfortunately, the majority of Kenyan workers and peasants
remain ‘excluded’ from political power and state resources. The new elites (petty bourgeoisie)
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inherited similar economic and political structures from the departing colonial administration.
The coercive power encapsulated in the colonial state was later deployed by the post-colonial
state to facilitate the process of primitive accumulation and to maintain law and order. This
process continued to generate inequalities over the years. Post-colonial Kenya was an extremely
stratified society, with a few thousand African, Asia, and European families at the top. A
significant urban middle class, a small working class in urban and rural areas, a growing
underclass of jua kali13 workers, and a large unemployed population considered as a landless
class.
The top class is made up of well-known families of those in power, those favored by the
patron-clientelist network, wealthy businessmen who bought manufacturing industries from
departing Europeans. This top class includes those who replaced the Europeans in the state
offices and state-owned business enterprises, including the Kenyatta family, the family of exCBK Governor Philip Ndegwa, Unilever boss Joe Wanjui, John Michuki (owner of Windsor
Hotel and Golf Club) among others (Hornsby, 2012, p.655). Most of these families were
privileged through the post-independence government, and some were able to acquire large
territories of farmland and ranches from Europeans. The second fraction of state bourgeoisie is
made up of those who made their money in the late 80s and early 90s through Moi’s neopatrimonial state. Despite denying having foreign bank accounts, it was well known that Moi had
several private residencies, investments and businesses along with his proxies such as Nicholas
Biwott. His cronies used his name as a form of authority for their “dirty” transactions (Hornsby,
2012, p.655). The third fraction is made up of Asian business community, who own several
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'Jua kali' can be translated as 'hot sun' in Kiswahili. However it is often used to refer to people
who work metal and wood for a living. However in the recent past, the term is being used to
reflect the poor working class who are immersed in manual labor.
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manufacturing industries and franchises, including Pattni, Somaia and the Shah banking families.
Their close ties with ministers helped them to win government contracts. There is, thus, a close
interrelationship between business, politics, and state power. The wealthiest elites know each
other, school their children together and are in business together. Their struggles to consolidate
resources into their mini-chaebol (family controlled conglomerates) lay the foundation of the
country’s political and class struggle (Hornsby, 2012, p.655).
The application of force has been fundamental to the creation and sustenance of the
colonial and post-colonial state. Even though the military has rarely been deployed on active
service inside Kenya (for several reasons which will not be discussed here), Kenyatta, Moi and
Kibaki’s governments all retained a monopoly on the means of coercion. The bulk of the
coercive force remains within the police, the GSU and the army (see appendix-Firoze). The
reason why the police has always carried out the orders of the government, even in scenarios
where the violence seems unnecessary, is because the interest of the police force and General
Service Unit has been linked with that of politicians. Historically, the government has invested
more resources in the security apparatus than any other sector including education and health
services. Secondly, the patron-client relations have also been extended to the security forces.
Kenyatta, for example, relied heavily on and believed in the importance of security, not only for
his personal protection but also for purposes of development. Kenyatta consistently used the
language of violence during his time in power, and while Moi seemed gentler in words, his deeds
proved to be more brutal, based on statistics gathered on the increase of police torture and extrajudicial killings (Hornsby, 2012, p.798). In short, the political assassinations, the Mwakenya
repression, the abuses of pro-pluralist elites, the clashes and violence against Mungiki, all point
to the fact that the state elite is willing to use force when its interest is at stake. This perception
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has remained ingrained in the Kenyan society. Indeed the state has long been part of the problem.
For that reason, the post-election violence in itself cannot be analyzed without referring to the
country’s history of state violence by the political class for personal accumulation.
State power, as Szeftel (2000) points out, is considered an “engine for development” that
commands power, resources and allegiance. The state becomes the epitome of upward social
mobility (Ajalu, 2000, p.151). For the petty bourgeoisie, their economic fortunes rest heavily on
their ability to access state-power. As a result, political power is sought by all means and
maintained by all means, including violence. Any attempts to democratize the post-colonial state
would obviously threaten the new political class, since stepping down meant that their access to
state-resources would be limited. Thus, it is not surprising that the control of the state or
proximity to those who have access to state-power has been increasingly the main preoccupation for all class strata. As discussed in chapter two and three, it is the state that has the
organizational capacity to create conditions and pursue policies which facilitates the
accumulation of wealth by the political elite. This privilege given to the elite is at the expense of
the popular classes (masses), who are forced to compromise their wealth and resources for the
state elite. This further fuels the struggle because the elite’s wealth is not based on legitimate
reasons. The politics of brutality and violence continue to manifest in different government
activities precisely because the economic mobility and expansion of the new ruling class is
largely tied to continued control of state-power. The Control of the state therefore is so crucial.
True, politics is generally about the control of state-power, and politics in Kenya cannot
be defined based on class relations only. Nevertheless, in countries where there is a convergence
between ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, the tendency is for the state to be the central
economic player. The state in Kenya has rarely used democratic means to distribute resources
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and pacify its people. The Kenyan state has historically pursued unfair policies such as the reAfricanization of land and ethnic-politicization to appropriate disproportionate percentages of
resources for those it favored (individuals or groups), while leaving those entitled (legally)
without any form of compensation. In the long-run, people developed resentments against the
ruling class based on its unfair neo-patrimonial tendencies and use of violence to get its way. The
government uses force either by directly employing the police or indirectly influencing the
decisions of the judicial system, thus making it difficult for the average person to get their rights.
All this supports the instrumentalist concept of the state, where the powers of the state determine
almost every aspect of investment patterns, access to resources and to social rights. In effect, the
state has been driven by a single social class, the petty bourgeoisie in power. Those without state
power and or proximity to anyone who has access to power remain politically insecure about
their rights and protection of property. In his book, Kenyan Capitalism, the State and
Development (1994), David Himbara discusses how the Indian commercial and industrial
capitalists were regarded as foreigners and how their property was arbitrarily confiscated by the
government and appropriated to African as part of re-Africanization policy in the 60s (Himbara,
1994, p.16). In most cases it was the politicians who gained from this transfer. On the other hand,
the Indian business owners were left politically insecure about the future of their assets.
Kenya’s post-colonial history of state power and class can be summed up in three related,
though distinct ways. (1) The dominance of patron-clientelism and the personalization (and
ethnicization) of decision making, (2) corruption and the commercialization of the state, and (3)
the limited capacity of the bureaucracy to execute policy (Hornby, 2012, p. 793) Each of these
are facets which can be used to analyze how state power and class in Kenya’s 2007 election
contributed to the violence. In Kenya, there is little doubt that patron-client politics and
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patronage are present in various spaces. The hierarchical personal relationship (often with ethnic
undertone) cover the private sector, the religious institutions, civil society, the professional
spaces and even the state itself. In the last two or three decades, these personalized clientelist
relationships have become so pervasive and cynical that everything is driven by money and less
on trust-based relationships. Many Kenyans no longer vote for free, and the moral obligation of
the rich towards the poor has weakened. So have the links that once connected the urbanites to
the rural life. The socio-political and economic disparity between these two groups has continued
to grow. Urbanization has created huge, poverty-stricken, violent, lawless and disenfranchised
communities which require urgent attention from the state in order to avoid complete social
collapse (Hornby, 2012, p.794). Instead in Kenya political elites have taken a different approach
to this issue. Political elites seem to profit from such violence. Instead of viewing the disorder as
dysfunction and threat to the state, the state elites in Africa have capitalized and institutionalized
violence for personal gains (ibid, p. 795)
In election periods, a rational pursuit for power induces political elites to tolerate and
even foster violence as an alternative to ballot-box outcomes. Several claims were made by civil
rights groups and various reports by Human Rights Commission, Kriegler and Waki that indeed
the state played a role in facilitating, financing and even deploying state (GSU) and non-state
actors (militia groups) to incite political violence in order to deflect attention from the soaring
class inequalities (Murunga, 2011, p. 22). This argument has been mentioned by some political
science scholars including Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999). They indicated that
African rulers tread a path between “formal and informal structures, bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic forms, statism and statel essness” (Beissinger and Crowford Young, 2002, p.244).
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In other words, non-state political units coexist with more bureaucratic and formal state entities
in order to provide legitimacy to state violence.
Despite these weaknesses, the Kenyan state does not constitute a failed state. Business
functions as usual, rebels do not roam the streets, and tourists still visit the country, among many
other achievements. However, it is true that Kenya is a neo-patrimonial state, in which
bureaucratic processes and norms compete with and coexist with personal authority (Hornsby,
2012, p.796). Today, the Kenyan state faces a systematic lack of trust in the efficiency and
neutrality of its administrative processes, unless there is a private patron-client relationship to
secure that trust. The state no longer has a presumption of impartiality in its decision-making
policies. Instead, all decisions are based on ethnic or personal benefit. In essence, the state is not
seen as an impersonal and partial entity, but rather a coiled mass of interests, harnessed by a
partial bureaucracy towards the wishes of the dominant political thread.
In what follows, I will discuss how state power and class were displayed in the 2007
election period. This analysis will be developed against the backdrop of the discussion above.
According to Susanne Meuller, “Kenyatta could give without taking away, but Moi had to take
away before he could give” (Mueller, 2008, p.188). This is the reason why Moi and his allies
resorted to extra-state violence that had never been experienced before. Moi’s presidency was far
more repressive due to the reduced opportunities for dispensing rewards compared to his
predecessor, Kenyatta. While Kenyatta could reward his followers freely with positions in civil
service and farms “belonging” to departing European settlers, Moi was faced with two major
obstacles. An obstinate Kikuyu political elite who resisted his rule and multiple demands from
his own “tribesmen” –the Kalenjin, and particularly Tugen –his clan members (Kagwanja, 2010,
p.12). While initially Moi opted to reward his followers, this proved to be more complicated. As
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a result, KANU politicians hired and used gangs to kill and displace opponents in key electoral
areas during 1992 and 97 election. The increase in informal violence led to establishment of
“privatized public violence” and ethnic clashes such as the 1997 Likoni incident. Moi was able to
sustain his power through such informal violence. Unfortunately, the urban gangs also preyed on
poor civilians. This was the beginning of the “normalization” of violence. Vigilantes were
operating side by side with the official security forces (Kagwanja, 2010, p.13).
In the case of 2007 elections, violence manifested itself in three inter-related categories
(ibid, p.13). The first was spontaneous violence in ethnically mixed areas such as Nairobi,
Mombasa and Kisumu. The second was organized violence by political elites mainly in the Rift
Valley region, the heart of the land disputes in Kenya (see chapter three). Thirdly, retaliatory
violence that was organized by criminal gangs who carried the resentment of the locals. And
lastly, state violence by security agencies who were accused of indiscriminate killings, rapes and
other human right violation in post-election period. Because of the diffusion of the violence by
various actors, such as urban gangs in slums, militia groups such as (Mungiki and Taliban), the
police, GSU personnel and the masses, the government remained overwhelmed and unable to
contain the violence. As the violence escalated into country-wide killings and demonstrations,
the government proved unable to protect its civilians. The normalization of violence helped to
undermine state institutions, the constitution and the rule of law (Kagwanja, 2010, p.13).
Scholars such as Godwin Murunga (2011) have divided the violence into state
premediated violence, mass premeditated violence, planned violence, mass spontaneous
violence. For the purpose of this argument on state power, class violence I will focus on the first
two categories. The prelude to premeditated violence was characterized by intermediate acts that
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may have been violent but were not necessarily planned in advance. This violence should be
distinguished from planned violence, which involved prior planning and better coordination.
It is in the example of the looting, harassment and theft that the post-election crisis
showed a shift from simple protest to apparently planned criminal acts. Theft and looting were,
however, intimately tied to local political dynamics: in some cases, simple jealousy and petty
rivalries among neighbors were involved, and in others, unemployed youths took advantage of
the lawlessness and disorder to loot property. This resulted in muggings, robbery, vandalism in
peri-urban areas of Kisumu, for instance (see appendix, respondent 8)
Under mass premeditated violence one can correctly argue that violence and looting were
also a consequence of idleness among the youth, who harbored great bitterness at the lack of
opportunities for advancement. This argument also cuts across other marginalized groups such as
ethnic minorities, class and gender inequality. It alludes to historic grievances among the masses
and marginalized sectors that remained unaddressed, culminating into gross dissatisfaction with
the country’s leadership and appropriation of resources. Thus, the masses were waiting for an
opportunity such as the post-election violence to demonstrate their grievances. The targeting of
specific peoples and communities in the urban and rural settings was a manifestation of
premeditated violence.
Premeditation by main political actors took the form of politicians using direct or indirect
form of violence. Indirect form of violence consisted of ideological manipulation, such as hate
speech, ethnic politicization, and class marginalization amongst others. Direct violence consisted
of the brutal use of force carried out by state agents, mainly the Kenya Police, the Administrative
Police and the General Service Unit. In some places, violence was coordinated through the
provincial administration. While the CIPEV Report acquitted the National Security Intelligence
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Service (NSIS) and the army on grounds of their comparative preparedness, diligence and
discipline, it convicted the other police agencies for their failure. The police failed for several
reasons, some related to their inextricable intimacy with the political class in government.
Indeed, it is precisely because of government control of the police that the latter exhibited such
confidence in manipulating the electoral field and interfering with vote tallies. According to
Murunga (2011, p.28), the police preferred to react through force rather than prevent the
occurrence of crimes, which is a direct reflection of the Kenyan post-colonial state. Both in the
manner of their deployment and in the functions they were assigned, the Administrative Police
and Kenya Police were meant to facilitate the defeat of the democratic process by tilting the
electoral playing field and, if necessary, forcing a result that favored Kibaki.
The police bear the greatest responsibility for deaths, with 405 dying from gunshots.
They mainly targeted Luo Nyanza, where 79.5% of deaths were from gunshots, followed by
Western province (72.5%), Rift Valley (26%) and Nairobi (18.4%). The Kenyan Human Rights
Commission (2001) estimates that state-sponsored or state condoned violence killed 4,000
people and displaced 600,000 others over the period 1991-2001 (Murunga, 2011, p.31). Much of
this violence was sponsored in the Rift Valley and in urban areas, especially in Nairobi where the
opposition held sway since 1992. Besides that, numerous studies on democracy and electoral
violence in Africa have shown that elections tend to be city matters because most institutions are
located within the urban areas. Moreover, studies have also indicated that information tends to
circulate more within the major urban cities like Nairobi as opposed to smaller country towns.
This explains the relatively larger share of state-elite sponsored violence in times of election in
places like Nairobi.
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Apart from the use of the police, another form of state premeditated violence is the
recruiting and sponsoring of ‘tribal militias’ and gangs so as to terrorize and instigate ethnic and
sexual violence. Political elites have coordinated with local gangs to suppress opposition
political-parties for their own political gain
Another cause of resentment and discontent among the lower classes in Kenya is the
recurrence of grand corruption scandals. According to Kenyan anti-corruption commission, the
country has been plagued with endemic corruption at the state level. Corruption is manifested
through various forms including petty bribery and grand fraud. The embezzlement of billions of
Kenyan shillings over the past two decades have fuelled the tensions among the rulers and the
ruled. Most of the scandals were never resolved due to partiality in the justice system. The result
has been giving leeway to those in power to amass public resources at the expense of the poor.
Grand corruption scandals contributed to the post-election violence in 2007. This is because the
popular classes felt alienated and marginalized from mainstream political and economic
opportunities. The widening gap between the rich and the poor is perceived as a form of
symbolic structural violence (Nyawalao et.al. 2010, p.96). Furthermore, the inability of the
judicial system to fairly try political elites who are suspected for such crimes has fostered mass
uprising against the government and its arms. This has led to the resentment that has sometimes
spawned violent conflicts in regions and the nation at large. A vivid example was the 2007 PEV.
Therefore, class disparity and poor economic prospects especially for the youth, was an
underlying cause of post-election violence.
In conclusion, electoral violence may be ignited by a disputed election but its root causes
lie in the historical marginalization and exclusion of classes. The state is the “ultimate prize”,
and access to it will guarantee both the leader, his family and petty bourgeois associates a chance
	
  

164	
  

	
  
	
  

to access “unlimited” economic resources. In the words of Hornsby, “money is power and power
is money” (2012, p.816).The political elites have confirmed this perception by using all means to
retain power, including through foul means if necessary. Having the control of resources, popular
forces, and of an entire country or constituency makes political elites obsessed with maintaining
this position. This obsession over control has been decisive in keeping politicians in power
irrespective of their contribution to the national project. According to Makau Mutua, the only
solution against state power abuse and excess “freedom” of political class is forging a strong
civil society to put checks and balances. In response, Godwin Murunga has challenged this
recommendation. He argued that civil society also faces challenges of internal fragmentation and
issues of transparency and accountability (Murunga, 2011, p. 48).
I discussed the consolidation of power among the petty bourgeoisie, and the mini-chaebol
families that often have connections to the political elites. They accumulate massive wealth at
the expense of the underclass. The disparity between those who are included in political power
and those that are excluded from political power and state resources causes friction and
resentment. In the long run, people revolt against the state for using policies that create class
divisions and exclusions that favor certain groups. In the case of 2007 elections, where
competition was stiff and the stakes were high due to convergence of various factors including
ethnic animosity and popular struggle for power, violence became a reality.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAN- AFRICANISM
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The causes of the 2007 post-election violence are complex, multiple, and inter-related.
The objective of this study was to examine the underlying causes of the post-election violence
rather than to focus on the immediate triggers such as electoral rigging and electoral fraud. The
study is guided by my research hypothesis which states that “in the event of electoral fraud, the
higher the social marginalization of those excluded from political power and national resources,
the more likely electoral violence will erupt and will be generalized.” I have argued that electoral
violence was not merely a spontaneous independent event; nor was it an irrational display of
barbarism by “tribal Africans” as implied in Eurocentric scholarship. The violence in Kenya was
indeed atrocious; it was not, however, based on unfounded “savagery.”
The polarization between Orange Democratic Movement and Party of National Unity
magnified the nature and complexity of the violence. Those who supported the ODM campaign
argued that PEV was due to electoral rigging. Taking an institutionalist approach they simplified
the entire violence based on failures of institutions as the Electoral Commission of Kenya and
the state security apparatus –the police, General Service Unit (GSU), and the judiciary. To be
sure, some arguments can be made in favor of an institutional argument. The nature and the
magnitude of the violence revealed that the crisis was exacerbated by the dispute over the elite
control of power and the skewed nature of the post-colonial democratic state. For this reason,
there is an urgent need to draw up a new constitution and ultimately renegotiate the terms of
mass involvement in the decision-making process. Central to this argument is the need to reassert
the basic democratic rights of citizenship for all Kenyans (Kagwanja, 2010, p.18). This includes
(1) the right to change the government through a free and fair election; (2) the entitlement of all
Kenyans to own property and to vote as they deem fit, irrespective of where they are
geographical located; (3) the outlawing of hate-speech and false propaganda against any social
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group. However, from my analysis institutional explanations and solutions fail to address the
underlying causes of the post-election violence.
The post-election violence was a direct reflection of the historically dysfunctional
political relationships and structural weaknesses that gradually contributed to the existing
animosities and resentment among social groups. These historically socio-political dysfunctions
can be traced back to colonial rule, which provided the material as well as the political and
ideological base of what is now called “tribalism”.
In this study, the concept of marginalization is situated within two pertinent variables,
namely ethnic politicization and class relations. Ethnicity, which is a symbol of identity, and
class materialism, which entails social status, evolved to become very effective tools for colonial
and post-colonial domination and exploitation. Just as the divisive politics of negative ethnicity
and class relations made it easy for the colonialists to achieve their aim of exploiting the colony
to serve the capitalistic interests of their home country, after independence the same system
mutated itself and had the African elite continue using ethnicity and class marginalization as
means of maintaining the hegemonic and exploitative status quo.
A number of political commentators, particularly Western media such as the Guardian
and The Wall Street Journal, have been quick to play the ethnic card as the key factor that
explains why Raila Odinga’s “Luo” and Mwai Kibaki’s “Kikuyu” were at each other’s throat.
However, the 2007 post-election violence was not just an ethnic conflict between two of the
largest tribal opposing factions. The political crisis involved numerous ethnic groups, including
geographically marginalized communities such as Turkana, the Masaai and even Coastal
“tribes.”
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On the other hand, for some political analysts, the cause of the violence was not ethnicpoliticization; instead it was a long simmering history of glaring poverty and despair, which had
now reached its boiling point with a more informed generation of young Kenyans” (Lafargue,
2009, p.179). The violence took place against the background of population growth, a greater
disparity in class inequality and youth underemployment. In other words, the divide occurred
between the political elites and the ordinary citizens, the inequalities between those who could
afford a roof over their heads and those who had been dispossessed. However, for most political
commentators as well as the participants in this study, the PEV proved to be more complicated
than simply reducing it to lack of employment and poverty elevation. For many the violence
represented multiple and interrelated issues that were intricately interwoven throughout the
legacy of colonial rule and the post-independence period. These factors were mainly land,
ethnicity and class relations (see appendix: respondent 9).
Therefore, I have argued in this study that Kenya’s fragmented political elite resorted to
manipulating the genuine economic grievances and the glaring ethnic polarization to ultimately
win the vote of “marginalized communities.” In effect, these political differences among elites
led to the polarization along two broad contours: ODM versus PNU. It is because of the tools
used by both political camps to scramble for the support of the dominant ethnic groups (Kikuyu,
Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya) that the 2007 election turned into a high-risk election and probably the
most narrowly contested election in Kenya’s history. As discussed in chapter four, ODM built on
majimbo policy to win the support of seemingly marginalized groups such as Kalenjin and Luo.
They attributed the Kikuyu economic edge over other Kenyan groups to the political patronage
of Kenya’s first president –Jomo Kenyatta. By highlighting the domination of Kikuyu’s in key
economic areas –banking, government, commercial farming, and most importantly land
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ownership, they were able to reignite the existing ethnic animosities that were constructed by
British colonizers through their “divide and rule” policy that was later adopted by post-colonial
authoritarian regimes.
In her book, Writing and Speaking from the Heart of Mind (2012), Micere Mugo,
captures this argument well and further proposes solutions. She states that ethnic cultural
differences are not the basic cause of ethnic conflict, rather the divisive ethno-political agenda
set by those in power (Mugo, 2012, p.151). Such divisiveness facilitates false consciousness
based on geographical affinities and dismal of “other” cultural beings. Communities easily
become targets to this form of elite-based manipulation because of their “perpetual state of
wretched poverty” which they are subjected to. In this argument, the intersection between ethnicpoliticization and class relations becomes a constant reality that can lead to conflict, if not
addressed. Using a Pan-Africanist approach, Mugo suggests that what is needed is “true
conscientization”, which will enable the masses to come together as a collective group with a
common culture to overcome economic deprivation. In other words, people need to constitute
new “ethnicities” based on common history of economic struggle. This can be done by active
psychological remapping of the Africana people (ibid, 2012, p.152). She also acknowledges the
importance of activating regional unities, communities and economic federation that may
weaken ethnocentrism.
Land ownership is ranked high in Kenya’s socio-economic priorities. Most Kenyans
aspire to have land because it presents a vital link to their “primordial” identity, wealth, welfare
and status. Throughout this study, land was discussed hand-in-hand with the post-independence
construction of ethnically based patronage. It was also discussed through class formation. The
resettlement program had a class dimension in terms of those with capital being able to
	
  

169	
  

	
  
	
  

accumulate more land at the expense of the “landless” class. The goal of resettling the
indigenous communities through re-Africanization policy was thus defeated from the outset,
translating into a basis for ethnic conflict (Kagwanja, p.2010, p.82). The landed elite took control
of both the politics and economy of “white highlands” and used violence to deflect attention
from the injustices they committed. The existence of historical injustices relating to the access,
ownership and use of land is central to the debate on historical marginalization and electoral
violence in Kenya. In fact, it is through the colonial land alienation and dispossession that class
disparity and ethnic animosity was built on in the post-colonial period. The class aspect of the
land question has a role in deepening conflicts. Yet, the past governments were not able to find
any viable solution to this problem. These factors provided fodder to the political elite during the
2007 campaigns. Even after the 2007 electoral violence, the coalition government failed to
address the land question.
The reinvention of migration and acquisition of land in key political and geographical
areas such as Rift Valley, Central Kenya and Coast Province provided the opposition party with
an ideological base on which to construct the “forty-one against one” rhetoric. This background
enabled the opposition group at the time to create an impression that the “Kikuyu had set
themselves up for resentment and retaliation” in what transpired in the 2007 elections
(Kagwanja, 2010, p.13). Yet, this was far from the truth. Most of the victims of the post-election
violence were poor families, particular Kikuyu IDP who were deposed of their land in Rift
Valley; land which they were legally given by the government as a form of compensation for the
land they lost in central province (their ancestral home) to wealthy political elites, European
settlers and multinational corporations. In the end, majimboism set the stage for divisive binaries
of natives vs. settlers, and indigenous vs. foreigners. Such rhetoric elevated the notion of ethnic
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citizenship over civic citizenship. Those who were regarded as foreigners were stripped of their
rights, thus setting up retaliatory violence and ultimately widespread chaos throughout the
country which, in turn, led to displacement of communities. In my opinion, the danger of
violence is likely to diminish when politicians set policies that promote common interest rather
than “insider” and “outsider” rhetoric.
All regimes, Kenyatta’s tenure (1963-1978), Moi's single party era (1968-1992), Moi’s
multiparty era (1992-2002), and Kibaki’s era (2002-2007), demonstrated the role of state power
and class in the decision-making process, and the growth of armed militia associated with
politicians, particularly in Moi’s repressive era. The centralization of power within the
presidential office was one of the major contributors to the post-election violence. According to
the Waki Commission, the personalization of power around the presidency intensified the belief
among Kenyans that it is essential for the ethnic group from which they derive to win the
presidency so as to guarantee access to state resources. The Kriegler Commission on the other
hand, cited as one of the major contributors of the violence the proliferation of violence by an
armed militia, often with political connections (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p.66). The
normalization of violence –during the electoral period and every day – was used to justify the
generalization of violence nationwide.
If social marginalization from political power and national resources as claimed in the
hypothesis was an underlying cause of PEV, why was the bulk of the violence experienced in
non-marginalized areas such as the capital city and other major towns where the distribution of
national resources appears to be more “equitable”? There are several proposed answers to this
question. Stephan Dercon and Roxana Romero suggested two explanations that may offer the
primary connections to electoral violence. The first explanation is that people who had land
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disputes were more likely to be involved in post-electoral violence (Dercon & Roxana, 2012,
p.44). In other words, people who had land disputes prior to the elections were more likely to
have been affected by PEV either as the ones instigating the violence or as victims of the
violence. This explanation suggests that violence could have taken place in any part of the
country where communities or individuals felt aggrieved from land disputes but not necessarily
where social marginalization was highest. The five main provinces where land disputes were
historically high include Nyanza, Rift Valley, Western, Coast and Central Province, where the
city of Nairobi lies. Land disputes may lead to electoral violence through the role played by
politicians. In his article, “Electoral Geography and Conflict,” Kimuli Kasara argues that
politicians provoke violence where there is inequality between groups in order to displace their
opponents from some areas (Kasara, 2014, p. 29). Rift Valley’s history as one of Kenya’s most
fertile regions that has been characterized by historical injustice of land distribution made it a
hotspot for the 2007 conflict.
The second explanation is that people living in areas where politically connected gangs
operated were more likely to be victims of post-electoral violence. The rationale is that political
elites aim to suppress opposition political parties by recruiting and sponsoring “tribal militias”
and gangs so as to terrorize the populace and instigate ethnic violence. These gangs were ready
to instigate violence, thus increasing the chances for people to become victims in areas where
these gangs operated. Since the 1990s these gangs have operated in urban areas, particularly in
Kibera slums in Nairobi.
Numerous studies on democracy and electoral violence in Africa provide the third
explanation. They have shown that elections tend to be city matters because most institutions are
located within the urban areas. These studies have also indicated that information tends to
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circulate more within the major cities like Nairobi as opposed to smaller country towns. In this
regard, younger voters supported the opposition party ODM which campaigned under the banner
of “change”. The Kenyan urban youth are regarded as one of the major stakeholders because of
their numbers, their lack of employment opportunities, and because they were barred from
peaceful protest, which compelled them to seek violent measures in PEV.
These explanations do not, however, invalidate the role played by ethnic and class
marginalization. They only confirm my hypothesis. In fertile and not materialized marginalized
areas such as Rift Valley, ethnic polarization and marginalization led to electoral violence. In
other less marginalized areas such as Nairobi, a mixture of poverty, class and ethnic
marginalization were triggers of electoral violence as well. Electoral violence in nonmarginalized areas is linked to poverty, a proxy of relative deprivation and grievance. Indeed,
scholars have argued that poverty motivates people to be violent. Scholars of African politics
have argued that grievances in terms of resource deprivation and poverty can lead to rebellion,
protest and civil conflict. Proponents of class analysis have delineated the close connection
between the marginalization of some classes and the way the distribution of resources takes
place.
Drawing from various literary sources and interviews I conducted, I would argue the
post-election violence was not simply an expression of ethnic rivalry for power but rather a
product of rising expectations due to the increase in democratic space at the time. These rising
expectations were fed by opinion polls and surveys consumed around the country during the
campaign and election period. Also, the spread of communication technology, or the “digital
revolution” played a crucial role in the 2007 election. Above all, however, the PEV was fueled
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by the exclusion of certain ethnic and class groups from political and economic resources. In the
event of electoral fraud such as occurred 2007 election, this exclusion inevitably causes violence.
Lessons for Pan-Africanism
The violence that followed Kenya’s 2007 general election caught many by surprise,
because Kenyan’s democracy was viewed as the most successful in the region, especially after
the smooth political transition in 2002. It also marked the end of Kenya’s regional uniqueness,
the deceptive era of normalcy and civility that had differentiated it from neighboring countries.
Apart from Tanzania, Kenya was the only country in East Africa that had not undergone a major
armed conflict. The international community as well as the civil society missed several warning
signs that could have been used to prevent the magnitude of the violence. Instead they were
lulled by the relative peace of 2002 election and 2005 referendum.
The 2007 Kenyan crisis, alongside the case of Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire, creates a
dangerous precedent for other African countries. An incumbent government or an opposition
party that is unwilling to accept defeat (in a situation in which they clearly lost) can foment
immense violence. While power sharing has become an attractive alternative method to avoiding
violence and gross human rights violations, I believe that solution is merely a short-term answer
to a long-term problem. Providing this option allows the incumbent to rely on coercion to resist
democracy. On the other hand, it sends the message that “losers” merely need to refuse the
electoral outcome by resorting to unconstitutional and violent actions. As a pan-Africanist, I
argue against the notion of power sharing. The key is to change the zero-sum quality of elections
so that politicians do not resort to an appeal to ethnicity and use of violence against their
opponents. Because politicians and political parties are driven by the desire to acquire access to
state resources and patronage, they make elections a do or die zero-sum exercise. If elites cannot
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find a means of ruling without viewing everything through the lens of corruption, ethnicity and
class self-interest, then the situation is likely to recur. Whilst reforming the electoral system and
changing the rules of the political game seem crucial, the efforts will be fruitless unless the
supporting state institutions are also reformed. These include state-owned media, the judiciary,
the police, and the security agencies, which is far more easily stated than achieved, especially in
the face of political resistance. Of course, these reforms will not take root unless the mentality
for making political calculations changes from that of playing an exclusive zero-sum game to
that of embracing proportionality and consolidation of democratic rule.
In the case of Kenya, it is worth noting that the dispute over election results was never
resolved. Each camp believed it was right, and each camp wanted to belong to the winning side.
Yet, the institutions that were responsible for establishing the “victor” are not able to confirm
who really won the elections. The chair of ECK, Samuel Kivuitu, acknowledged in a press
meeting that he does not “know if Kibaki won the elections.” This provided a stronger reason for
people to protest against the government and its institutions. The Kriegler Commission reported
in 2008 that “the conduct of the 2007 elections was materially defective and that it is impossible
–for IREC or any other agency –to establish true or reliable results for both presidential and
parliamentary elections” (Kagwanja, 2010, p.109).
The Kenyan mediation process generated a number of lessons that are valuable for the
Pan-African world at large. The first lesson is that intervention matters but the speed of
intervening is even more important (Kathina, 2010, p.164). Dealing with protracted electoral
disputes tends to be more complicated and difficult to resolve. Secondly, the character of the
mediating team is also crucial. In the case of Kenya, the mediators embodied expansive
experience, expertise, network and mediation skills to address the myriad issues. In fact, both
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leaders were able to come to the negotiating table because they had confidence in the mediation
team.
But, external efforts to mediate the Kenyan crisis still faced major obstacles. Proud
Kenyan politicians saw Kenya as an exceptional state in the region. The incumbent president
believed that the issue could be resolved through the use of security forces. Kenya has
historically taken the role of mediator in most regional conflicts, including Sudan, Somalia and
even Uganda with regard to the LRC. Thus, it associated mediation enterprises with failed states.
Accepting the intervention of outside mediators meant that the sovereignty of the country was at
stake. The idea behind an AU promoted mediation was to find African solutions to African
problems; rather than seeking Western institutions that often categorized African leaders as
violators of human rights. The Annan mediation team signaled Africa’s determination to assume
a proactive role in finding viable solutions to maintain stability and democracy in the region
(Kagwanja, 2010, p.170). Besides that, it also elevated the perception of Africans in the
international community as a collective entity that seeks to uphold its dignity and to promote
unity in the continent and Pan-Africanism. In essence, this was an example of Ubuntu.
The analysis suggests a number of solutions or proposals for the Pan-African world. The
first lesson concerns the institutions of recourse. The Kenyan crisis showed that regional
institutions for “conflict” resolutions ought to be strengthened and promoted throughout the
continent. The crisis underscored the importance of stable states as the foundational pillars for
regionalism, security, prosperity and identity. An aspect of this institutional strengthening is the
human rights of citizens in a country like Kenya. Given that what happened in Kenya has been
repeated in other countries in Africa, human rights becomes a fundamental issue that Pan
Africanists need to address. The analysis has shown that both ethnic and class marginalization
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and the inability to respect the institutional principles were at the basis of gross human rights
violations in Kenya. In order to avoid such violations in other countries in Africa, there is a need
to reinforce African Union’s Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The analysis also suggests that Kenya’s history of ethnic and class marginalization has
been at the root of the violence that took place in 2007 and before then. The lesson for PanAfricanism is that these two causes, be it in Kenya or other parts of Africa, need to be addressed
institutionally. Given that both ethnic and class marginalization formed around the state, the
institutional solution consists of decreasing the enormous power in the hands of the holders of
state power. One way of doing this is to increase the potential power of the lower classes and
ethnic minorities’ vis-à-vis the state and those who hold power. The Kenyan case has proved that
doing so at the individual state level is not necessarily feasible. Moreover, attempts to do so have
been very often frustrated by the power holders. For this reason, the institutional way of
preventing ethnic and class marginalization at the state level is to make it applicable to all the
African countries. Once again, the institutional outlet is the African Union. I suggest that the
intercontinental organization create an organ through which African underclass and ethnic
minorities can find redress for their grievances against the behaviors of their states that might
precipitate violent outburst.
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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Where were you during the post-election violence in 2007?
2. Did your location at the time of the post-election violence color your perception of the
event? If so, how?
3. Have you discussed or written any material regarding the post-election violence in 2007?
4. According to you, what made the 2007 general election unique/different from prior
elections (1992, 1997, and 2002)?
5. In your opinion what may have been the underlying cause of the Post-election violence?
6. Regardless of your answer to question 5, would you say electoral fraud played a role or
was contributing factor to the post-election violence? If so, how?
7. In the event that electoral fraud did not occur, do you think political violence of the same
magnitude would have occurred? (Explain)
8. Would you say that the Kenyan state provides the conditions for socio-economic and
political marginalization of some groups in society to take root?
9. Regardless of your answer to question 5, would you say that the marginalization of some
groups in society may have contributed to the post-election violence? If so, how?
10. Regardless of your answer to question 5, would you say that the Kenyan ethnic relations
played a role in post-election violence? If so, how?
11. Regardless of your answer in question 5, what role do you think the new democratic
institutional framework played in the post-election violence?
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